dissenting: The purpose of the statute in question (K. S. A. 21-3503) is to proscribe sexual molestation of a child. The offense is labeled “indecent liberties with a child” which is defined as the fondling or touching of the person of either the child or the offender with the intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either. The thrust of the majority opinion appears to be that the deletion of the words “lewd” and “sex organs” from the statute as finally enacted results in unconstitutional vagueness. I cannot agree. The basis of the offense is touching, coupled with intent prompted by a sexual urge. The word “lewd” adds nothing. If the touching or fondling is done without the requisite intent it is not lewd; conversely, if done with such intent it would be lewd. In the context of the statute — as drawn — the addition of “lewd” only results in redundancy.
Included within the purpose of the statute is the proscription of the touching whether it be sexual organs or some other part of the body of the person of either the child or the offender. It seems to me that the ordinary person is clearly warned that the touching or fondling of a child or the inducement of the child to touch the offender, with the intent to arouse either sexually, is impermissible conduct. The establishment of such intent necessarily requires a showing *72that the act of touching or fondling be lewd, lascivious, or indecent as distinguished from an innocent touching such as an affectionate pat on the head or shoulder. The intent proscribed by the statute stems from sexual urge while the innocent expression of affection is the result of platonic motivation. The intent requirement, when read in the light of the statute as a whole, is sufficiently precise to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct, if sexually motivated, is forbidden and, thus, the requirement of constitutional certainty is satisfied.
Courts of other jurisdictions in considering similar, though not identical language, have reached the same conclusion. (See, People v. Polk, 10 Ill. App. 3d 408, 294 N. E. 2d 113; State v. Minns, 80 N. M. 269, 454 P. 2d 355; and Martin v. State, 245 Ind. 224, 194 N. E. 2d 721.)
Most crimes embody the element of intent, difficulty in the proof thereof is not determinative of the constitutionality of the criminal statute involved. It is only necessary that the intent proscribed by the statue be proved.
In my view the judgment below should be reversed.
Fromme, J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.