Petitioner Kenneth Trambitas appeared in Spokane County Juvenile Court on January 16, 1980, and pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree burglary. Trambitas failed to appear on February 1, the date set for his disposition hearing. He was apprehended and placed in detention on February 7. Additional charges of first degree burglary, second degree burglary, and second degree assault were filed on February 11. A disposition hearing was conducted on February 13 concerning the first set of charges. The court ordered that Trambitas be committed to the Department of Social and Health Services, Division of Juvenile Rehabilitation (DSHS/DJR) for a term of 13 to 16 weeks on each of the two counts, the terms to run consecutively. No credit was given to Trambitas for time which he spent in detention while awaiting disposition. On February 20, Trambitas pleaded not guilty to the second group of charges. Subsequent plea bargaining resulted in his later plea of guilty to the burglary charges and the dismissal of the assault charge. In sentencing on the guilty plea, the *331court ordered that Trambitas serve 52 to 65 weeks for the second degree burglary and 103 to 129 weeks for the first degree burglary, the terms to run consecutively. The court gave no credit to the defendant for time spent in detention awaiting disposition.
Richard Blakesley was detained in the Spokane County juvenile detention facility from November 9, 1979, through November 12, while law enforcement authorities investigated his role in certain crimes. An information was filed November 21 charging Blakesley with first degree robbery, first degree burglary, and second degree possession of stolen property. Blakesley was again placed in confinement on November 26. He was held in continual detention by court order because it was thought that it was highly probable that he would fail to appear for further proceedings and because he was dangerous to the community at large. On December 4, an amended information was filed adding a fourth count — second degree burglary. On December 18, as a result of plea negotiations, Blakesley pleaded guilty to first degree robbery and the three other counts were dismissed. On December 31, a disposition hearing was held, wherein Blakesley was committed to DSHS/DJR for a standard range term of 103 to 129 weeks. He received no credit against his term of confinement for the time spent in detention prior to the disposition.
Neither Trambitas nor Blakesley appealed the fined order of the trial court. They both filed personal restraint petitions which were consolidated for argument before this court. They raise both constitutional and statutory arguments.
We agree with petitioners that the State's failure to credit their dispositions with the time which they spent in pretrial detention violates the United States Constitution. In Reanier v. Smith, 83 Wn.2d 342, 517 P.2d 949 (1974), we held that pretrial detention time served by adults must be credited against maximum and mandatory minimum terms to avoid constitutional violations. We see no reason to deny similar protection to juveniles.
*332The petitioners argue that the maximum terms to which the credit must be given is the upper end of the standard range imposed. The State disagrees, arguing that the maximum disposition in any juvenile case is the offender's 21st birthday; therefore, as long as the pretrial detention, plus the disposition imposed, will not hold a juvenile past the age of 21, no credit need be given for the prior detention. The State cites In re Quinlivan, 22 Wn. App. 240, 588 P.2d 1210 (1978) to support this proposition.
Petitioners urge the better rule. The maximum sentence against which the credit is to be given is the upper end of the standard range applicable to such offender. In re Quinlivan is not in point. In that case, petitioner requested that pretrial detention time be credited against discretionary minimum sentences set by the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles. The court acknowledged that the detention time had to be credited against the maximum sentence. In re Quinlivan, supra at 244. To hold a juvenile until 21 years of age requires the court to make a finding of "manifest injustice", RCW 13.40.160. This procedure enhances the punishment beyond the maximum. It does not articulate the statutory maximum which is set forth by the standard range guidelines.
Petitioners also assert that due process demands that such credit be given because to do otherwise would constitute punishment without an adjudication of guilt. This violation, petitioners argue, occurs when detention time not credited causes the offender to be detained longer than allowable under the standard range guidelines.
The State contends that the holds placed on petitioners were for the purpose of assuring their continued availability, as opposed to the inability to post bail, as discussed in Reanier. The State also contends that pretrial detention for juveniles is not "punishment"; rather, the juvenile system stresses rehabilitation and intervention. State v. Lawley, 91 Wn.2d 654, 591 P.2d 772 (1979).
It is true that in Reanier we discussed fundamental fairness in relation to an accused's inability to post bail and *333said that it would be a denial of due process to fail to credit pretrial detention in that case. However, we did not limit our analysis to persons who were detained prior to trial because of indigency. In fact, one of the petitioners before us in that case was held without bail because of the nature of the crime. Reanier, at 344. The distinction raised by the State in the instant case is without merit.
Fundamental fairness . . . dictate [s] that an accused person, unable to or precluded from posting bail or otherwise procuring his release from confinement prior to trial should, upon conviction and commitment to a state penal facility, be credited as against a maximum and a mandatory minimum term with all time served in detention prior to trial and sentence. Otherwise, such a person's total time in custody would exceed that of a defendant likewise sentenced but who had been able to obtain pretrial release. Thus, two sets of maximum and mandatory minimum terms would be erected, one for those unable to procure pretrial release from confinement and another for those fortunate enough to obtain such release. . . . [I]t is clear that the principles of due process ... of the law are breached without rational reason.
(Footnote omitted. Italics ours.) Reanier, at 346-47.
As to the State's argument that pretrial detention does not constitute "punishment", we reiterate what was stated in In re Erickson, 24 Wn. App. 808, 810, 604 P.2d 513 (1979) that "the juvenile disposition order did constitute 'punishment for crime'". The restrictions on a person's liberties suffered by pretrial detention is no less "punishment" than that imposed by the disposition order. Reanier, at 351.
We also find that the failure to credit pretrial detention against the maximum sentence violates the juvenile's rights to equal protection, secured through the United States Constitution.
RCW 13.40.160(5) provides:
Whenever a juvenile offender is entitled to credit for time spent in detention prior to a dispositional order, the dispositional order shall specifically state the number of days of credit for time served.
Thus, the juvenile statutory scheme contemplates that *334credit will be given to some juveniles. Petitioners assert that an impermissible classification occurs if some juveniles and not others receive credit. As stated before in Reanier, we held that credit for time served was mandated whether the reason for the hold was inability to post bond or otherwise. Consequently, the State's argument that only a classification based on indigency of an accused violates the equal protection clause, must fall. As we previously determined with adults, we now find that this disparate treatment among juveniles is impermissible.
Petitioner Trambitas also argues that the sentence imposed on February 28 was enhanced improperly. He argues that the court should not have considered the February 13 offenses because petitioner had no opportunity, after judgment was entered, to reform his behavior before the disposition made on February 28. This is a purely statutory argument and cannot be raised through a personal restraint petition when no appeal was taken; only constitutional issues may be raised at this time. In re Schellong, 94 Wn.2d 314, 616 P.2d 1233 (1980). Likewise, petitioners' other statutory arguments will not be considered.
In conclusion, we find that the time spent by petitioners in detention prior to the imposition of their dispositions should have been credited against the maximum sentence received under the standard range.
We remand both cases to the Superior Court and direct that such credit be given to the respective defendants.
Rosellini, Utter, and Williams, JJ., concur.
Stafford, J., concurs in the result.