On November 6, 1975, defendant was arrested on an assault charge. The police took defendant to the police station and informed him of his rights as follows:
"I advised him he had the right to remain silent, that anything he said would be used against him in a court of law; he had a right to have a lawyer and have him present while he was being questioned, and if he could not afford to hire one, the Court would appoint one to him at no expense to himself.”
The police informed defendant of his rights in English. Defendant speaks some English, but his primary language is Spanish. However, when an officer asked defendant in Spanish whether he understood his rights, defendant answered that he did and signed the form.
Defendant chose not to exercise his Miranda rights and was interrogated for approximately four hours. At some time during the questioning defendant became a suspect in a murder case, which is the subject of the present appeal.
Defendant had two keys in his possession when he was arrested. The police asked about them and defendant said they were keys for lockers at the Greyhound Bus Depot. An officer asked defendant (in Spanish) for permission to search the lockers. He did not inform defendant that he need not consent. Defendant consented. The police searched the lockers and discovered property missing from the murder victim’s home.
The police continued to question defendant. When defendant asked for an attorney, the police stopped questioning him. However, defendant then asked, "What happens now?” An officer told him in Spanish that he would be charged with murder and outlined the evidence against him. During this conversation, defendant admitted killing the victim. After again being advised of his rights, defendant confessed to killing the victim in self-defense.
*276At the pretrial hearing, the trial court made the following findings:
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"3. The Defendant was fully and properly advised of all his Constitutional rights in both English and Spanish.
"4. The Defendant fully understood his rights.
"5. After being fully advised, the Defendant did make statements freely and voluntarily and did consent to a search of the bus lockers under his control.
"6. All statements made by the Defendant were freely and voluntarily made and were not the product of any threats, promises or coercion of any nature whatsoever.
"7. After making numerous statements, the Defendant did request an attorney, at which time the questioning was terminated.
"8. After termination of questioning, the Defendant did enter into conversation with an officer and did voluntarily assert that he had committed the homicide in question.
"9. The admission regarding the homicide was not the result of interrogation but was a decision of the Defendant.”
The court therefore refused to suppress the confession or the items taken from the lockers. After trial on defendant’s plea of not guilty, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder and robbery. Judgment was entered on the verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion, 27 Or App 428, 556 P2d 1391 (1976).
Defendant filed a petition for review, contending that his consent to the search was invalid because he had not been informed by the police that he could refuse consent. His argument was based on State v. Williams, 248 Or 85, 432 P2d 679 (1967), and State v. Douglas, 260 Or 60, 488 P2d 1366 (1971).
In State v. Williams, supra, a case factually similar to the case at bar, a majority of this court held that the evidence seized as a result of a search with the defendant’s consent was not admissible because the defendant was not advised of his rights. But in that *277case the decision was based on the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution when the U. S. Supreme Court had not ruled on the question now before us. It was not based on Article 1, Sec. 9, of the Oregon Constitution. In State v. Douglas, supra, a majority of this court held that under the facts of that case "the police officers were under no duty to affirmatively inform defendant of his constitutional right to refuse consent to a search of his suitcase before asking if he would consent to an examination of its contents. To hold otherwise would, in our view, emphasize form over substance and permit the making of a 'game’ out of the use of Fourth Amendment rights by defendants who have admitted knowledge of such rights.” (260 Or at 73-74). Again, that opinion was prior to the U. S. Supreme Court ruling on the question and was not based on Article 1, Sec. 9, of the Oregon Constitution.
We granted review and in the letter stating the questions for review noted that United States v. Watson, 423 US 411, 96 S Ct 820, 46 L Ed 2d 598 (1976), held not only that a defendant in custody need not be told of his right to refuse consent to search, but also that the fact that a defendant in custody, not aware of his right to refuse consent, is not to be given controlling significance. We also raised sua sponte the question whether this court ought to look to the Oregon Constitution in reviewing the apparent conflict between State v. Williams, supra, and United States v. Watson, supra. If so, we further asked whether we should adhere to our decision in State v. Williams, supra, or whether we should interpret the Oregon Constitution so as to agree with the result in United States v. Watson, supra.
We first observe that the interpretation given the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution in United States v. Watson, supra, and in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 93 S Ct 2041, 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973), constrains us to hold that defendant’s federal constitutional rights were not violated in this case. Schneckloth held:
*278"* * * [T]he question whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent. * * *” 412 US at 227.
Schneckloth expressly reserved the question of whether the same result applied to custodial arrests. Watson held that the same result did apply (423 US at 424).
In the case at bar, the police used no force or threat of force, made no promises, and used no other forms of coercion in obtaining defendant’s consent to the search.1
Despite this apparent absence of coercion, defendant claims that his consent was not his own "essentially free and unconstrained choice” because his will had been "overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired,” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra at 225, because of the following factors: (1) he had been arrested; (2) there was no proof that he knew he could withhold his consent; and (3) he had been taken to the police station. However, United States v. Watson, supra, holds that the first two factors are not dispositive. The only difference between this case and Watson is that the defendant in that case had not been taken to the police station. The question, then, based on the U. S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Watson, is whether that court would hold that the suspect’s being taken to the police station was "to be given controlling significance” (423 US at 424) so as to require proof of his knowledge that he could withhold consent. We are of the opinion that it would not. *279Defendant had been properly arrested, had been informed of his Miranda rights, and had not been subjected to any coercion. Under these circumstances, we believe that his being in the police station is not controlling but is merely another factor in determining voluntariness.
After arguments by the parties on both the Federal and Oregon Constitutions, we are now of the opinion that we should consider the Oregon Constitution in order to make a final ruling on this issue, although the defendant failed to invoke Article 1, Sec. 9, of the Oregon Constitution in the trial court, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, and in his petition for review. Although the general rule precluding appellate review of questions not raised in the trial court applies to constitutional questions, see The Alpha Corp. v. Multnomah Co., 182 Or 671, 680, 189 P2d 988 (1948), we have adopted a rule of flexibility in cases involving an individual’s liberty. State v. O’Neill, 214 Or 59, 65, 545 P2d 97 (1976). Where, as here, the record is sufficient to make the constitutional determination, we will do so.
Although we are bound by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal Constitution, we are at liberty to adopt a stricter test under our own constitution. Oregon v. Hass, 420 US 714, 719, 95 S Ct 1215, 43 L Ed 2d 570 (1975); State v. Evans, 258 Or 437, 442, 483 P2d 1300 (1971). However, we see no persuasive reason to do so.
The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 Stan L Rev 297, 318-19 (1977), suggests four criteria that state courts should consider in engaging in an independent interpretation of their own state constitutions. They are: (1) the similarity of the state and federal provisions; (2) relevant state precedents; (3) unique local conditions; and (4) the position taken by the United States Supreme Court. To these considerations we would add a fifth—the need for a uniform standard in the area of *280law under discussion. State v. Florance, 270 Or 169, 183, 527 P2d 1202 (1974).
Oregon constitutional provisions are similar. Article I, Sec. 9, provides:
"No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.”
The Fourth Amendment provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
These provisions differ only in that the Oregon Constitution uses the active voice and refers to search or seizure rather than searches and seizures.2 There is no indication that the drafters of our constitution intended Article I, Sec. 9, to be different from the Fourth Amendment. See generally, Carey, A History of the Oregon Constitution (1926). In addition, although early Oregon cases construed Article I, Sec. 9, without reference to the Federal Constitution,3 we have more recently stated that the scope of both provisions is similar.4 From the above, we conclude that there is no reason, based on either the text or the history of *281Article I, Sec. 9, to suppose that that section has a different meaning from the Fourth Amendment.
The only state precedents for defendant’s position are State v. Williams, supra, and State v. Douglas, supra. However, those cases were specifically based on the federal, not the state, constitution and so are not authority for defendant’s interpretation of the Oregon Constitution. We are not aware of any unique local conditions, such as widespread police misconduct infringing suspects’ rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, that would require a different rule under the state constitution. And, of course, the United States Supreme Court decision, United States v. Watson, supra, is contrary to defendant’s position and is not an old decision indirectly relevant to this case. Rather, it is quite recent and on point.
Further, the fifth consideration—the need for a uniform standard—is also against defendant’s interpretation. In State v. Florance, supra, and State v. Evans, supra, we noted that to promote effective law enforcement, particularly when state and federal law enforcement agencies collaborate, and to further the orderly administration of criminal trials, there ought to be a uniform rule. We see no need to re-examine the position we took in those cases.
Finally, on the merits, we note that to adopt a rule requiring proof that a criminal suspect was aware of his right to refuse consent would be tantamount to requiring a police warning similar to the Miranda warning. As to such a result, we agree with the dissenting opinion of Justice Holman in State v. Williams, supra:
"The rules of Escobedo and Miranda were promulgated by the United States Supreme Court as prophylactic measures for the purpose of preventing police from exercising physical and psychological pressures upon persons in custody to obtain admissions and confessions. While this court had not theretofore seen sufficient evidence of such abuses in this state to merit such *282prophylactic rules, this court was bound by the necessarily uniform application of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
"The majority of this court now apply Escobedo and Miranda rules to searches and seizures. The application of such rules to searches and seizures can only be justified on the basis that there is the same necessity for prophylaxis because of similar abuses by the police in obtaining consents to searches and seizures. The United States Supreme Court has not yet determined that there are such abuses on a national scale and I know of no evidence which presently justifies such a determination in Oregon.” 248 Or at 94-95.
For this reason, and because of the "one rule” policy of Florance and Evans, we decline to interpret Article I, Sec. 9, of the Oregon Constitution more strictly than the United States Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Watson, supra.5
Affirmed.
Indeed, the Miranda warning, informing defendant of his right to remain silent, would have served to some extent to inform defendant that he need not answer the police request to search the lockers and, in fact, would have indicated to him that he need not respond to the initial questions about what the keys were for.
State v. Elkins, 245 Or 279, 286, 422 P2d 250 (1966), relied on the use of the word "or” in our constitution as demonstrating the framers’ intent to apply the reasonableness test to both searches and seizures. However, the federal provision has also been interpreted disjunctively. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 US 383, 34 S Ct 341, 58 L Ed 652 (1913); United States v. Jeffers, 342 US 48, 72 S Ct 93, 96 L Ed 59 (1951).
See, e.g., State v. Rosser, 162 Or 293, 349, 86 P2d 441, 87 P2d 783, 91 P2d 295 (1939); State v. Christensen, 151 Or 529, 531, 51 P2d 835 (1935); State v. Walker, 135 Or 680, 683, 296 P 850 (1931); but cf. State v. Lee, 120 Or 643, 647-49, 253 P 533 (1927).
State v. Elkins, 245 Or 279, 282, 422 P2d 250 (1966).
Although the decisions of other state courts are not of great relevance in interpreting our constitution, it may be noted that on this issue the following states have refused to interpret their constitutions more restrictively than the United States Supreme Court interprets the Fourth Amendment. State v. Knaubert, 27 Ariz App 53, 550 P2d 1095, 1099 (1976); People v. Reed, 393 Mich 342, 224 NW2d 867, 876-77 (1975); State v. Berry, 526 SW2d 92, 98 (Mo App 1975); and State v. Rocheleau, 131 Vt 563, 313 A2d 33, 40 (1973). The only case we have found to the contrary is State v. Johnson, 68 NJ 349, 346 A2d 66, 68 (1975), where the court, without stating why the analysis under its constitution should be different, announced that the New Jersey Constitution requires proof that the suspect know of his right to refuse consent.