NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 17 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LINDA BEEMAN, No. 22-15696
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:21-cv-01774-WBS-DB
v.
JOHN B. CRUZ, individually and as MEMORANDUM*
employee of the Amador County Sheriff's
Department; AMADOR COUNTY
SHERIFF'S OFFICE; COUNTY OF
AMADOR; J. CORDOZA,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 15, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: CALLAHAN and BADE, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON,*** District
Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the
Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
Linda Beeman appeals the district court’s dismissal of her first amended
complaint (“FAC”), alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Detective John
Cruz, Lieutenant Jim Cardoza, and the County of Amador (collectively,
“Defendants”). The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that the FAC failed to state a
claim for municipal liability, unreasonable execution of a warrant, malicious
prosecution, supervisory liability, or deprivation of due process.
On appeal, Beeman challenges only the dismissal of her claims for malicious
prosecution and supervisory liability. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and may affirm on any ground supported by the record. See Ochoa v. Pub.
Consulting Grp., Inc., 48 F.4th 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2022). Reviewing the district
court’s dismissal order de novo, see Tingley v. Ferguson, 47 F.4th 1055, 1066 (9th
Cir. 2022), we affirm.
To state a claim for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Beeman
must allege “that the defendants prosecuted [her] with malice and without probable
cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying [her a] specific constitutional
right.” Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)). While the
Superior Court’s decision to hold Beeman to answer following a preliminary
hearing is not conclusive evidence of probable cause, see id. at 1067, Beeman
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failed to allege facts sufficient to rebut this prima facie showing of probable cause
by, for example, alleging facts demonstrating that the criminal prosecution was
“induced by fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful
conduct undertaken in bad faith,” id. 1
Rather, the facts alleged in the FAC, which we accept as true, Manzarek v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008), demonstrate
that the evidence allegedly withheld from the District Attorney at the time charges
were filed was before the Superior Court at the time of the preliminary hearing.
With that evidence in mind, the judge nevertheless concluded that there was
probable cause to support the complaint against Beeman. See Maxwell v. Cnty. of
San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1085–86 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Probable cause exists if the
arresting officers ‘had knowledge and reasonably trustworthy information of facts
and circumstances sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that [the arrestee]
had committed or was committing a crime.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Ricardo D., 912 F.3d 337, 342 (9th Cir. 1990))). Additionally,
Beeman alleged that the district attorney chose to file an information against her
following the preliminary hearing, this time with full knowledge of the allegedly
withheld evidence. Therefore, the FAC does not sufficiently allege the absence of
1
Beeman provides no authority establishing that a subsequent dismissal of
criminal charges has any bearing on the Superior Court’s probable cause
determination here.
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probable cause necessary to state a claim for malicious prosecution.
As for Beeman’s supervisory liability claim against Lieutenant Cardoza,
because Beeman failed to state a claim for a predicate constitutional violation, she
necessarily failed to state a claim of supervisory liability. Jackson v. City of
Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Neither a municipality nor a
supervisor . . . can be held liable under § 1983 where no injury or constitutional
violation has occurred.”).
AFFIRMED.
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