specially concurring, with whom MACY, Justice, joins.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but write to express my concern that the majority too broadly construe the Rule 404(b), W.R.E. exception to the general proscription against other bad acts. The challenged prior bad-acts evidence in this case consists of two references to the defendant’s prior sexual misconduct with the victim. Because I agree with the court that the crime of incest is usually an ongoing affair, I think that prior evidence of sexual misconduct with the victim lies within the context of the charged crime.
I do not think this case rests on the admissibility of the testimony of other victims, as is suggested by the majority’s reliance on Elliott v. State, Wyo., 600 P.2d 1044 (1979). I would prefer instead to rely solely on the majority’s reasoning that
“ * * * [t]he crime of incest rarely consists of one isolated incident; rather, it is usually an ongoing affair consisting of a series of misconduct varying in severity. Therefore, the necessity for the admission of prior bad acts which involve the victim becomes even more compelling.” (Emphasis added.)
Evidence about other bad acts which attacks the character of the accused should be confined and carefully circumscribed in the interest of fairness and due process, unless it involves the course of the transaction or context of the event. United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1986); Lessard v. State, Wyo., 719 P.2d 227 (1986).