(concurring in the result):
I concur in the result. Plaintiff’s main thesis is that we should adopt the “discovery rule” in determining when the statute of limitations started to run on its cause of action. It articulates the “discovery rule” as follows:
The limitation statute in malpractice cases does not start to run until the date of discovery, or the date when, by the exercise of reasonable care, plaintiff should have discovered the wrongful act.
Plaintiff cites numerous cases where this rule has been applied to the malpractice of engineers, surveyors, insurance agents, inspectors, accountants, attorneys, architects and engineers. As an alternative, plaintiff urges us to adopt the “continuous services exception” where, as in this case, the engineer retains his professional relationship with his client after the occurrence of the negligent act. Plaintiff states that “The theory is that the client continues to repose trust and confidence in the [professional] and is not placed on his guard against misconduct until after the termination of the professional relationship.” Under the “continuous services exception” the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the termination of the professional relationship. Plaintiff justifies this exception on the ground that it is an unreasonable burden to demand that the plaintiff hire a second engineer to review the defendant’s work while the defendant is still employed as plaintiff’s consulting engineer.
As pointed out by the defendant, most of Utah’s statutes of limitations do not begin to run until the plaintiff’s cause of action “accrues.” We have generally interpreted a cause of action to “accrue” only when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury or damage. See also, Peteler v. Robinson, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244 (1932) where we recognized an exception in medical malpractice cases, which exception is very similar to the “continuous services exception” urged by the plaintiff in this action.
As stated in the main opinion, however, plaintiff’s cause of action is barred under the provisions of § 78-12-25.5, U.C.A.1953. This statute was enacted by the legislature in 1967 and is similar to special statutes of limitations enacted in over thirty states according to defendant. Its obvious intent was to protect “persons performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or construction” of improvements to real property from indefinite future liability. In that statute the legislature fixed seven years after the completion of construction as the period of limitations.
California has a similar ten year statute of limitations, Code of Civ.Proc., § 337.15. Leaf v. City of San Mateo, 104 Cal.App.3d 398, 404, 163 Cal.Rptr. 711 (1980). Under these special statutes of limitations actions are barred after the designated period has run irrespective of whether the alleged negligence of the professional has been discovered, or should have been discovered, by that date. In view of that determination made by the legislature, there is no room for us by means of judicial interpretation to hold, as urged by the plaintiff, that the statute of limitations should not run until the negligence of the professional was discovered, or could have been discovered, or until his professional relationship with his client was terminated. Thus cases like City of Aurora v. Bechtel Corp., 599 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1979), relied upon by the plaintiff, cannot be followed by us since there the court was construing Colorado’s general six year statute of limitations found in § 13-80-110, C.R.S.1973. It held that in an action for professional malpractice against an engineer or architect under that general statute of limitations, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows, or should know in the exercise of reasonable diligence, all material facts essential to show the elements of that cause of action. We recently indulged in similar judicial license in Myers v. McDonald, Utah, 635 P.2d 84 (1981), where we held that the statute of limitations does not begin to run on a wrongful death action until the heirs *748possessing the cause of action know or should know by the exercise of diligence, of the death of their relative.
The action of our legislature in fixing a maximum period of exposure to liability in § 78-12-25.5 is similar to its enactment of a special statute of limitations respecting malpractice actions against health care providers. In § 78-14 — 4, U.C.A.1953, enacted in 1976, it was provided that such malpractice actions must be commenced within two years after the plaintiff discovers, or should discover, his injury but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence. We upheld the constitutionality of that statute in Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., Utah, 635 P.2d 30 (1981).
In conclusion, the legislature by enacting § 78-12-25.5 has foreclosed us from adopting, in cases which come under that section, either the “discovery rule” or the “continuous services exception,” despite the very persuasive arguments made and the authorities cited by the plaintiff.