(concurring) — I concur in affirming the judgment but on a different ground. I would hold that once the arbitration award has been confirmed and reduced to judgment pursuant to RCW 7.04.1508 that the award is no longer subject to vacation pursuant to RCW 7.04.160.9
*378An arbitration award that is confirmed pursuant to RCW 7.04.150 is entered as a judgment of the court10 and "has the same force and effect, in all respects as, and is subject to all the provisions of law relating to" any other civil judgment. RCW 7.04.210. (Italics mine.) The majority rule creates a judgment unlike any other in that it creates the anomaly of permitting, in effect, an appeal from a judgment more than 30 days after it has become final. After confirmation of the award, not only is the judgment creditor entitled to institute garnishment or execution proceedings but third parties, such as title companies and credit bureaus, are entitled to rely on the unappealed judgment.11 I find that the majority's result is inconsistent with the policy of the finality and integrity of judgments.12
*379I see no reason to believe that the Legislature intended this unique exception to the normal rules governing the modification and amendment of judgments. Indeed, it is arguable, although not argued, that the majority's interpretation of RCW 7.04.160 results in an encroachment on the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court. As interpreted it is, if not in conflict with, at least inconsistent with the civil rules as to judgments including: CR 59 new trial, reconsideration and amendment of judgments, CR 60, relief from judgment or order, and RAP 5.2, time allowed to file notice. Such a result is not required by the language of the statute and should be avoided.
I see no unfairness to Martin, or other parties to an arbitration, to require that when notified of the application for confirmation he should make any objections to the arbitration process to the court.13 At that time he should be aware of any defects in the award process. If he has a reasonable basis to seek more time to develop his objections, RCW 7.04.180 specifically authorizes a stay of proceedings on a motion to confirm. While I concede this provision is not in and of itself decisive, nonetheless, it is hard to understand why it was placed there except to insure the other party an opportunity to make known his objections to the award process.
The policy of RCW 7.04 is to foster and implement the arbitration process as a more flexible, informal and economical way for parties to resolve their disputes.
The 1-year period for the confirmation of an award and the unusually long 90-day period to move for vacation of the award appear to be designed to give the parties ample time to implement any such award or, indeed, perhaps modify some aspects of it by mutual agreement without recourse to the courts. It is desirable to provide every opportunity to complete the resolution of the dispute without court intervention recognizing that this may often be done without the partici*380pation of lawyers. However, once a party has sought confirmation of the award, thus invoking the court's authority, the procedure should insure that such confirmation is proper and represents the final adjudication of the rights of the parties with all the normal consequences of a formal judgment. This purpose is achieved by requiring that the party objecting to confirmation based on RCW 7.04.160 to present the objection to the court prior to and not subsequent to confirmation.
"At any time within one year after the award is made, unless the parties shall extend the time in writing, any party to the arbitration may apply to the court for an order confirming the award, and the court shall grant such an order unless the award is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or is vacated, modified, or corrected, as provided in RCW 7.04.160 and 7.04.170. Notice in writing of the motion must be served upon the adverse party, or his attorney, five days before the hearing thereof. The validity of an award, otherwise valid, shall not be affected by the fact that no motion is made to confirm it."
"In any of the following cases the court shall after notice and hearing make an order vacating the award, upon the application of any party to the arbitration:
*378"(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means.
"(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators or any of them.
"(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct, in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior, by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
"(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
"(5) If there was no valid submission or arbitration agreement and the proceeding was instituted without either serving a notice of intention to arbitrate, as provided in RCW 7.04.060, or without serving a motion to compel arbitration, as provided in RCW 7.04.040(1).
"An award shall not be vacated upon any of the grounds set forth under subdivisions (1) to (4), inclusive, unless the court is satisfied that substantial rights of the parties were prejudiced thereby.
"Where an award is vacated, the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing either before the same arbitrators or before new arbitrators to be chosen in the manner provided in the agreement for the selection of the original arbitrators and any provision limiting the time in which the arbitrators may make a decision shall be deemed applicable to the new arbitration and to commence from the date of the court's order."
RCW 7.04.190.
The purpose of confirmation of an award is to give the award the status of a judgment in a civil suit so as to render it enforceable like any other judgment. See Trollope v. Jeffries, 55 Cal. App. 3d 816, 128 Cal. Rptr. 115, 120 (1976).
See 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 4 (1975). See also International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 969 v. Babcock & Wilcox, 826 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1987).
This is a reasonable interpretation since an objection to an order of confirmation is considered a motion to vacate. See, e.g., Thriftimart, Inc. v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 2d 421, 21 Cal. Rptr. 19 (1962).