People v. Meza

Filed 4/13/23 (review denied 8/16/23; reposted with Supreme Court order and
statement)
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B318310

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA150314)
v.

DANIEL MEZA et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Tammy Chung Ryu, Judge, and Laura R.
Walton, Judge. Affirmed.
Sharon Fleming, under appointment by the court of appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Daniel Meza.
Bess Stiffelman, under appointment by the court of appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Walter Meneses.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Michael C.
Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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 Jennifer Lynch and Andrew Crocker for Electronic Frontier
Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and
Appellants.
________________________________
INTRODUCTION
“A geofence is a virtual fence or perimeter around a
physical location. Like a real fence, a geofence creates a
separation between that location and the area around it. . . . [¶]
It can be any size or shape, even a straight line between
two points. [¶] Geofences are created using mapping software,
which allow the user to draw the geofence over the desired
geographic area. It is made up of a collection of coordinates
(i.e., latitude and longitude) or in the case of a circular geofence
one point that forms the center.”1
“Geofence warrants (sometimes called ‘reverse location
searches’) are official requests by law enforcement authorities to
access the device location data gathered by large tech companies
like Google. The warrants specify a time and geographic area,
and require the companies to turn over information on any
devices that were in that area at that time. While this data is
typically anonymized, it can be used in conjunction with other

1 Verizon Connect, What Is A Geofence?
[as of April 13, 2023],
archived at < https://perma.cc/A3A6-NPZ9>.

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investigative techniques to tie devices to specific users—and
identify persons of interest in a criminal investigation.”2
“The government filed its first geofence search warrant in
2016, and by the end of 2019, Google was receiving about
180 search warrant requests per week from law enforcement
officials across the country. . . . Between 2018 and 2020, Google
received about 20,000 geofence warrant requests for data,
including over 11,500 in 2020 alone.”3
* * *
Daniel Meza and Walter Meneses were identified as
suspects in the murder of Adbadalla Thabet after a geofence
search warrant directed to Google revealed cell phones signed in
to Google accounts connected to them were in several of the same
locations as Thabet on the day of his murder. After their motions
to quash and suppress evidence were denied, Meza pleaded guilty
to first degree murder; and Meneses pleaded no contest to
second degree murder.
On appeal Meza and Meneses contend the trial court erred
in denying their motion to suppress, arguing the geofence

2 SecureMac, What Are Geofence Warrants? (Sept. 8, 2020)
[as of
April 13, 2023], archived at .
3 Owsley, The Best Offense Is A Good Defense: Fourth
Amendment Implications of Geofence Warrants (2022) 50 Hofstra
L.Rev. 829, 834; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Google LLC in
Support of Neither Party, filed December 20, 2019 in United
States v. Chatrie (E.D.Va. 2019, No. 3:19-cr-00130-MHL) (Google
Amicus Brief) (“Google has observed over a 1,500% increase in
the number of geofence requests it received in 2018 compared to
2017; and to date, the rate has increased over 500% from 2018 to
2019”).

3
warrant violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and did not
comply with the California Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 2016 (Pen. Code, § 1546 et seq.)4 (CalECPA). Although the
geofence warrant satisfied the requirements of CalECPA, we
agree it lacked the particularity required by the Fourth
Amendment and was impermissibly overbroad. Nonetheless, we
affirm Meza’s and Meneses’s convictions under the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule established by United States v.
Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 (Leon).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The Murder of Adbadalla Thabet and the Initial
Investigation
According to surveillance footage viewed by police officers,
at approximately 10:30 a.m. on March 1, 2019 Thabet drove into
the parking lot of a bank in Paramount, followed by a gray sedan
and a red sedan.5 The driver of the red car parked, got out of his
vehicle and walked to the gray car, where he stopped to speak to
the driver of the gray car. The driver of the gray car then drove
slowly toward Thabet’s parked car. The driver of the red car
followed on foot. As Thabet got out of his vehicle, the gray car
pulled up next to Thabet’s car; and an occupant of the gray car
shot Thabet in the torso. Thabet fell to the ground as the gray
car sped away. The driver of the red car approached Thabet, took
his backpack, retreated to the red car and drove away. Thabet
died from his injuries.

4 Statutory references are to this code.
5 Our factual summary is based on the preliminary hearing
transcript and the search warrant affidavit.

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 The investigating officers were able to retrace Thabet’s
steps from the morning of the shooting. They learned Thabet
worked for his uncle’s business, which included managing several
gas stations. Twice per week Thabet picked up cash receipts
from the gas stations and deposited the cash at the bank in
Paramount. The day of the shooting Thabet left his apartment
building in Downey around 7:00 a.m. and drove to a gas station
in Downey to pick up cash for deposit. Thabet was at the Downey
gas station from approximately 7:15 a.m. to 7:30 a.m. Thabet
then met his brother-in-law at approximately 9:00 a.m. at a gas
station in Bellflower. Thabet and his brother-in-law departed the
gas station in separate cars at approximately 9:40 a.m. and drove
to a strip mall in Compton where the brother-in-law was
contemplating renting retail space. Thabet left the strip mall
alone, driving to a gas station in Lynwood to pick up cash
receipts. From Lynwood Thabet drove to the bank in Paramount
where he was killed.
In addition to the video surveillance from the bank parking
lot, investigators obtained video surveillance from other locations
Thabet visited that morning. The gray and red vehicles from the
bank surveillance footage were also identified in surveillance
footage from at least two of those additional locations.
Investigators concluded the suspects had been following Thabet,
anticipating his arrival at the bank with the cash deposits. The
license plate numbers of the gray and red vehicles were not
legible in any of the footage.
2. The Search Warrant Affidavit
a. Probable cause
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Detective Jonathan Bailey
applied for a search warrant directing Google to identify

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individuals whose location history data indicated they were in
the vicinity of the six locations visited by Thabet on March 1,
2019. In an affidavit supporting the application, Bailey described
Thabet’s murder as seen on the surveillance footage of the bank
parking lot. Bailey stated he had viewed surveillance camera
footage from several of the other locations Thabet had visited
that morning and had seen the gray and red sedans in the
footage. Bailey did not state how many of the six locations had
available surveillance footage, nor did he identify the locations at
which the red and gray cars were visible.
The affidavit included a brief overview of how Google tracks
and stores location history data, stating Google collected data
through “Global Position System (GPS) data, cell site/cell tower
information, Bluetooth connections, and Wi-Fi access points.”
Bailey stated, “I know most people in today’s society possess
cellular phones and other items (e.g. tablets, watches, laptops)
used to communicate electronically. . . . Most people carry
cellular phones on their person and will carry them whenever
they leave their place of residence.” In addition, Bailey
explained, “Suspects involved in criminal activity will typically
use cellular phones to communicate when multiple suspects are
involved.” Therefore, Bailey concluded, identification of
individuals in Thabet’s vicinity on the day of the murder would
assist investigators in locating the drivers of the vehicles involved
in the murder, who investigators believed had been following
Thabet throughout the morning.
b. Search parameters
The warrant application sought location history data for
individuals within six target locations. The first location was
Thabet’s apartment, which was located in the middle of a large

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city block, surrounded by both residential and retail buildings.
The area designated for the search was a circle with a radius of
100 meters from the center of the apartment complex
(approximately seven and a half acres). It included the entire
apartment building as well as portions of several surrounding
buildings and approximately three-quarters of the street in front
of the building. The timeframe for this search was 6:00 a.m. to
7:15 a.m. on March 1, 2019.
The second location was the gas station in Downey where
Thabet picked up cash for deposit. The gas station is on the
corner of a large intersection and is surrounded by other retail
establishments. The search area consisted of a circle with a
radius of 75 meters from the approximate center of the gas
station (more than four acres). Included in the circle were the
gas station, a restaurant and portions of other businesses, as well
as the intersection in front of the gas station and the two main
streets bordering the gas station. The timeframe for this search
was 7:00 a.m. to 7:30 a.m. on March 1, 2019.
The third location was the gas station in Bellflower. The
search area consisted of a circle with a radius of 50 meters from
the approximate center of the gas station (almost two acres).
Included in the circle were part of the intersection and
approximately 50 meters of the streets bordering the gas station,
as well as portions of the surrounding businesses. The timeframe
for this search was 7:30 a.m. to 9:40 a.m.
The fourth location was the strip mall in Compton. The
search area was a rectangle that included the strip mall,
three streets bordering it and some neighboring buildings and
parking lots (approximately one and one-half acres). The
timeframe for this search was 9:40 a.m. to 10:15 a.m.

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 The fifth location was the gas station in Lynwood. The
search area was a rectangle that included the gas station,
neighboring buildings, including buildings across the street that
appeared to be residences and the intersection bordering the gas
station (approximately three acres). The timeframe for this
search was 10:15 a.m. to 10:30 a.m.
The sixth and final location was the bank in Paramount
where the murder took place. The search area was a circle with a
radius of 75 meters from the center of the bank building (more
than four acres). The search area included the bank and parking
lot, neighboring businesses and parking lots, the intersection in
front of the bank and approximately 50 meters of the streets
bordering the bank.
c. The warrant process
The warrant set forth a three-step process by which Google
would respond to the request for information. At step one, Google
was directed to search location history data for the six designated
locations and times and produce an anonymized list of devices
found within the search areas in the designated timeframes,
including the individual times each device was recorded in the
search area during the applicable time period.
At step two, law enforcement would review the anonymized
list of devices “to remove devices that are not relevant to the
investigation, for example, devices that were not in the location
for a sufficient period of time.” If law enforcement believed
additional information was needed to determine whether a
particular device was relevant to the investigation, law
enforcement could request that Google provide additional location
history information for that device even if that information fell
outside of the initial geographic and temporal search parameters.

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 At step three, law enforcement could demand identifying
information from Google for all devices law enforcement deemed
relevant to the investigation. The warrant directed Google to
provide this identifying information without additional legal
process.
3. Execution of the Search Warrant and Charges Against
Meza and Meneses
A Los Angeles superior court judge, acting as magistrate,
signed the geofence search warrant on March 21, 2019.
After reviewing the anonymized data provided by Google,
the Sheriff’s Department sought identifying information for
eight devices that had been in the relevant locations on March 1,
2019. Google provided corresponding email addresses to law
enforcement. The Sheriff’s Department then drafted additional
search warrants related to two of those email addresses, which
eventually led to the identification of Meza and Meneses as
suspects.
In an information filed December 4, 2020 Meza and
Meneses were charged with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))
with three special circumstances—murder for financial gain
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)), murder by means of lying in wait (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(15)) and intentionally discharging a firearm with intent
to inflict death (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21)). It was specially alleged as
to the murder charge that a principal was armed with a rifle
within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(2). The
information included special firearm-use enhancement
allegations as to Meza (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) and (d)).
Meneses was also charged with two counts of possession of a
firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), possession of an assault
weapon (§ 30605, subd. (a)) and unlawful possession of

9
ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)). Finally, the information
specially alleged Meneses had suffered a prior serious felony
conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
4. The Motion To Quash and Suppress
On March 18, 2021 Meza moved pursuant to section 1538.5
to quash the geofence warrant and suppress all evidence seized
as a result of the warrant, including evidence seized pursuant to
subsequent warrants and statements made by witnesses and
other individuals. Meneses joined the motion. The motion
contended Detective Bailey’s affidavit failed to establish probable
cause and the geofence warrant lacked the particularity required
by the Fourth Amendment. In a supplemental brief Meza and
Meneses argued the geofence warrant did not comply with
CalECPA because it did not adequately identify the target
individuals or accounts and applications to be searched.
A hearing on the motion was held on April 12, 2021.
Spencer McInvaille, an expert on geolocation and mobile devices,
testified on behalf of Meza and Meneses. McInvaille’s testimony
was based on his training and experience, as well as his review of
documents publicly filed by Google.6

6 One such document was the Google Amicus Brief filed in
United States v. Chatrie (E.D.Va. 2022) 590 F.Supp.3d 901, which
was admitted as an exhibit without objection at the hearing.
McInvaille also considered two declarations of Google employees
filed in United States v. Chatrie, which the superior court
received into evidence without objection. These documents
describe Google’s location data collection and storage procedures
as well as its process for responding to warrants for location
history data.

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 McInvaille explained Google’s location data is derived from
several sources: GPS, Bluetooth signals, cellular network data
and the strength of nearby WiFi networks.7 Google logs each
device’s location hundreds of times each day—as often as every
two minutes according to some estimates. (See United States v.
Chatrie (E.D.Va. 2022) 590 F.Supp.3d 901, 908 & fn. 10
(Chatrie).) However, Google cannot pinpoint a user’s location
with 100 percent accuracy. McInvaille stated the longitude and
latitude recorded by Google as the device’s location is “not a
physical actual location of the device. It’s just the estimate
derived from the measurement that they took.” Thus, Google
also reports a confidence interval, measured in meters, that
indicates Google’s confidence in the location of the device. For
example, a confidence interval of 15 meters indicates Google
estimates the device is within a 15 meter radius of the given
coordinates. The size of the confidence interval varies depending
on the type of data from which the measurement was taken.

7 According to Google, a user must not only enable location
tracking on his or her device but also must opt-in to having that
location data saved. Specifically, Google “saves a record of the
user’s travels only when the user opts into [location history] as a
setting on her Google account, enables the ‘Location Reporting’
feature for at least one mobile device, enables the device-location
setting on that mobile device, permits that device to share
location data with Google, powers on and signs into her Google
account on that device, and then travels with it.” (Google Amicus
Brief, supra, at p. 8.) Nevertheless, some reports indicate Google
can track a user’s location history even when the user has opted
out of location reporting. (See In re Search of Information that Is
Stored at the Premises Controlled by Google LLC (D.D.C. 2021)
579 F.Supp.3d 62, 70 & fn. 8.)

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Google aims to estimate a device’s location with 68 percent
accuracy—that is, there will be a 68 percent chance the user was
actually within the circle created by the confidence interval.
When responding to a geofence warrant, Google considers a
device within the search parameter if the estimated location is
within the search boundaries even if the confidence interval
extends beyond the search boundaries. Similarly, a device with
an estimated location outside the search boundaries will not be
included in the search results even if the confidence interval
extends within the search boundaries.
Romy Haas, a crime analyst for the Sheriff’s Department,
testified for the prosecution regarding the application for and
execution of the geofence warrant in this case. Haas explained
she typically consults with detectives prior to drafting a geofence
warrant application and assists in establishing the geographic
parameters and timeframes of the requested warrant. She had
participated in drafting and processing returns on more than
50 geofence warrants by the time of the motion to suppress
hearing in 2021, but at the time she assisted Detective Bailey
with drafting the geofence warrant in this case in 2019 she had
worked on only two other geofence warrants. Haas had
participated in a number of trainings regarding location history
data and geofence warrants, most of which took place after the
warrant had been drafted in this case.
The court directly questioned Haas regarding how she and
Detective Bailey decided on the search parameters for the
warrant. For the first location (Thabet’s apartment building),
Haas testified the search radius of 100 meters from the center of
the apartment building was selected so that it would capture the
street in front of the building “in the event that [Thabet] was

12
being watched before he left.” Haas explained it was typical with
early geofence warrants to draw a circle from a midpoint, but she
noted a polygon “will help reduce the number of devices that will
show up in the geofence.”
For the second location, Haas testified the geofence
perimeter was again drawn to capture the streets bordering the
gas station “to see if . . . someone had been coming down those
streets or parked on those streets if the—if someone was
watching the victim at that location.” The perimeter for the third
location was drawn to include the street on the north side of the
gas station because there was surveillance video footage showing
the suspect vehicles parked on that street. The perimeters for
locations four and five were drawn as rectangles because Haas
found using a circle captured too much area and would
“encompass a bunch of devices that I didn’t feel would be
necessary because they were in the outer neighborhood.”
Instead, for location four she drew a rectangle that encompassed
the area the victim visited inside the strip mall, and for location
five the rectangle encompassed a parking lot across the street
from the gas station where one of the suspect vehicles had been
seen on surveillance video.
Haas also testified regarding the warrant’s three-step
process for Google’s production of data in response to the
warrant. Haas explained the process was mandated by Google as
the procedure that would most likely ensure Google’s compliance
with a geofence warrant.8 However, the process was not strictly

8 See generally Chatrie, supra, 590 F.Supp.3d at page 914
(“[I]n 2018, Google held both internal discussions with its counsel
and external discussions with law enforcement agencies,
including the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section

13
followed in this case. Rather than produce an anonymized list of
users found within the six geofence perimeters at step one, a
Google employee called Haas and told her the strip mall location
had produced “voluminous results.” Google requested Haas
either shorten the timeframe or decrease the search area to
reduce the number of responsive results. Haas testified she
declined the request because “based on our careful consideration
of the location and the timeframe involved, I didn’t think that
would be fair to the case to do that. . . . I in discussion explained
to [the Google employee] really what I was looking for based on
the facts of the case. . . . I said I was looking to find devices that
were [in] at least two or more of the geofence locations.” The
Google representative responded she could filter the search and
produce information for devices that were only in two or more of
the specified locations at the applicable times. Haas agreed.
Google produced a list of eight anonymized accounts that
had been at two or more of the six locations at the relevant time
periods. Of the eight accounts, one had been at four of the
geofence locations, one at three locations and the remaining six
had been at two locations. Haas requested, and Google produced,
identification information for all eight accounts. Two of those

of the United States Department of Justice (‘CCIPS’), to develop
internal procedures on how to respond to geofence warrants. ‘To
ensure privacy protections for Google users, . . . Google instituted
a policy of objecting to any warrant that failed to include
de[-]identification and narrowing measures.’ [Citation.]
Seemingly developed as a result of Google’s collaboration with
CCIPS, this de-identification and narrowing ‘protocol typically
. . . entails a three-step process’”).

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accounts (the ones that had been at three and four of the
locations) ultimately led authorities to Meza and Meneses.
5. The Superior Court’s Denial of the Motions To Suppress
The superior court found there was sufficient probable
cause to support issuance of the geofence warrant. The fact that
the two suspect cars were seen in multiple surveillance videos
made it reasonably probable “that they were using their phones
to communicate or to determine the location that they’re going
to.” The court further found the warrant satisfied the
particularity requirements of the United States Constitution and
CalECPA. The court stated it was satisfied the boundaries of the
search areas were based on the locations of the suspect vehicles
as seen in the video footage and were not so broad as to
unnecessarily include devices of uninvolved bystanders. Finally,
the court ruled, even if the warrant had been defective, the
officers were entitled to rely on it under the good faith exception
of United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 (Leon). Accordingly,
the court denied the motions to suppress.
6. The Pleas and Sentences
Following denial of the motions to suppress evidence, Meza
pleaded guilty to first degree murder and Meneses pleaded no
contest to second degree murder. Pursuant to negotiated
agreements the special circumstances and special allegations
were stricken, and the remaining counts as to Meneses were
dismissed. Meza was sentenced to an indeterminate state prison
term of 25 years to life. Meneses was sentenced to an
indeterminate state prison term of 15 years to life.

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 DISCUSSION
1. The Geofence Warrant Violated the Fourth Amendment
a. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures and guarantees that “no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (U.S. Const.,
4th Amend.; see People v. Robinson (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1131;
People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830-831.)9

9 Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution similarly
provides, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and
searches may not be violated; and a warrant may not issue except
on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to
be seized.” Notwithstanding this separate warrant requirement
in the California Constitution, pursuant to article I, section 28,
subdivision (f)(2), of the state Constitution (the Truth-in-
Evidence provision), “evidence sought to be introduced at a
criminal trial is subject to suppression as the fruit of an
unconstitutional search and seizure ‘only if exclusion
is . . . mandated by the federal exclusionary rule applicable to
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment [of the
United States Constitution].’” (People v. Maikhio (2011)
51 Cal.4th 1074, 1089; accord, In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d
873, 896.)
This limitation on the suppression of unlawfully obtained
evidence does not apply if the search violated state law and
exclusion was authorized “by statute hereafter enacted by a two-

16
 A search is presumptively reasonable, and thus in
compliance with the Fourth Amendment, if supported by a
warrant describing with particularity the thing or the place to be
searched. (See People v. Weiss (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1082.)
“‘The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement [is] to
prevent general searches. By limiting the authorization to search
to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause
to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be
carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the
character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers
intended to prohibit.’” (People v. Amador (2000) 24 Cal.4th 387,
392; accord, Maryland v. Garrison (1987) 480 U.S. 79, 84.)
Accordingly, in determining the validity of a warrant,
courts examine three main factors: probable cause, particularity
and overbreadth.10 Probable cause will be found to support the

thirds vote of the membership of each house of the Legislature.”
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(2).)
10 As a threshold matter no warrant is required if an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the place
or thing searched. (See People v. Camacho, supra, 23 Cal.4th at
pp. 830-831.) As the Attorney General recognizes, the prosecutor
did not argue this point in the trial court; and, thus, the issue is
forfeited. (See People v. Nottoli (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 531, 561
[“[s]ince the prosecutor failed, in opposing the suppression
motion, to assert that Barry had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the vehicle or cell phone, the People have forfeited that
issue on review of the suppression ruling”].) Nevertheless, the
United States Supreme Court has suggested that an individual
has a right to privacy regarding his or her current and historical
location. (See Carpenter v. United States (2018) __ U.S. __,
[138 S.Ct. 2206, 2219] [retrieval of wireless carrier cell tower
data to determine suspect’s location “invaded [suspect’s]

17
issuance of a warrant if “‘the magistrate had a substantial basis
for concluding a fair probability existed that a search would
uncover wrongdoing.’” (People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632,
659-660; accord, People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 576; People
v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1040-1041; see Illinois v. Gates
(1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238-239 (Gates).)
“Particularity is the requirement that the warrant must
clearly state what is sought.” (In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
Dated Dec. 10, 1987 (9th Cir. 1991) 926 F.2d 847, 856.) To satisfy
this requirement, “[c]omplete precision in describing the place to
be searched is not required.” (People v. Amador, supra,
24 Cal.4th at p. 392; accord, People v. Minder (1996)
46 Cal.App.4th 1784, 1788.) “‘It is enough if the description is
such that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable
effort ascertain and identify the place intended.’” (Amador, at
p. 392; accord, Steele v. United States (1925) 267 U.S. 498, 503.)
“Breadth deals with the requirement that the scope of the
warrant be limited by the probable cause on which the warrant is
based.” (In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Dec. 10, 1987, supra,
926 F.2d at pp. 856-857.) This is distinct from the particularity
requirement because it “prevents the magistrate from making a
mistaken authorization to search for particular objects in the first
instance, no matter how well the objects are described.” (United
States v. Weber (9th Cir. 1990) 923 F.2d 1338, 1342 [although
rules regarding particularity and overbreadth “serve the same
ultimate purpose, they achieve the purpose in distinct ways”]; see

reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of his physical
movements”]; Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 395-396
[citing location history data as one of the privacy interests
implicated by search of a cell phone’s contents].)

18
also United States v. Purcell (2d Cir. 2020) 967 F.3d 159, 179 [“A
warrant that comports with the particularity requirements may,
however, be defective due to overbreadth. ‘[B]readth and
particularity are related but distinct concepts’”].)
“In reviewing the trial court’s suppression ruling, we defer
to its factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. We
independently assess the legal question of whether the
challenged search or seizure satisfies the Fourth Amendment.”
(People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 975; accord, People v.
Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 133.)
b. The Search Warrant Was Supported by Probable
Cause
Meza and Meneses contend Detective Bailey’s assertion of
probable cause in his affidavit was insufficient because “[t]here
was absolutely no evidence that either suspect had, or was using,
a phone or other device at any time during the relevant
timeframe.” Accordingly, they argue, there was no basis for
determining that searching cell phone location history would lead
to the identity of potential suspects or the recovery of other
evidence related to the murder.
Probable cause does not require conclusive evidence that a
search will uncover relevant evidence, only that “‘there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place.’” (People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at
p. 1041; accord, Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 238.) “‘“[S]ufficient
probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment.”’” (People v. Beck and Cruz (2019)
8 Cal.5th 548, 592; see also People v. Carrington (2009)
47 Cal.4th 145, 163 [“[t]he showing required in order to establish
probable cause is less than a preponderance of the evidence or

19
even a prima facie case”].) In making this determination a
magistrate may draw reasonable inferences about where
evidence is likely to be found based on the nature of the evidence
and the type of offense. (See Gates, at p. 240; People v. Sandlin
(1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1310, 1315.)
It was reasonable for the magistrate to conclude the
perpetrators were carrying cell phones the morning of the murder
and used them in coordinating their movements. Not only did
Detective Bailey opine, based on his training and experience, that
criminal suspects use cell phones to coordinate criminal activity,
but also such an inference was reasonable in today’s society,
especially given the suspected movement of the individuals to
various locations in separate vehicles. (See Riley v. California
(2014) 573 U.S. 373, 385, 401 [cell phones “are now such a
pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial
visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature
of human anatomy”; “[c]ell phones have become important tools
in facilitating coordination and communication among members
of criminal enterprises”]; United States v. James (8th Cir. 2021)
3 F.4th 1102, 1105 [finding probable cause supported warrant for
cell phone records “[e]ven if nobody knew for sure whether the
robber actually possessed a cell phone, the judges were not
required to check their common sense at the door and ignore the
fact that most people ‘compulsively carry cell phones with them
all the time’”].)
c. The Search Warrant Lacked Sufficient Particularity
As discussed, the “purpose of the ‘particularity’
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is to avoid general and
exploratory searches by requiring a particular description of the
items to be seized.” (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229,

20
1296.) “However, a warrant ‘need only be reasonably specific’
[citation], and the ‘specificity required “varies depending on the
circumstances of the case and the type of items involved.”’”
(People v. Robinson, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1132 [“particularity
‘is a flexible concept, reflecting the degree of detail available from
the facts known to the affiant and presented to the issuing
magistrate’”].) “‘[T]his requirement is held to be satisfied if the
warrant imposes a meaningful restriction upon the objects to be
seized.’” (People v. Frank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 711, 724.) In other
words, “[t]he description in a search warrant must be sufficiently
definite that the officer conducting the search ‘can, with
reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.’
[Citation.] Nothing should be left to the discretion of the officer.”
(People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 880; see also United States
v. Blakeney (4th Cir. 2020) 949 F.3d 851, 863 [warrants met
particularity requirement where they “describe the items to be
seized with enough particularity to constrain the discretion of the
executing officers and prevent a general search”]; United States v.
Collins (9th Cir. 1987) 830 F.2d 145, 145-146 [warrant not
sufficiently particular where it contained an incorrect address
and imprecise description, resulting in search of the wrong
house].)
The warrant in this case sufficiently described the place to
be searched (Google’s database of users’ location history) and the
items to be retrieved from that search (designated records for
users found within the boundaries of certain coordinates at
certain times). Indeed, Mesa and Meneses do not argue there
was any ambiguity in the warrant that would lead law
enforcement or Google personnel to search an incorrect database

21
or to identify individuals not contemplated by the text of the
warrant.
However, the warrant here failed to meet the particularity
requirement because it provided law enforcement with unbridled
discretion regarding whether or how to narrow the initial list of
users identified by Google. Once the step one search had been
conducted, law enforcement officials were able to enlarge the
geographic parameters of the search and request additional
information on any of the potentially thousands of users
identified without any objective criteria limiting their discretion.
Again, at step three law enforcement could seek identifying
information of any of the users found within the search
parameters without restriction on how many users could be
identified or any further showing that information concerning
each individual user would be relevant to the case.
This failure to place any meaningful restriction on the
discretion of law enforcement officers to determine which
accounts would be subject to further scrutiny or deanonymization
renders the warrant invalid. (See Chatrie, supra, 590 F.Supp.3d
at p. 934 [geofence warrant lacks requisite particularity because
“Steps 2 and 3 of this warrant leave the executing officer with
unbridled discretion and lack any semblance of objective criteria
to guide how officers would narrow the lists of users”]; In re
Search of: Info. Stored at Premises Controlled by Google (N.D.Ill.
2020) 481 F.Supp.3d 730, 754 (In re Google N.D.Ill) [denying
geofence warrant application because “the warrant puts no limit
on the government’s discretion to select the device IDs from
which it may then derive identifying information from among the
anonymized list of Google-connected devices that traversed the
geofences”]; In re Search of Info. Stored at the Premises

22
Controlled by Google (Va.Cir.Ct., Feb. 24, 2022, KM-2022-79)
2022 Va.Cir. Lexis 12, at pp. *24-*25 [denying geofence warrant
application that allowed police to “unilaterally . . . enlarge the
Court-authorized search zone” and “unilaterally tell Google which
cell phones it wants to unmask to obtain the owner’s personal
information”].)11
d. The Search Warrant Was Overbroad
In determining whether a warrant is overbroad courts
consider “whether probable cause existed to seize all items of a
category described in the warrant” and “whether the government
could have described the items more particularly in light of the
information available to it at the time the warrant issued.”
(United States v. Shi (9th Cir. 2008) 525 F.3d 709, 731-732; see
also People v. Hepner (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 761, 778
[“overbreadth also hinges on whether a more precise description
[of the items to be seized] was reasonably possible”]; People v.
MacAvoy (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 746, 754-755 [“[o]n its face, the
warrant would allow the officers to search every part of the
fraternity house; since probable cause existed to search

11 While not the only way to address unfettered law
enforcement discretion at steps two and three, judicial oversight
at those steps, not just prior to issuance of the warrant, would
resolve many of the constitutional deficiencies discussed. (See,
e.g., In re Search of Information that Is Stored at the Premises
Controlled by Google LLC (D.D.C. 2021) 579 F.Supp.3d 62, 88-89
[granting geofence warrant application requiring law
enforcement to seek second court authorization for additional
information regarding anonymous users initially identified by
Google; this process “eliminated law enforcement’s discretion at
step two by requiring it to return to the Court and justify any
device deanonymization”].)

23
appellant’s room only, the warrant, as a general rule, is void”];
Owens v. Lott (4th Cir. 2004) 372 F.3d 267, 276 [warrant
authorizing search of “all persons” at certain location was valid
“if the affidavit and information provided to the magistrate
supply enough detailed information to establish probable cause to
believe that all persons on the premises at the time of the search
are involved in the criminal activity”]; In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Dated Dec. 10, 1987, supra, 926 F.2d at p. 857 [“the
concept of breadth may be defined as the requirement that there
be probable cause to seize the particular thing named in the
warrant”].)
The geofence warrant in this case ran afoul of both of these
requirements. First, the warrant authorized the identification of
any individual within six large search areas without any
particularized probable cause as to each person or their location.
For example, the first search location, the area around Thabet’s
apartment complex, allowed law enforcement to obtain
information on every individual in a seven-and-a-half-acre area
over a 75 minute period in the early morning. The search area
included Thabet’s entire apartment complex and surrounding
buildings despite the lack of any evidence (or supported
inference) that the suspects left their vehicles, let alone entered
the apartment building. Given the early morning timeframe for
the search, the warrant permitted identification of numerous
individuals with no connection to the murder who were simply
still at home. Indeed, for many of the search locations, the
geographic boundaries incorporated more surface area where the
suspects were not believed to have been present (inside buildings)
than area where they were (adjacent roads and intersections).
This overbreadth is even more pernicious given that individuals

24
(especially those near the perimeters of the search area) would be
included in the warrant return despite an estimated 32 percent
chance they were actually not within the search parameter at all.
Second, law enforcement officials failed to draw the search
boundaries as narrowly as they could have given the information
available. For the first location Haas explained her goal was to
capture the street in front of the apartment complex. Rather
than draw a shape that would include only that targeted area,
Haas used the center of the apartment building as a starting
point for a circle large enough to incorporate the desired area.
Haas implicitly conceded this method resulted in an overbroad
search and no longer constituted best practices, explaining, “I feel
that sometimes a polygon shape will help reduce the number of
devices that will show up in the geofence. But a lot of circles in
this type of shape [were] being used in the beginning to indicate
the actual geofence.”
The timeframes designated in the geofence warrant were
also not narrowly tailored. The most striking example of this
overbreadth was with location three, the Bellflower gas station
where Thabet met his brother-in-law. According to preliminary
hearing testimony, Thabet’s brother-in-law told police he met
Thabet at the gas station at approximately 9:00 a.m. and they left
at approximately 9:40 a.m. The warrant, however, directed
Google to search the location for any devices present between
7:30 a.m. and 9:40 a.m. Even allowing for some uncertainty,
there is no evidence Thabet or the suspects were at the gas
station 90 minutes before the time that the brother-in-law
recalled arriving. Given this was a gas station in a metropolitan
area during normal commuting hours, there were likely many

25
devices travelling through the search area during that
90 minutes that were entirely unrelated to Thabet’s murder.
Haas’s testimony there was surveillance footage from the
Bellflower location showing one or both suspect cars parked on
the street near the gas station constituted further evidence of the
failure to narrow the parameters. The Sheriff’s Department
presumably could have determined a far shorter time period
during which the suspects were present based on a timestamp in
the surveillance footage, but they failed to narrow the search
accordingly. In fact, the evidence presented to the magistrate
was devoid of any detail regarding the surveillance footage that
would have supported a finding of probable cause for the
particular search areas and times. Detective Bailey’s affidavit
stated only that surveillance footage was available at “several
locations” without identifying which locations had surveillance
footage and which footage showed the suspects’ vehicles, let alone
the precise location and time the suspects’ vehicles were seen.
This information should have been used to more narrowly focus
the search parameters.
The failure to sufficiently narrow the search parameters
potentially allowed a location-specific identification of thousands
of individuals—likely a search within the ambit of the Fourth
Amendment12— for whom no probable cause existed. While we

12 See Note, Geofence Warrants and the Fourth Amendment
(2021) 134 Harv. L.Rev. 2508, 2510-2511 (whether geofence
warrants are Fourth Amendment searches is an open question;
“[o]n the one hand, the [Supreme] Court has recognized that, in
certain circumstances, individuals have reasonable expectations
of privacy in their location information”; “[o]n the other hand,
there is a strong argument that the third party doctrine—which
states that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy

26
recognize it may be impossible to eliminate the inclusion of all
uninvolved individuals in a geofence warrant, it is the
constitutionally imposed duty of the government to carefully
tailor its search parameters to minimize infringement on the
privacy rights of third parties. (See In re Search Warrant
Application for Geofence Location Data Stored at Google
Concerning Arson Investigation (N.D.Ill. 2020) 497 F.Supp.3d
345, 362 (In re Arson Investigation) [“[I]t is nearly impossible to
pinpoint a search where only the perpetrator’s privacy interests
are impacted. Similarly, in the geofence context, there is no way
to exclude the possibility that at any given time a delivery truck
may drop off a parcel within the geofence location. The proper
line of inquiry is not whether a search of location data could
impact even one uninvolved person’s privacy interest, but rather
the reasonableness of the search, the probability of finding
evidence at the location, and the particularity of the search
request”]; In the Matter of the Search of Information Associated
with the Facebook Account Identified by the Username
Aaron.Alexis That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Facebook,
Inc. (D.D.C. 2013) 21 F.Supp.3d 1, 7 [rejecting “overly broad
search and seizure warrant application directed to Facebook, at
least in part because it unduly invaded the privacy of third
parties”].) The warrant here, authorizing the search of more than
20 acres total over a cumulative period of more than five hours in
residential and commercial areas did not meet this fundamental
threshold requirement.

in information they voluntarily provide to third parties—applies
to these warrants” (fn. omitted)).

27
 Other cases that have considered the validity of geofence
warrants have also, almost uniformly, determined that such
warrants are valid only if they are narrowly tailored to avoid
unnecessary infringement on the privacy of uninvolved third
parties. For example, in Chatrie a geofence warrant was issued
directing Google to search a 17.5-acre area surrounding a bank
where a robbery had occurred. The timeframe was for
approximately 30 minutes prior to the robbery and 30 minutes
after the robbery—a total of one hour. The district court noted
the search area included a church and the search identified
individuals “who may not have been remotely close enough to the
Bank to participate in or witness the robbery.” (Chatrie, supra,
590 F.Supp.3d at p. 930.) The court found the warrant was
overbroad because it failed to “include any facts to establish
probable cause to collect such broad and intrusive data” from
each individual within the search area. (Id., at p. 929;13 see also
In re Search of Information That Is Stored at the Premises
Controlled by Google, LLC (D.Kan. 2021) 542 F.Supp.3d 1153,
1158 (In re Google D.Kan.) [denying geofence warrant application
because search area included two public streets and an
uninvolved business with no explanation as to why suspects
might be found in those locations and contained no justification
for the time period requested]; In re Google N.D.Ill, supra,
481 F.Supp.3d at p. 757 [denying geofence warrant application
because search area included unrelated business, public street,
residential units and parking lot during 90 minute period despite

13 Despite finding the geofence warrant invalid the Chatrie
court ultimately denied the defendant’s motion to suppress based
on the good faith exception of Leon, supra, 468 U.S. 897.

28
no showing all individuals in those locations were involved in the
offense].)
An example at the other end of the spectrum is In re Google
D.D.C., supra, 579 F.Supp.3d 62. In that case, police were
investigating criminal activity at a business located in an
industrial area. Police obtained surveillance footage from inside
the business showing the suspects engaging in criminal activity.
Based on the precise locations of the suspects and the times
depicted in the footage, police designated a geofence area of less
than a quarter of an acre, including the front-half of the business
and the parking lot but excluding another business in the
building and the road bordering the building. The time period in
the warrant totaled 185 minutes in increments of two to
27 minutes on 8 different days based on when police knew the
suspects had been present. The warrant affidavit also explained
that, during the designated time periods, the suspects were
either alone inside the business or were in the proximity of “‘on
average’ no more than 2 or 3 others.” (Id. at p. 73.) The
magistrate judge granted the warrant application, finding the
government had “appropriately contoured the temporal and
geographic windows in which it is seeking location data” and the
warrant did not “have the potential of sweeping up the location
data of a substantial number of uninvolved persons.” (Id. at
pp. 80 & 85; see also In re Arson Investigation, supra,
497 F.Supp.3d at p. 353 [granting geofence warrant application
where search area excluded residences and commercial buildings,
time periods sought were approximately 15 to 30 minutes per
location and there was evidence premises in search areas were
unoccupied during relevant time periods; “the government has
structured the geofence zones to minimize the potential for

29
capturing location data for uninvolved individuals and maximize
the potential for capturing location data for suspects and
witnesses”]; United States v. Rhine (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2023, No. 21-
0687) 2023 U.S.Dist. Lexis 12308, at pp. *95-*103 [denying
motion to suppress where geofence warrant had sought
identification of individuals in the United States Capitol Building
over a four and a half hour period on January 6, 2021; court
found warrant was narrowly tailored to include individuals
improperly inside the Capitol given that the building was closed
to the public and the search area excluded nearby grounds, did
not include any commercial businesses or residences and there
had been substantial road closures during the relevant time
period].)
2. The Officers Reasonably Relied on the Geofence Warrant
in Good Faith
“In Leon, the [United States] Supreme Court held that
when ‘an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a
search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its
scope,’ the ‘marginal or nonexistent benefits’ produced by
suppressing the evidence obtained ‘cannot justify the substantial
costs of exclusion.’” (People v. Lazarus (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th
734, 766, quoting Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 920-922.)
Accordingly, denial of the motion to suppress must be upheld
under the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule where a
search has been conducted “in objectively reasonable reliance on
a subsequently invalidated search warrant.” (Leon, at p. 922.)
Leon set forth four scenarios in which such objectively reasonable
reliance should not be found and suppression remained the
appropriate remedy: (1) “[T[he magistrate or judge in issuing a
warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the

30
affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for
his reckless disregard of the truth”; (2) if “the issuing magistrate
wholly abandoned his [or her] judicial role”; (3) the affidavit is
“‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief
in its existence entirely unreasonable’”; or (4) if the warrant was
“so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to
be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers
cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” (Id. at p. 923.) The
government bears the burden to establish applicability of the
good faith exception. (People v. Willis (2002) 28 Cal.4th 22, 36-
37.)
Meza and Meneses argue both the third and fourth Leon
scenarios—a total lack of probable cause and an obvious failure to
satisfy the requirement of particularity—apply here. As
discussed, probable cause supported issuance of the warrant.
This factor does not preclude application of the good faith
exception.
In determining whether the warrant was so facially
deficient that the executing officers could not have reasonably
presumed it to be valid, “we apply the objective test of ‘whether a
reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search
was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.’” (People v.
Hochanadel (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 997, 1015; see also People v.
Camarella (1991) 54 Cal.3d 592, 605.) “This objective standard
‘requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law
prohibits.’” (People v. Gotfried (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 254, 265.)
That standard was not met here. At the time law
enforcement officers sought and executed the search warrant,
geofence warrants were still a novel investigative tool. The
warrant was only the third prepared by Haas, and she had not

31
yet had much of the training on the practice that she would
eventually receive. In early 2019 when this warrant was drafted
and executed, there were no published cases anywhere in the
country, let alone in California, analyzing the constitutionality of
geofence warrants. (See Chatrie, supra, 590 F.Supp.3d at p. 938
[when warrant was obtained in June 2019, “no court had yet
ruled on the legality” of geofence warrants]; In re Search of:
Information Stored at Premises Controlled by Google (N.D.Ill.
July 8, 2020, No. 20 M 297) 2020 U.S.Dist. Lexis 165185, at p. *9
[noting no controlling authority addressing constitutional validity
of geofence warrants].) Furthermore, as the preceding analysis
demonstrates, “the permissibility of geofence warrants is a
complex topic, requiring a detailed, nuanced understanding and
application of Fourth Amendment principles.” (Chatrie, at
p. 938.)
Meza and Meneses argue the good faith exception should
not apply here because, instead of following the three steps
described in the warrant, “Haas and Bailey disregarded the
express terms set forth in the warrant, and essentially fashioned
their own search warrant.” While officers may not rely on the
good faith exception when they have knowingly exceeded the
scope of a warrant (see Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 918, fn. 19 [the
good faith exception “assumes, of course, that the officers
properly executed the warrant and searched only those places
and for those objects that it was reasonable to believe were
covered by the warrant”]; see also People v. Nguyen (2017)
12 Cal.App.5th 574, 586-587), the manner of execution in this
case (Google’s filtering of the results at step one) narrowed, not
expanded, the search authorized by the warrant. Rather than
receiving a list of many thousands of anonymized devices from

32
Google that could then be filtered and matched, law enforcement
received only information about eight specific devices—as if only
two rooms of a house were searched pursuant to a warrant that
authorized searching the entire property.
Given the dearth of authority directly on point and the
novelty of the particular surveillance technique at issue, the
officers were not objectively unreasonable in believing the
warrant was valid, even if the issue, upon close legal
examination, is not a particularly close one. (See People v.
Rowland (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1124 [applying good faith
exception where no California precedent existed on the issue];
People v. Pressey (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1191 [same]; see
also United States v. Smith (N.D.Miss. Feb. 10, 2023, No. 3:21-cr-
107-SA) 2023 U.S.Dist. Lexis 22944, at pp. *37-*38 [applying
good faith exception to geofence warrant given lack of legal
authority on the issue]; Chatrie, supra, 590 F.Supp.3d at p. 938
[same].)14
3. The Geofence Warrant Did Not Violate CalECPA
Effective January 1, 2016, CalECPA requires law
enforcement officials to obtain a warrant in order to compel
production of electronic communication information and

14 Meza and Meneses attempt to distinguish Chatrie because
in that case the detective sought advice from prosecutors before
applying for the geofence warrant. While such a practice is
certainly prudent when dealing with a novel search technique
and a lack of legal authority, we cannot say in this particular
instance the failure to do so rendered law enforcement’s reliance
on the warrant objectively unreasonable.

33
electronic device information from a service provider.15 (§ 1546.1,
subd. (b).) Covered information includes “information stored on
or generated through the operation of an electronic device,
including the current and prior locations of the device.” (§ 1546,
subd. (g).) Any warrant issued pursuant to CalECPA “shall
describe with particularity the information to be seized by
specifying, as appropriate and reasonable, . . . the target
individuals or accounts” and “the applications or services
covered.” (§ 1546.1, subd. (d)(1).) A party “may move to suppress
any electronic information obtained or retained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or of this
chapter.” (§ 1546.4, subd. (a).)16
Meza and Meneses first argue the geofence warrant in this
case violated CalECPA because it “fails to specifically target
individuals or accounts. No individual’s name was included in
the warrant, nor was any specific cell phone number, email
address, or account information.” Their argument ignores the

15 Prior to passage of CalECPA, California law did not require
law enforcement officials to obtain a warrant to access most
electronic information. Proponents of CalECPA sought to update
the law for “the digital age” and “properly safeguard the robust
constitutional privacy and free speech rights of Californians, spur
innovation, and support public safety by instituting clear warrant
standards for government access to electronic information.” (Sen.
Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 178 (2015-2016
Reg. Sess.) Mar. 24, 2015; see also Freiwald, At the Privacy
Vanguard: California’s Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(CalECPA) (2018) 33 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 131, 143-147.)
16 Senate Bill No. 178 (Stats. 2015, ch. 651) was adopted by a
greater-than-two-thirds vote by both the state Senate and
Assembly. See foonote 9, above.

34
plain language of the statute, which provides that a warrant
shall describe with particularity the information to be seized “as
appropriate and reasonable.” (§ 1546.1, subd. (d)(1).) The
warrant in this case described the target individuals and
accounts with the greatest degree of particularity available to
investigators—individuals whose devices were located within the
search boundaries at certain times. There is no requirement in
the statute that a suspect’s name or other identifying information
be included in the warrant to ensure its validity. In fact,
CalECPA specifically contemplates a scenario where there is “no
identified target of a warrant” and provides that, in such an
instance, because notice of the warrant cannot be served upon
any individual, the law enforcement agency seeking the warrant
must notify the California Department of Justice. (§ 1546.2,
subd. (c).) Accordingly, the failure to specify an individual’s name
or other identifying information did not render the warrant
invalid under CalECPA.
Meza and Meneses next argue the warrant violated
CalECPA because it did not specify the “applications and services
covered” by the warrant. CalECPA does not define “applications
and services”; and Meza and Meneses have not explained what
they believe it means, what particular information they contend
should have been included in the warrant, or how the warrant
was ambiguous absent such unspecified information. The
common sense meaning of the statute appears to be that, when
law enforcement seeks to recover the content of electronic
communications, such as emails or text messages, the warrant
must specify, as appropriate and reasonable, the particular mail
or text message applications and services from which law
enforcement seeks to retrieve information. With a geofence

35
warrant, however, the government is not seeking data or content
related to a particular application or service. Rather, what is
sought is the service provider’s record of all electronic contact
with that device, regardless of which applications or services
originated the contact. Accordingly, the failure to name a
particular application or service in this instance does not result
in a violation of CalECPA.
Finally, Meza and Meneses argue any constitutional
infirmities in the warrant create an independent violation of
CalECPA.17 Meza and Meneses do not explain precisely how a
constitutional violation is also a statutory violation. However, it
appears they rely on CalECPA’s requirement that a warrant
must comply with all “provisions of California and federal law”
(§ 1546.1, subd. (d)(3)) and its grant of standing to “any person”
to “move to suppress any electronic information obtained or
retained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution or of this chapter” (§ 1546.4, subd. (a)).
Those provisions do nothing more than expressly preserve an
individual’s existing rights under the federal Constitution. There
is nothing in the cited language that, without more, converts a
Fourth Amendment violation into a statutory violation.

17 Establishing an independent CalECPA violation in addition
to a Fourth Amendment violation is crucial to Meza and
Meneses’s position because they contend the Leon good faith
exception is not applicable to a CalECPA violation. We need not
address that issue.

36
 DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.

37
Filed 8/16/23

Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven - No. B318310

S280089

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
En Banc
________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DANIEL MEZA et al., Defendants and Appellants.
________________________________________________________________________

Defendant Meneses’s motion to join defendant Meza’s petition for review is
granted.
The petitions for review are denied.

Liu and Evans, JJ., are of the opinion the petition should be granted.

(See Dissenting Statement by Liu, J.)

____________/s/__________________
Chief Justice
 PEOPLE v. MEZA
S280089

Dissenting Statement by Justice Liu

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA;
Pen. Code, § 1546 et seq.) governs law enforcement’s ability to
“compel the production of or access to electronic communication
information from a service provider.” (Id., § 1546.1, subd. (b).)
“Any warrant for electronic information” must meet certain
requirements: it must “describe with particularity the
information to be seized” and “require that any information
obtained . . . that is unrelated to the objective of the warrant
shall be sealed.” (Id., § 1546.1, subd. (d)(1), (2)). In addition, the
warrant must “comply with all other provisions of California
and federal law, including any provisions prohibiting, limiting,
or imposing additional requirements on the use of search
warrants.” (Id., § 1546.1, subd. (d)(3).)
Here, law enforcement used a geofence warrant — a
“ ‘ “reverse location search[]” ’ ” request — to access device
location data gathered by Google. (People v. Meza (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 520, 525 (Meza).) The warrant directed Google to
search certain location history data, produce an anonymized list
of devices, and turn over identifying information for devices that
law enforcement deemed relevant to the investigation. (Id. at
pp. 529–530.) This led to the identification of defendants Daniel
Meza and Walter Meneses, whose cell phones, while “signed in
to Google accounts connected to them[,] were in several of the
same locations” as the victim. (Id. at p. 526.) Meza and Meneses
challenge the warrant and admission of the resulting evidence

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Liu, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review

under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and CalECPA.
The Court of Appeal concluded the geofence warrant
violated the Fourth Amendment because it “lacked the
particularity required by the Fourth Amendment and was
impermissibly overbroad.” (Meza, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at
p. 526.) It then held that the warrant did not violate CalECPA,
rejecting an argument that the “constitutional infirmities in the
warrant create an independent violation” of the statute. (Meza,
at p. 546.) The Court of Appeal’s analysis was minimal. It
reasoned that “nothing in the [statutory] language . . . , without
more, converts a Fourth Amendment violation into a statutory
violation.” (Ibid.)
It is not apparent what “more” is necessary here. Penal
Code section 1546.1, subdivision (d)(3) requires all warrants to
comply with “all other provisions of California and federal law,”
which includes the Fourth Amendment. CalECPA’s
incorporation of the Fourth Amendment’s requirements seems
unambiguous: a warrant that violates federal law also violates
CalECPA. Consistent with this reading, the statute’s remedy
provision specifically references Fourth Amendment violations:
“Any person in a trial, hearing, or proceeding may move to
suppress any electronic information obtained or retained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution or of this chapter.” (Pen. Code, § 1546.4, subd. (a).)
The Court of Appeal held that these “provisions do nothing
more than expressly preserve an individual’s existing rights
under the federal Constitution.” (Meza, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th
at p. 546.) But there is no need for a state statute to “expressly
preserve” federal rights. An individual can always

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 PEOPLE v. MEZA
Liu, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review

independently pursue a federal constitutional challenge, as
Meza and Meneses did here. CalECPA did not purport to
supplant the requirements of federal law; in fact, it would have
been impermissible for the statute to do so. (See Sibron v. New
York (1968) 392 U.S. 40, 60–61 [a state “is, of course, free to
develop its own law of search and seizure to meet the needs of
local law enforcement” but “may not . . . authorize police conduct
which trenches upon Fourth Amendment rights”].) Interpreting
these provisions as solely preserving existing federal rights
appears to give them no effect.
The consequences of this decision are potentially
significant. Despite finding that the warrant violated the
Fourth Amendment, the Court of Appeal declined to apply the
exclusionary rule under the good faith exception of United
States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897. (Meza, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th
at p. 544.) It is not clear whether such an exception applies to
violations of CalECPA, and there are plausible arguments on
both sides of the question. (See Freiwald, At the Privacy
Vanguard: California’s Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(CalECPA) (2018) 33 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 131, 161 [“[T]he state
procedures do not incorporate the expansive exceptions that
courts have used to deny suppression remedies in Fourth
Amendment cases under the doctrine of good faith.”], fn.
omitted; Meza, at p. 546, fn. 17 [declining to reach the question];
cf. People v. Jackson (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 129, 153–160
[considering various factors in concluding that the good faith
exception does not apply to evidence gathered in violation of
California’s wiretap law].) If the exception does not apply, then
the identifying evidence would be suppressed under CalECPA,
thus affecting the validity of Meza’s and Meneses’s convictions.

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 PEOPLE v. MEZA
Liu, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review

CalECPA is a “significant” statute that made “the law
governing access to electronic communications by law
enforcement in California . . . much more protective of
communications privacy.” (Freiwald, supra, 33 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. at p. 133.) Because I find questionable the Court of Appeal’s
interpretation of this important state law, and because of the
practical importance of the issue, I would grant review.

LIU, J.

I Concur:
EVANS, J.

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