dissenting.
The parties have stipulated that Sea-Land met the requirements for reimbursement in this case, except for the written record requirement of AS 23.30.205(c). As I understand this stipulation, Sea-Land in fact knew of Vincent's preexisting impairment when it hired him, and retained him despite such knowledge. However, its written record was inadequate to show such knowledge.
In view of the stipulation, the identified purposes of the written record requirement have been satisfied: the state is obviously convinced that this claim is neither spurious nor collusive and there is no need to litigate the issue of Sea-Land’s knowledge. Unfortunately, the holding of the court has the counterproductive effect of forcing the parties to litigate the adequacy of the written record.
The only justification for this holding, alluded to by the court but never developed, is administrative convenience. When the State of Alaska Second Injury Fund is willing to stipulate to the employer’s knowledge of the employee’s preexisting impairment, I fail to understand how the state is administratively inconvenienced by not litigating the issue. The issue of knowledge is present regardless of the written record requirement. If the state disputes or is unpersuaded that the employer had knowledge in fact when the employer cannot produce an adequate written record, the holding is justified on administrative convenience grounds. When the state concedes the issue, the holding is simply unjustified, and in my view unjustifiable.