dissenting: The law of Kansas as it relates to the power of eminent domain, which heretofore could only be *746exercised by virtue of legislative enactment giving specific authorization, has now yielded to change in favor of the public interest.
The law of eminent domain as applied to the statutes material herein, and as it has been construed for the past 30 years, is correctly stated and applied to the facts in this school condemnation case in the opinion written by Mr. Justice Fromme, sitting on the Court of Appeals, in Board of Education of U.S.D. 512 v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 888, 636 P.2d 802 (1981). The Supreme Court granted a Petition for Review. As a preliminary to further discussion, I incorporate the Court of Appeals opinion herein and fully endorse it as a part of my dissenting opinion.
Normally, statutes granting the right of eminent domain should never be enlarged by implication. Strain v. Cities Service Gas Co., 148 Kan. 393, 83 P.2d 124 (1938); Sutton v. Frazier, 183 Kan. 33, 40, 325 P.2d 338 (1958).
It must be noted the court is not concerned in this case with the special power conferred upon a public or quasi-public body to purchase, hold, sell and convey real estate and other property. Under such special power it may purchase the real property in fee simple by warranty deed, including all interests therein, and convey the same in like manner. That power authorizes acquisition of property without resort to condemnation where it is possible to agree with the owner upon the price. But such special power confers no privilege upon a public or quasi-public body to take the fee simple title, including all interests therein, against the will of the owner by the exercise of its power of eminent domain. Sutton v. Frazier, 183 Kan. at 41.
The court in its opinion recognizes the authority of Sutton v. Frazier, 183 Kan. 33, as standing for the proposition that eminent domain statutes will be construed to authorize only the taking of an easement on or title to land sufficient for the public use intended, and that the taking of fee title is authorized only where the empowering statute clearly so provides, either expressly or by necessary implication.
Here the court was required to find a legislative intent to authorize the taking of fee simple title for school use by “necessary implication,” that is, by reading empowering provisions into the enabling legislation (G.S. 1949, 72-4701 [1955 Supp.]). In *747doing so the Kansas rule authorizing the “necessary implication” of legislative intent has been expanded by resort to foreign law and far beyond any prior Kansas decisions.
The cases establishing the rule that the condemner is authorized to take the fee simple title to land in a condemnation proceeding by “necessary implication” are State, ex rel., v. State Highway Comm., 163 Kan. 187, 197, 182 P.2d 127 (1947), and Devena v. Common School District, 186 Kan. 166, 348 P.2d 827 (1960). Devena cited and adhered to Sutton v. Frazier, 183 Kan. 33, as the law in the construction of statutes authorizing condemnation, and Sutton cited with approval State, ex rel., v. State Highway Comm., 163 Kan. 187, which construed the condemnation statute to authorize the taking of fee simple title by necessary implication of legislative intent in the statute, but overruled the case in part on other grounds. Devena cited Buckwalter v. School District, 65 Kan. 603, 70 Pac. 605 (1902), for the proposition that the same school condemnation statute was before the court in Buckwalter and was there construed. It is important to note these cases were founded on statutory enactments which authorized the condemnation of land for school purposes and which were construed to authorize school districts to take fee simple title to land condemned for school purposes. The statutes were amended in 1951.
A careful reading of the statutes construed, where the taking of the fee simple title in a condemnation proceeding was authorized by necessary implication, leads to the inescapable conclusion they are clearly not applicable as authority for the construction of G.S. 1949, 72-4701 (1955 Supp.) here under consideration.
To accept the appellee’s argument, as the court has done, that the enabling statute (G.S. 1949, 72-4701 [1955 Supp.]) must be construed in conjunction with the procedural statute (G.S. 1949, 26-101), to which reference is made in the enabling statute, would render meaningless any reference to specific grants of power. Application of the general procedural statute would result in transfer of fee simple title in all eminent domain proceedings. Such a result obviously was not intended by the legislature. The procedural provision for the condemnation of land contains no grant of power and cannot expand the specific substantive provision. Nor can language incorporated in the papers of the eminent domain proceeding expand power granted in the enabling statute. *748Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Winn, 227 Kan. 101, 104, 605 P.2d 125 (1980); Sutton v. Frazier, 183 Kan. at 39.
The appellee presents an extensive review of the statutory history of the exercise of eminent domain by common school districts. Reference has been made to Devena v. Common School District, 186 Kan. 166, and Buckwalter v. School District, 65 Kan. 603, construing G.S. 1889, section 5591. While acknowledging the word “title” appears in the prior statutory provision as a distinguishing feature, the appellee argues the word “title” was omitted from the provision under consideration during codification of school law with no legislative intent to alter materially the nature of the estate taken on condemnation. The appellee requests the court to consider rights historically granted to school districts in interpreting the right under consideration in the instant case. I do not perceive it to be the function of our court to encompass preservation of rights previously enjoyed by school districts when the general rules of law and the specific statute under consideration unmistakably point in another direction.
In determining the legislative intent for the purpose of statutory construction, the historical background and changes made in a statute are to be considered by the court, and any changes and additions made in existing legislation raise a presumption that a change in meaning and effect was intended. State ex rel. Stephan v. U.S.D. No. 428, 231 Kan. 579, 647 P.2d 329 (1982), and authorities cited therein.
The 1951 change (L. 1951, ch. 395) by the legislature in the school condemnation statute must be construed as an intended change in the enabling statute from authorization to take fee simple title, prior to that time, to an authorization “for the purpose of appropriating private property for use for sites for school buildings” (emphasis added) which is less than fee simple title. G.S. 1949, 72-4701 (1955 Supp.).
Similarly, the 1982 session of the legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 729 which became law. (L. 1982, ch. 301.) It provides in part:
“New Section 1. (a) A unified school district may acquire by condemnation, for school purposes, any interest in real property, including fee simple title. If, within 10 years after entry of final judgment under K.S.A. 26-511, the school district fails to construct substantial buildings or improvements that are used for school purposes on any real property acquired under this subsection, the school district shall notify the original owners or their heirs or assigns that they have an option to *749purchase the property from the school district for an amount equal to the compensation awarded for the property under the eminent domain procedures act. Such option shall expire if not exercised within a period of six months after the date of the expiration of the ten-year period.
“(b) A unified school district may acquire by condemnation, for any purpose whatsoever, any reversionary interest held by others in real property which the school district has previously acquired by condemnation, deed or contract if:
“(1) The district, or its predecessor districts, has constructed substantial improvements on the property; and
“(2) the school district, or its predecessor districts, has held an interest in the property for at least 20 years. ”
Clearly, the legislature intended to change the school condemnation law, as it existed prior to the 1982 enactment, and authorize the taking for school purposes of fee simple title by a unified school district in condemnation proceedings after its enactment into law. To emphasize the intended change, in section (b) above the legislature recognized the reversionary interest outstanding in real property “previously acquired by condemnation” and authorized the school district to condemn the reversionary interest held by others in real property where the school district had an interest in the real property for at least 20 years and upon which improvements had been constructed.
On the record here presented the Board of Education of U.S.D. 512 has not abandoned use of the school property but is seeking merely to quiet title. Under the 1982 enactment it is now authorized to condemn the reversionary interest outstanding.
Many school closings are now contemplated by reason of decreasing student attendance at various attendance facilities in school districts in Kansas. The highly inflated value of urban real estate used for school sites, where abandonment of the school facilities is contemplated, and the need for additional school funds have led the court after 30 years of established law to reconsider legislative intent. Here legislative intent is utilized as a fiction to do “equity” in favor of public monetary considerations in complete disregard of prior condemnation law.
In its opinion the court says:
“It would be reasonable to say that several hundred pieces of private land were condemned for school building sites by school boards in Kansas from 1951 until the beginning of the 1980’s. Thousands of dollars of public funds derived from the sale of school bonds were expended to construct public buildings and other improvements on condemned land. All of these actions were taken under statutory authority. It is difficult to believe that it was the intent of the legislature that these *750school districts were not authorized to receive the fee title to the lands condemned.” (p. 744.)
The legislature is capable of speaking with clarity when it intends that the condemning authority shall acquire the fee simple title to real property taken under the power of eminent domain. Sutton v. Frazier, 183 Kan. at 43, citing L. 1864, ch. 124, sec. 4 (since repealed); G.S. 1949, 13-1388 (1957 Supp.); G.S. 1949, 17-4749 (1957 Supp.); G.S. 1949, 68-413, -413a (1957 Supp.). As a further example of legislative capability, witness the clarity in Senate Bill No. 729 enacted by the 1982 session of the legislature.
It is respectfully submitted the decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed and the decision of the district court reversed.
Holmes, J., joins the foregoing dissenting opinion.