Werner v. American-Edwards Laboratories, Inc.

*440SHEPARD, Chief Justice,

dissenting.

For the following reasons I cannot agree with the majority opinion.

The specific issue posed in this case is, at what point in time does a cause of action accrue for medical malpractice, such that the statute of limitations begins to run under the provisions of I.C. § 5-219(4).

In Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 175-76, 706 P.2d 63, 64-65 (1985), this Court stated:

The majority of the decisions of this Court involving statute of limitations defenses have concerned medical malpractice. In 1964, in construing the statute of limitations then effective for malpractice cases, this Court adopted the “discovery rule,” to the effect that a cause of action for medical malpractice did not accrue until the patient learned, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have learned, of the damages resulting from the doctor’s negligence. See Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 498, 389 P.2d 224, 232 (1964). Billings treated only the problem of foreign objects left in the patient’s body, but that rule was extended to cover misdiagnosis cases in Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1970). Apparently in response to Renner, the legislature, in 1971, amended I.C. § 5-219(4) to provide that the discovery rule would not apply to malpractice cases, but at the same time incorporated therein two expressly-defined exceptions for foreign objects left in a patient’s body and for fraudulent concealment of negligence. The statute presently limits the time for filing suit for professional malpractice to two years, as follows:
5-219. Actions against officers, for penalties, on bonds, and for professional malpractice or for personal injuries. —Within two (2) years:
4. An action to recover damages for professional malpractice, or for an injury to the person, or for the death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, including any such action arising from breach of an implied warranty or implied covenant; provided, however, when the action is for damages arising out of the placement and inadvertent, accidental or unintentional leaving of any foreign object in the body of any person by reason of the professional malpractice of any hospital, physician or other person or institution practicing any of the healing arts or when the fact of damage has, for the purpose of escaping responsibility therefor, been fraudulently and knowingly concealed from the injured party by an alleged wrongdoer standing at the time of the wrongful act, neglect or breach in a professional or commercial relationship with the injured party, the same shall be deemed to accrue when the injured party knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been put on inquiry regarding the condition or matter complained of; but in all other actions, whether arising from professional malpractice or otherwise, the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of, and the limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom or any continuing professional or commercial relationship between the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer, and, provided further, that an action within the foregoing foreign object or fraudulent concealment exceptions must be commenced within one (1) year following the date of accrual as aforesaid or two (2) years following the occurrence, act or omission complained of, whichever is later. The term “professional malpractice” as used herein refers to wrongful acts or omissions in the performance of professional services by any person, firm, association, entity or corporation licensed to perform such services under the law of the state of Idaho. (Original emphasis.)

In Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 270-71, 688 P.2d 1172, 1175-76 (1984), this Court stated:

Under I.C. § 5-219, a cause of action accrues at the time of the wrongdoing, rather than at the time of discovery of *441the wrongful act. Owyhee County v. Rife, 100 Idaho 91, 593 P.2d 995 (1979); Martin v. Clements, 98 Idaho 906, 575 P.2d 885 (1978). See also Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital Bldg. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 644 P.2d 341 (1982).

In the instant case, Dr. Daugharty took Mr. Werner off of coumadin and substituted aspirin and persantine on November 27, 1978. From the record it appears that Dr. Daugharty did not see, treat or advise Mr. Werner after August 5, 1981. Thus, the complaint, filed March 30, 1984, was not filed within the two year statute of limitations. Suit was filed five years and four months after Dr. Daugharty had recommended discontinuance of coumadin and two years and eight months after Dr. Daugharty had last seen and treated Mr. Werner.

It is also apparent that the complaint was not timely filed against Dr. Trout. Mr. Werner commenced a patient-doctor relationship with Dr. Trout on August 17, 1981. Dr. Trout advised Mr. Werner that he discontinue taking persantine. On December 1, 1981, Mr. Werner consulted Dr. Trout about chest pain. Dr. Trout put Mr. Werner on 200 mg. per day of persantine. Dr. Trout was of the opinion that Mr. Werner had suffered or was suffering from mild to moderate severe heart failure. December 1, 1981, was Mr. Werner’s last visit to or treatment by Dr. Trout. The complaint was filed two years and four months after Mr. Werner had last been treated by Dr. Trout.

Construing these facts in favor of the nonmoving party on motion for summary judgment, it is my view that the plaintiffs have not filed suit within the statute of limitations period set forth in I.C. § 5-219(4), and I would affirm the trial court.