Michael Sullivan v. LG Chem Ltd.

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 23a0185p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

┐
MICHAEL SULLIVAN,
│
Plaintiff-Appellant, │
> No. 22-1203
│
v. │
│
LG CHEM, LTD., │
Defendant-Appellee. │
┘

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:21-cv-11137—Laurie J. Michelson, District Judge.

Argued: May 3, 2023

Decided and Filed: August 17, 2023

Before: MOORE, CLAY, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Mark Granzotto, MARK GRANZOTTO, PC, Berkley, Michigan, for Appellant.
Rachel Atkin Hedley, NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY & SCARBOROUGH LLP, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Mark Granzotto, MARK GRANZOTTO, PC,
Berkley, Michigan, Wolfgang Mueller, MUELLER LAW FIRM, Novi, Michigan, for Appellant.
Rachel Atkin Hedley, NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY & SCARBOROUGH LLP, Columbia,
South Carolina, Cynthia M. Filipovich, CLARK HILL PLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.
_________________

OPINION
_________________

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Defendant LG Chem, Ltd. (“LG Chem”)
manufactured the LG HG2 18650 lithium-ion batteries that exploded in Plaintiff Michael
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 2

Sullivan’s pocket and caused him severe second- and third-degree burns. Sullivan seeks to hold
LG Chem liable for his injuries. Sullivan obtained these batteries from a vape store in Michigan
to use for his e-cigarette device. But LG Chem, a South Korean company, vigorously opposes
personal jurisdiction. It argues that exercising personal jurisdiction over it in Michigan would be
improper under both Michigan’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause because, not only
has LG Chem never sold the 18650 batteries to this Michigan vape store, but also it has never
sold its 18650 batteries for individual consumer use in Michigan. We conclude that LG Chem
urges too narrow a view of personal jurisdiction. The district court sitting in Michigan may
properly exercise personal jurisdiction over LG Chem because it directly shipped its 18650
batteries into the State of Michigan and entered into two supplier contracts with Michigan
companies for 18650 batteries. Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court
and REMAND for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

We begin with the parties. Defendant LG Chem, Ltd. (“LG Chem”) is a South Korean
company, headquartered in Seoul, South Korea. R. 3 (Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at
1) (Page ID #240). It manufactures the LG HG2 18650 lithium-ion battery as “industrial
component products.” Id. at 2 (Page ID #241). LG Chem asserts that it has “never designed,
manufactured, distributed, advertised, or sold any HG2 (or any 18650 lithium ion cells) for use
by individual consumers as standalone, replaceable batteries with e-cigarette or vaping devices.”
Id.; see also R. 21 (LG Chem’s Suppl. Br. at 3) (Page ID #718) (“LG Chem did not serve a
consumer market in Michigan for standalone, replaceable lithium-ion batteries.”). LG Chem
states that its product is “not [a] standalone, replaceable consumer batter[y], and [it was] not
designed to be handled by consumers.” R. 3 (Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 2) (Page ID
#241).

LG Chem has a subsidiary in Michigan—LG Energy Solution Michigan, Inc. f/k/a LG
Chem Michigan, Inc. (“LG Energy” or “LGESMI” or “LGCMI”). Id. According to LG Chem,
LG Energy does not have any role “in the design, manufacture, marketing, distribution, or sale of
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 3

any model of LG 18650 lithium ion cells to anyone.” Id. at 2–3 (Page ID #241–42). LG Energy
is not a party to this appeal.

Sandra Sullivan, Plaintiff’s spouse, visited Montrose Smokers Palace in Montrose,
Michigan1 to purchase a vaping product for Plaintiff on March 28, 2018. R. 1-1 (Compl. ¶ 15)
(Page ID #22); R. 1-1 (Def.’s Initial Disclosures at 1) (Page ID #84). She purchased “a regulated
mod manufactured by SMOK, a NITECORE battery charger, [and, relevant here,] four brown
LG HG2 18650, 3000 mAh, 3.7V batteries,” which are allegedly manufactured by LG Chem. Id.
¶ 16 (Page ID #22); R. 10 (Pl.’s Opp’n at 1–2) (Page ID #337–38).

A few months later, in October 2018, Plaintiff had two of LG Chem’s “18650 batteries in
his left front pocket,” which made a loud sound and exploded in his pocket. R. 1-1 (Compl.
¶ 18) (Page ID #22); see also id ¶ 19 (Page ID #22). Plaintiff’s pants caught fire resulting in,
among other things, “[s]evere second and third-degree burns to his left hand and left upper
thigh,” id. ¶ 27 (Page ID #23–24). He required hospitalization, skin-graft surgery, and
debridement treatments. R. 10 (Pl.’s Opp’n at 2) (Page ID #338). Plaintiff alleges that he
suffered severe scarring, pain and suffering, emotional distress, wage loss, and other economic
and non-economic injuries. R. 1-1 (Compl. ¶ 27) (Page ID #23–24). Sullivan’s Complaint, filed
in the Circuit Court of Genesee County, Michigan, includes one count of negligence, id. ¶¶ 28–
31 (Page ID #24–26), and one count of gross negligence, id. ¶¶ 32–38 (Page ID #26–27).

B. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT AND LIMITED DISCOVERY

Upon removing the lawsuit to federal court, on May 18, 2021, LG Chem moved to
dismiss the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction. R. 3 (Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss) (Page
ID #235–64). Defendant argued that the district court sitting in Michigan lacked both general
and specific jurisdiction over it. Id. ¶¶ 2–3 (Page ID #236). The district court held a hearing on
Defendant’s motion to dismiss. R. 20 (Hr’g Tr.) (Page ID #645–712). The hearing largely
focused on whether Defendant had sufficient contacts with Michigan to satisfy due process. See
generally id.

1
Defendant contends that it has never sold 18650 batteries to Montrose Smokers Palace. R. 3 (Mem. in
Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 2) (Page ID #241).
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 4

During the hearing, Defendant’s counsel acknowledged that, unlike in most other states,
LG Chem likely had at least some small amount of “sales of [] 18650’s into the State of
Michigan.” R. 20 (Hr’g Tr. at 16) (Page ID #660); see also id. at 15 (Page ID #659) (“My
general understanding and recollection is that there were some [sales] to Michigan.”), 32 (Page
ID #676) (stating counsel believed “that there were” a few customers in Michigan to whom LG
Chem shipped 18650 batteries). LG Chem argued that, to the extent these contacts existed, they
were nevertheless irrelevant and of no consequence in establishing personal jurisdiction because
LG Chem never distributed 18650 batteries for the purpose of individual consumer use and those
possible customers were “not serving a market for consumers to go buy one of these 18650 cells
and put it in their pocket and walk around and use it to power their devices.” Id. at 20 (Page ID
#664). At the end of the hearing, the district court ordered “some limited written jurisdictional
discovery on the issue of LG Chem’s contacts with Michigan related to the 18650 batteries,” id.
at 64 (Page ID #708), and supplemental briefing, id. at 66 (Page ID #710).

Limited discovery revealed that LG Chem sent at least two shipments of 18650 batteries
directly into the State of Michigan. First, LG Chem shipped one hundred 18650 batteries to a
vacuum-cleaner manufacturer in Michigan. R. 24-2 (Ex. 1, Def.’s Response to Pl.’s Req. for
Produc. at 2) (Page ID #873); R. 24-5 (Ex. 4, Invoice to Vacuum-cleaner Manufacturer) (Page
ID #897); R. 21-4 (Ex. B, Def.’s Response to Pl.’s Req. for Interrogs. at 5–6) (Page ID #807–
08); R. 21 (LG Chem’s Suppl. Br. at 3–4) (Page ID #718–19) (characterizing the shipment as “a
sample shipment of 100 lithium-ion cells” for which it received no revenue). Second, LG Chem
shipped battery packs that contained 50,277 pounds of 18650 batteries to its subsidiary into
Michigan.2 R. 10-6 (Ex. 5, LG Chem’s Import Data at 2) (Page ID #473); R. 17-2 (Ex. A, K.
Choi Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 4–6) (Page ID #544–45). The district court therefore determined that there
were at least “two undisputed shipments of 18650s to Michigan.” Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd.,
2
Plaintiff originally pointed the district court to three shipments to LG Chem’s subsidiary, R. 10-6 (Ex. 5,
LG Chem’s Import Data at 2–4) (Page ID #473–75), but the district court excluded two subsidiary shipments from
its analysis because “LG Chem submitted an affidavit showing that only one such shipment—which contained over
50,000 pounds of batteries—was for 18650s, while the other two contained ‘lithium-ion pouch-type [battery] cells.’”
Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd., 585 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1003 (E.D. Mich. 2022) (alteration in original); see also R. 17-2
(Ex. A, K. Choi Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 5–6) (Page ID #544–45). The district court considered only the shipment of 18650
batteries “[b]ecause Sullivan never disputed this affidavit and because it is consistent with his statement about
shipments of ‘lithium-ion batteries.’” Sullivan, 585 F. Supp. 3d at 1003. Plaintiff does not challenge that
determination on appeal.
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 5

585 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1003 (E.D. Mich. 2022). On appeal, LG Chem acknowledges this. See
Appellee Br. at 7 (acknowledging shipment of 18650 batteries to vacuum-cleaner manufacturer
in Michigan); id. at 8 (acknowledging shipment of 18650 batteries to its subsidiary in Michigan).
Neither party puts forth evidence or addresses whether any of the 18650 batteries that LG Chem
shipped into Michigan was ultimately one of the batteries that injured Plaintiff.

Limited discovery further revealed that LG Chem executed “two supplier agreements . . .
with Michigan companies relating to 18650 batteries.” Sullivan, 585 F. Supp. 3d at 1003; see
also R. 21 (LG Chem’s Suppl. Br. at 5) (Page ID #720) (describing agreements as “agreements
with manufacturers in Michigan for the purchase of 18650 lithium-ion cells or battery packs
containing 18650 lithium-ion cells for 2016-2020”). First, LG Chem executed an agreement
with that same vacuum-manufacturing company, with headquarters in Michigan, to purchase LG
Chem’s 18650 batteries. See R. 24-6 (Ex. 5, Vacuum-manufacturing Co. Contract) (Page ID
#917–20); R. 24-2 (Ex. 1, Def.’s Response to Pl.’s Req. for Produc. at 5) (Page ID #876); R. 21
(LG Chem’s Suppl. Br. at 5) (Page ID #720). Under this contract, LG Chem shipped 18650
batteries directly into Michigan. See R. 21-4 (Ex. B, Def.’s Response to Pl.’s Req. for Interrogs.
at 5–6) (Page ID #807–08); R. 24-2 (Ex. 1, Def.’s Response to Pl.’s Req. for Produc. at 2) (Page
ID #873); R. 24-5 (Ex. 4, Invoice to Vacuum-cleaner Manufacturer) (Page ID #897). Second,
LG Chem contracted with a Michigan-based automaker-product manufacturer. R. 24-7 (Ex. 6,
Automaker-product Manufacturer Contract) (Page ID #922–46); R. 24-2 (Ex. 1, Def.’s Response
to Pl.’s Req. for Produc. at 5–6) (Page ID #876–77); R. 21 (LG Chem’s Suppl. Br. at 5) (Page ID
#720). This contract was originally entered into in 2016 and then supplemented in 2019 for the
purchase of battery packs. R. 24-7 (Ex. 6, Automaker-product Manufacturer Contract) (Page ID
#922–46). LG Chem never shipped 18650 batteries into Michigan under this contract (and
instead shipped the batteries to a different state) but the contract “shall be considered as a
contract made and to be performed in the State of Michigan” and contains a Michigan forum-
selection clause (wherein both parties waived any personal-jurisdiction defenses). R. 24-7 (Ex.
6, Automaker-product Manufacturer Contract at 20) (Page ID #945); see also R. 24-5 (Ex. 4,
Invoices) (Page ID #898–915) (listing an out-of-state address as the final destination of
shipment); R. 21 (LG Chem’s Suppl. Br. at 5) (Page ID #720) (explaining LG Chem never
shipped any 18650 batteries to the automaker-product manufacturer in Michigan).
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 6

The district court granted LG Chem’s motion to dismiss. Sullivan, 585 F. Supp. 3d at
1008–09. It determined “that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over LG Chem comports with
due process,” id. at 1007, but found that Plaintiff had not sufficiently addressed whether the
exercise of jurisdiction satisfied Michigan’s long-arm statute, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.715, id.
at 1008. Plaintiff timely appealed the final judgment dismissing the case.

C. SIMILAR LAWSUITS AGAINST LG CHEM

Michael Sullivan is not the only individual seeking to hold LG Chem liable for injuries
caused by its 18650 batteries. Over a dozen people have filed lawsuits against LG Chem across
the country. Many cases have been dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., State
ex rel. LG Chem, Ltd. v. McLaughlin, 599 S.W.3d 899, 901–02 (Mo. 2020) (finding no personal
jurisdiction where LG Chem never shipped its 18650 batteries into the forum state). But where
LG Chem has more contacts with the forum states, the cases have survived. See Berven v. LG
Chem, Ltd., No. 1:18-CV-01542-DAD-EPG, 2019 WL 4687080, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 26,
2019) (finding personal jurisdiction because of LG Chem’s direct shipments of the 18650
batteries into California); Tieszen v. EBay, Inc., No. 4:21-CV-04002-KES, 2021 WL 4134352,
*5–7 (D.S.D. Sept. 10, 2021) (finding personal jurisdiction because LG Chem sells and
distributes lithium ion batteries, including the 18650 batteries, in the forum state). We find these
cases informative because they demonstrate that other courts have exercised personal jurisdiction
over LG Chem when LG Chem conducts business related to its 18650 batteries in or ships its
18650 batteries into the forum state.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo a” district court’s “dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.”
Indah v. SEC, 661 F.3d 914, 920 (6th Cir. 2011). Dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction
“under Rule 12(b)(2) involves burden shifting: after the plaintiff makes a prima facie case for
personal jurisdiction, which can be done ‘merely through the complaint,’ the burden shifts to the
defendant.” Peters Broad. Eng’g, Inc. v. 24 Cap., LLC, 40 F.4th 432, 437 (6th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Malone v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc., 965 F.3d 499, 504 (6th Cir. 2020)). When the
burden shifts to the defendant, its “motion to dismiss must be supported by evidence.” Id. The
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 7

burden then returns “to the plaintiff, ‘who may no longer stand on his pleadings but must, by
affidavit or otherwise, set forth specific facts showing that the court has jurisdiction.’” Id. at
437–38 (quoting Malone, 965 F.3d at 504). “We ‘must view the pleadings and affidavits in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff and not weigh the controverting assertions of the party
seeking dismissal.’” Id. at 438 (quoting Ingram Barge Co., LLC v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp.,
3 F.4th 275, 278 (6th Cir. 2021)).

III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

“When sitting in diversity, a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-
of-state defendant only if a court of the forum state could do so.” Blessing v. Chandrasekhar,
988 F.3d 889, 901 (6th Cir. 2021). Personal jurisdiction can be general or specific. Malone, 965
F.3d at 501. “General jurisdiction exists when the defendant’s affiliations with the forum state
are ‘so continuous and systematic as to render the defendant essentially at home’ there.” Id.
(quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). Plaintiff
does not appeal the district court’s determination that it lacked general jurisdiction over LG
Chem.

Specific jurisdiction “depends on an affiliation between the forum and the underlying
controversy, principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is
therefore subject to the State’s regulation.” Id. at 502 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).
“For specific jurisdiction to exist in a diversity case, two factors must be satisfied: the forum
state long-arm statute, and constitutional due process.” Miller v. AXA Winterthur Ins. Co., 694
F.3d 675, 679 (6th Cir. 2012). This appeal concerns both the Michigan long-arm statute and
constitutional due process.

A. MICHIGAN’S LONG-ARM STATUTE

Michigan has numerous long-arm statutes. See Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 600.701–600.735.
Relevant here is § 600.715, which establishes when Michigan has specific jurisdiction3 over a
corporation. It enumerates a list of relationships (and the circumstances creating them) between

3
Specific jurisdiction is sometimes referred to as “limited personal jurisdiction.” See, e.g., Mich. Comp.
Laws § 600.715.
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 8

a defendant and Michigan that permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
Id. § 600.715. It reads:

The existence of any of the following relationships between a corporation or its
agent and the state shall constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the
courts of record of this state to exercise limited personal jurisdiction over such
corporation and to enable such courts to render personal judgments against such
corporation arising out of the act or acts which create any of the following
relationships: (1) The transaction of any business within the state. (2) The doing
or causing any act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in
an action for tort. . . .

Id.

The district court observed a difference in the language and structure between the
constitutional standard for personal jurisdiction and § 600.715. See Sullivan, 585 F. Supp. 3d at
1007–08. The Due Process Clause requires that a “defendant . . . purposefully avail himself of
the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state,” Air Prods.
& Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int’l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting S. Mach. Co.
v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968))), “[t]he plaintiff’s claims . . . ‘arise
out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts’ with the forum,” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth
Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of
Cal., S.F. Cnty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017)) and “the exercise of jurisdiction over the
defendant [be] reasonable,” Air Prods., 503 F.3d at 550 (quoting S. Mach. Co., 401 F.2d at 381).
Michigan’s § 600.715, by contrast, permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant
for claims against “corporation[s] arising out of the act or acts which create” one of the
relationships between the corporation and Michigan enumerated in the statute. Mich. Comp.
Laws § 600.715. Given that the due-process standard also includes the phrase “relate[s] to” and
§ 600.715 enumerates several broad relationships that can give rise to personal jurisdiction, the
district court posited that courts likely need to conduct separate analyses to determine whether
they could exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See Sullivan, 585 F. Supp. 3d at
1007–08. Because the district court determined that Plaintiff had not independently and
sufficiently addressed § 600.715, it dismissed Plaintiff’s action, despite finding that due process
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 9

allowed it to exercise jurisdiction over LG Chem. Id. at 1008. We address each of these points
in turn.

1. Preservation of the Long-arm Statute Arguments

As a preliminary matter, LG Chem now argues that “Plaintiff waived his argument that
§ 600.715 is satisfied by failing to raise that argument before the district court.” Appellee Br. at
13; see also id. at 12, 14–17. But the proceedings below reveal a more complicated and nuanced
story. To determine whether Plaintiff failed to preserve his long-arm-statute argument, we look
to the proceedings below.

LG Chem’s motion to dismiss argued that a district court sitting in Michigan lacked both
general and specific jurisdiction over LG Chem. R. 3 (Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss ¶¶ 2–3)
(Page ID #236). Specific jurisdiction, LG Chem contended, did not exist because its contacts
with Michigan satisfied neither Michigan’s long-arm statute for specific jurisdiction for a
corporation, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.715, nor the Due Process Clause. Id. ¶ 3 (Page ID #236).
Specifically, with regards to the long-arm statute, LG Chem argued that “Plaintiff makes no
allegations of any contacts between LG Chem and Michigan related to his suit,” R. 3 (Mem. in
Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 11) (Page ID #250), that could enable Plaintiff’s action to “arise out of”
an act by LG Chem that created one of the relationships enumerated in the statute, see also Mich.
Comp. Laws § 600.715.

In response, Plaintiff, perhaps mistakenly, argued that LG Chem’s contacts with
Michigan satisfied Michigan’s general jurisdiction long-arm statute (Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 600.711), rather than the specific jurisdiction statute (id. § 600.715). See R. 10 (Pl.’s Opp’n at
8) (Page ID #344). Plaintiff then proceeded to argue that exercising jurisdiction over Defendant
satisfied due process. Id. In LG Chem’s reply brief, LG Chem devoted two sentences to
§ 600.715, noting that Plaintiff failed to address the long-arm statute (§ 600.715), and then LG
Chem immediately moved on to its due-process argument. R. 17 (Def.’s Reply Br. at 3) (Page
ID #530).
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 10

At the hearing, the district court recited to the parties Sixth Circuit precedent interpreting
the scope of Michigan’s long-arm statute and asked the parties whether Michigan’s long-arm
statute and the Due Process Clause required separate analysis. The district court stated:

[W]e’ve got the Sixth Circuit case law that indicates, “[w]hen a state’s long-arm
statute reaches as far as the limits of the due process clause, the two inquiries
merge and the court need only determine whether the assertion of personal
jurisdiction violates constitutional due process.” Is there any dispute here that
Michigan’s long-arm statute reaches as far as the limits of the due process clause
such that we can focus on the due process arguments?

R. 20 (Hr’g Tr. at 5) (Page ID #649). Counsel for Plaintiff responded no. Id. LG Chem’s
counsel stated:

[W]e don’t concede that the long-arm statute is satisfied; however, I did not
intend to spend time on that today because I think the due process issue is so
easily resolved and there are authorities that say The Court doesn’t have to go
through the long-arm statute analysis, if due process is not met then The Court,
essentially, does not have to spend time on the long-arm and that was the way I
would approach the hearing today.

Id. at 6 (Page ID #650).

The district court asked if there was “different analysis,” id., and whether, “if I found that
that [Michigan’s general personal jurisdiction long-arm statute] is not satisfied under Daimler,
for example, then I’d still have to go to 600.715 which is limited personal jurisdiction which
seems like it gets me to a similar, if not the same inquiry as under the due process analysis.” Id.
at 7 (Page ID #651) (emphasis added). LG Chem’s counsel responded: “That’s right. And so
while I don’t concede that the long-arm statute is satisfied, I was planning to focus my argument
only on the due process issue.” Id. (emphasis added). The district court concluded the exchange
by stating, “Okay. Very good. And it sounds like [Plaintiff’s counsel] is as well.” Id. Counsel
for the parties then addressed personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause only.

In LG Chem’s Supplemental Brief, it argued that general jurisdiction was not at issue, R.
21 (LG Chem’s Suppl. Br. at 6) (Page ID #721), and argued that Michigan lacked specific
jurisdiction over LG Chem because “Plaintiff’s claims do not ‘arise out of or relate to’ these
activities, and specific jurisdiction is lacking based on both Michigan’s long-arm statute and due
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 11

process.” Id. at 9 (Page ID #724). This first clause quotes the due-process standard, see, e.g.,
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (“The plaintiff’s claims . . . ‘must arise out of or relate to the
defendant’s contacts’ with the forum.” (quoting Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780)). It is true
that in some places in its brief, LG Chem tailored its language specifically to each source of
personal jurisdiction,4 but LG Chem did not explicitly argue that even if its contacts satisfied due
process they nonetheless failed under Michigan’s long-arm statute. See generally R. 21 (LG
Chem’s Suppl. Br.) (Page ID #713–25). LG Chem’s Supplemental Brief relied on the same
analysis for its § 600.715 and due-process arguments. See id. at 8–9 (Page ID #724–25).
Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief addressed only due process. See R. 24 (Pl.’s Suppl. Br. at 4–9)
(Page ID #863–68). Specifically, Plaintiff argued that consistent with Supreme Court precedent,
the lawsuit “relates to” LG Chem’s contacts with Michigan. See, e.g., id. at 6–7 (Page ID #865–
66).

To summarize, Plaintiff was sloppy in his briefing and neglected to address § 600.715.
To Plaintiff’s credit, Sixth Circuit caselaw states that “Michigan’s long-arm statute ‘extends to
the limits imposed by federal constitutional due process requirements and thus, the two questions
become one.’” See, e.g., AlixPartners, LLP v. Brewington, 836 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Mich. Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 954 F.2d 1174, 1176
(6th Cir. 1992)). Plaintiff’s counsel told the district court that it understood that Michigan’s
long-arm statute extended to the limits of the Due Process Clause, R. 20 (Hr’g Tr. at 5) (Page ID
#649), and then in Plaintiff’s supplemental briefing addressed only the Due Process Clause, R.
24 (Pl.’s Suppl. Br. at 4–9) (Page ID #863–68). Defendant argued that Plaintiff needed to satisfy
§ 600.715 but never argued explicitly before the district court that the two inquiries differed.
See, e.g., R. 17 (LG Chem’s Reply Br. at 3) (Page ID #530); R. 21 (LG Chem’s Suppl. Br at 8–9)
(Page ID #723–24).

4
For instance, LG Chem stated that “[e]ven if jurisdictional discovery had revealed that LG Chem
extensively supplied 18650 lithium-ion cells to consumer product manufacturers in Michigan to be incorporated
with protective circuitry in battery packs (which it did not), that would not support the exercise of specific
jurisdiction because such activities would not give rise to Plaintiff’s claims, as required to satisfy Michigan
§ 600.715, and would not relate to Plaintiff’s claims, as required to satisfy due process.” See, e.g., R. 21 (LG
Chem’s Suppl. Br.) (Page ID #723–24) (second and third emphasis added).
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 12

This situation is unique and distinct from the typical instances of forfeiture. Though
Plaintiff did not independently articulate that he satisfied the long-arm statute before the district
court, at the hearing he argued that the two standards were the same based on Sixth Circuit
caselaw—believing that he was in fact addressing the very issue that LG Chem argues he failed
to preserve. Although this court generally declines to consider arguments that were not timely
raised before the district court, “[w]e have, on occasion, deviated from the general rule in
‘exceptional cases or particular circumstances or when the rule would produce a plain
miscarriage of justice.’” Foster v. Barilow, 6 F.3d 405, 407 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Pinney
Dock and Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1461 (6th Cir. 1988)). Because of
Plaintiff’s reliance on Sixth Circuit caselaw and the clarity by which the parties addressed the
issue on appeal, we will consider the merits.

2. Whether the Michigan’s Long-arm Statute and the Due-Process Analyses
Merge Into One

Like the district court, we believe that Michigan’s interpretation of its long-arm statute
requires a separate analysis from the Due Process Clause. The district court’s thorough order
highlights the nuances of this inquiry. See Sullivan, 585 F. Supp. 3d at 1007–08. Plaintiff points
us to our numerous general statements that “Michigan’s long-arm statute ‘extends to the limits
imposed by federal constitutional due process requirements and thus, the two questions become
one.’” See, e.g., AlixPartners, 836 F.3d at 549 (quoting Mich. Coal., 954 F.2d at 1176). Yet LG
Chem (on appeal) and the district court contend that such statements oversimplify and
overgeneralize the matter, and that there are instances in which Michigan’s long-arm statute does
not overlap with the Due Process Clause. To answer the question of the scope of the Michigan
statute, we consider published decisions by the Michigan courts, and in the absence of such
decisions, “it is the obligation of this Court to exercise [our] best judgment as to the
interpretation which the Supreme Court of [Michigan] would place upon this legislation.”
Kroger Co. v. Dornbos, 408 F.2d 813, 816 (6th Cir. 1969).

In Mallory v. Conida Warehouses, Inc., 317 N.W.2d 597 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982), the
Court of Appeals of Michigan determined that because, categorically, the “Michigan courts lack
jurisdiction over” another state, “on statutory grounds” under the state’s long-arm statutes,
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 13

it need not conduct the constitutional analysis. Id. at 600. Mallory considered unique facts; it
addressed “whether Michigan has a statutory basis for exercising long-arm jurisdiction over the
State of Idaho,” id. at 599, to adjudicate a claim that Idaho “negligently inspect[ed] kidney beans
grown in Idaho,” id. at 598. After examining Michigan’s numerous long-arm statutes that permit
actions against “an individual or his agent,” “a corporation or its agent,” “a partnership” or an
agent thereof, or “a partnership association or an unincorporated voluntary association, or an
agent thereof,” it determined that “[n]one of these statutes expressly permits a Michigan court to
exercise long-arm jurisdiction over another state.” Id. at 599. Because a sister state categorically
did not fall under any of the long-arm statutes, the Michigan Court of Appeals thus ended its
analysis without considering the Due Process Clause, explaining that, “[e]ven if the” due-process
test were satisfied, the absence of “statutory authority” precluded the exercise of personal
jurisdiction. Id. at 601.

Mallory acknowledged that “[w]hile it is true that in Sifers v. Horen, 385 Mich. 195, 188
N.W. 623 (1971), the [Michigan Supreme] Court did indicate that the Legislature intended full
expansion of long-arm jurisdiction, Sifers was a case that clearly involved an individual, and the
only question before the Court was whether one of the statutory criteria was met.” Id. at 600.
However, the Mallory case involved different circumstances, requiring it to “decide whether a
sister state was intended to be covered under the provisions for suits against individuals,
corporations, partnerships and voluntary associations or their agents.” Id. Mallory demonstrates
that even if the exercise of jurisdiction may satisfy the Due Process Clause, such an exercise may
still fail under the Michigan’s various long-arm statutes thereby depriving courts sitting in
Michigan of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Though Mallory does not reach a holding
on the scope of the long-arm statutes, it comments on the intended wide reach of the Michigan
long-arm statutes. See id.

The Michigan Supreme Court clarified its interpretation of its long-arm statutes in Green
v. Wilson, 565 N.W. 2d 813 (Mich. 1997). Green began by distinguishing two different types of
long-arm statutes: “self-adjusting” and “laundry-list” statutes. Id. at 816. “[S]elf-adjusting”
statutes “stretch[] automatically to extend jurisdiction wherever the Due Process Clause
permits.” Id. (emphasis added). They function “[l]ike a complete solar eclipse,” because “the
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 14

due process and statutory analyses overlap entirely” and “only a one-step analysis is necessary.”
Id. On the other hand, “[l]aundry-list statutes enumerate specific acts that give rise to personal
jurisdiction. They do not permit a one-step analysis, even in circumstances where they are
thought to be ‘coextensive’ with due process.” Id. Green explained that the analysis under a
“laundry-list” statute “is akin to a partial solar eclipse, with part of the statute granting
jurisdiction within the permissible constitutional scope and part of the statute possibly outside
it.” Id. Michigan has a “laundry-list” statute. Id.; see also id. at 815 (considering long-arm
statutes more generally and noting that “there may be instances where a state court will lack the
power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, even though jurisdiction may be
constitutionally permissible”).

Green then explained what it means to say that Michigan’s long-arm statutes are
“coextensive with due process”: “[I]f a defendant’s actions or status fit within a provision of a
long-arm statute, jurisdiction may be extended as far as due process permits. The long-arm
statute is coextensive with due process insofar as the statute is limited by due process, and,
therefore, the statute and due process share the same outer boundary.” Id. at 816 (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted). But “[t]he coextensive nature of Michigan’s long-arm jurisdiction
becomes pertinent only if the particular acts or status of a defendant first fit within a long-arm
statute provision.” Id. (emphasis added). It explained that “this does not mean that the two are
equal and require a single inquiry based solely upon due process restrictions.” Id. at 816–17.
The Michigan Supreme Court then instructed the application of a two-prong approach: “The
State of Michigan may exercise limited personal jurisdiction over [a defendant] if two conditions
are met: First, [the defendant]’s conduct must fall within a provision of Michigan’s long-arm
statutes” and “[s]econd, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with due process.” Id. at 817.

Michigan courts continue to cite Green’s proposition that determining personal
jurisdiction requires a two-prong analysis, instructing that “[b]oth prongs of this analysis must be
satisfied for a Michigan court to properly exercise limited personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident.” Yoost v. Caspari, 813 N.W.2d 783, 791 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam); see
e.g., id. (declining to “consider whether the exercise of limited personal jurisdiction over
[counter-defendant] comports with due process because we conclude that [counter-plaintiff]
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 15

failed to establish a prima facie case against [counter-defendant] that satisfied” the long-arm
statute); W.H. Froh, Inc. v. Domanski, 651 N.W.2d 470, 475 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (“A personal
jurisdiction analysis involves a two-fold inquiry.”).

Additionally, several Michigan courts have characterized Michigan’s personal-
jurisdiction analysis as involving two sequential steps. See, e.g., Starbrite Distrib., Inc. v.
Excelda Mfg. Co., 562 N.W.2d 640, 641 (Mich. 1997) (stating that “[f]irst, we must decide
whether . . . the long-arm statute” is satisfied and “[s]econd, if we find that [statute i]s satisfied,
then we must also decide” the due-process question (emphasis added)); Mallory, 317 N.W.2d at
599 (“Before any constitutional considerations are considered, it is necessary to determine
whether Michigan has a statutory basis for exercising long-arm jurisdiction.” (emphasis added));
Yoost, 813 N.W.2d at 791 (same); Metry v. Coastal Cmty. Fed. Credit Union, No. 354372, 2021
WL 4005883, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2021) (same). These cases instruct that the
determination of whether a court sitting in Michigan can exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant requires two separate analyses.

Our statement that “Michigan’s long-arm statute ‘extends to the limits imposed by federal
constitutional due process requirements and thus, the two questions become one,’” AlixPartners,
836 F.3d at 549 (quoting Mich. Coal., 954 F.2d at 1176)), and other similar statements,5
ultimately rely on cases that predate the Michigan Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Green. For
instance, AlixPartners, 836 F.3d at 549, quoted Michigan Coalition, 954 F.2d at 1176, which we
decided in 1992—five years before the Michigan Supreme Court decided Green. The Michigan
Court of Appeals has also done this. In 1999—overlooking Green and citing a case that
predated Green—the Michigan Court of Appeals stated that “where it is found that personal
jurisdiction does not offend due process, it consequently cannot violate this state’s long-arm
statute.” Bell v. Mannausa, No. 209117, 1999 WL 33434986, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)

5
See also MAG IAS Holdings, Inc. v. Schmuckle, 854 F.3d 894, 899 (6th Cir. 2017) (“The Michigan long-
arm statute, however, ‘extends to the limits imposed by federal constitutional due process requirements and thus, the
two questions become one.’” (quoting AlixPartners, 836 F.3d at 549)); Adelson v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 17-1917,
2018 WL 7226966, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 20, 2018) (order) (“Because Michigan’s ‘long-arm statute has been
interpreted to grant the broadest basis for jurisdiction consistent with due process,’ the two inquiries merge: If the
exercise of personal jurisdiction ‘does not offend due process, it consequently cannot violate [Michigan’s] long-arm
statute.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Comm’r of Ins. v. Arcilio, 561 N.W.2d 412, 421 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)).
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 16

(per curiam) (quoting Ins. Comm’r of Mich. v. Arcilio, 561 N.W.2d 412, 421 (Mich. Ct. App.
1997) (decided on Jan. 1, 1997)). But Green requires that we conduct two separate inquiries
when determining whether a court sitting in Michigan has personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

3. The Scope of § 600.715

We next consider the scope of Michigan’s long-arm statute and whether LG Chem and
Michigan had a sufficient relationship under § 600.715 to satisfy long-arm jurisdiction. We
return to the statute itself, which provides:

The existence of any of the following relationships between a corporation or its
agent and the state shall constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the
courts of record of this state to exercise limited personal jurisdiction over such
corporation and to enable such courts to render personal judgments against such
corporation arising out of the act or acts which create any of the following
relationships: (1) The transaction of any business within the state. (2) The doing
or causing any act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in
an action for tort. . . .

Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.715; see also Oberlies v. Searchmont Resort, Inc., 633 N.W.2d 408,
413 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (“Well-settled principles of statutory interpretation require us to look
to the plain language of M.C.L. § 600.715(1) to determine whether defendant falls within the
state’s long-arm jurisdiction.”). The statute allows courts sitting in Michigan to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant when a “plaintiff[] . . . show[s] that their cause of action
arose out of one of the relationships enumerated in the statute.” Schneider v. Linkfield, 198
N.W.2d 834, 835–36 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (“The cause of action did arise out of the use of
personal property constructively situated within the state of Michigan.”), aff’d, 209 N.W.2d 225
(Mich. 1973); see also Lanier v. Am. Bd. of Endodontics, 843 F.2d 901, 905, 908 (6th Cir. 1988)
(characterizing the existence of the relationship as criterion one, see id. at 905, and whether the
claim arose of out the relationship as criterion two, id. at 908); 1 Mich. Pl. & Pr. § 2:35 (2d ed.).
Here, Plaintiff argues that at least two subsections of § 600.715 support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction. Appellant Br. at 18–22. We examine each below.

Beginning with § 600.715(1), the statutory phrase “transaction of any business within the
state,” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.715(1), is broad and “[t]he word ‘any’ means just what it says.
It includes ‘each’ and ‘every.’ It comprehends ‘the slightest.’” Sifers, 188 N.W.2d at 624 n.2
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 17

(citing Harrington v. Inter-State Bus. Men’s Accident Ass’n, 178 N.W. 19 (Mich. 1920); Gibson
v. Agric. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 276 N.W. 450 (Mich. 1937)). Thus, when a “defendant conduct[s]
even the slightest act of business in Michigan,” a sufficient transaction of business occurs under
§ 600.715(1). Lanier, 843 F.2d at 906. Here, LG Chem’s two shipments of its batteries and its
two supplier contracts are sufficient evidence of transactions of business within Michigan,
satisfying the first criterion of § 600.715(1); see also Oberlies, 633 N.W.2d at 413.

But the long-arm statute “exposes a non resident to suit in Michigan only for a cause
which arose out of the relationship serving as a basis for such jurisdiction.” Sifers, 188 N.W.2d
at 623 (emphasis added); see also Electrolines, Inc. v. Prudential Assurance Co., 677 N.W.2d
874, 888 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (finding no personal jurisdiction under § 600.715(1) when,
“even assuming arguendo that [the defendant insurance company]’s registration with the
Michigan Insurance Commissioner is an act that could constitute a ‘transaction of any business’
under MCL 600.715(1), plaintiff’s suit does not arise from [the defendant]’s registration, but
from a fire of an insured building in Liberia”). We observe that Michigan courts have liberally
construed the long-arm statute’s arising-out-of language. For example, in Schneider, the
Michigan Court of Appeals found that personal jurisdiction existed over a defendant who was a
former Michigan resident in an action brought by a plaintiff for injuries that the plaintiff had
suffered in a car accident with the defendant in Indiana. 198 N.W.2d at 834–36. Schneider
examined the long-arm statute’s third relationship:6 “The ownership, use, or possession of any
real or tangible personal property situated within the state.” Id. at 835 (quoting Mich. Comp.
Laws § 600.705(3)). The court held that the plaintiff’s claim “did arise out of the use of personal
property constructively situated within the state of Michigan” because the defendant’s car was
titled in Michigan, even though the accident occurred in Indiana. Id. at 836.

Similarly, in Oberlies, the Michigan Court of Appeals considered whether it could assert
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in an action brought by a Michigan resident who suffered
injury at the defendant’s ski facility in Canada. 633 N.W.2d at 411. In Oberlies, the “defendant
engaged in widespread advertising that had a clear purpose of soliciting business from Michigan
residents.” Id. at 413. Many of the advertisements “highlighted the proximity of defendant’s ski
6
The Michigan Court of Appeals examined § 600.705(3), which is identical in this regard to § 600.715(3).
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 18

facility to Michigan, provided detailed directions to the facility from Michigan, and highlighted
the apparent benefits of skiing in Ontario as opposed to Michigan.” Id. at 414. According to the
plaintiff, the “defendant’s advertisement led her to establish a business relationship with
defendant.” Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals found that the advertisements “constituted the
transaction of business in Michigan” and concluded that, “[u]nder these circumstances,”
§ 600.715(1) permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id. Yet—despite finding
§ 600.715(1) satisfied—the court then determined that due-process principles nonetheless
prohibited the exercise of personal jurisdiction because the plaintiff’s claim was too “attenuated”
from the defendant’s advertising in Michigan and thus did not “arise from the circumstances
creating the jurisdictional relationship between the defendant and” Michigan. Id. at 416 (quoting
Rainsberger v. McFadden, 436 N.W.2d 412, 413 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)); see also id. at 417.
Oberlies’s determination that § 600.715(1) allowed for what the Due Process Clause
prohibited—the exercise of personal jurisdiction when the plaintiff’s claim “was merely
tangentially related to” the defendant’s transaction of business in Michigan—speaks to the
breadth of Michigan’s long-arm statute and its arising-out-of language. Id. at 417. In this
particular instance, it is arguable that Plaintiff can show that his action arises from LG Chem’s
transaction of business in Michigan. Because we conclude, however, that Plaintiff satisfies the
long-arm statute under § 600.715(2), we need not decide whether Plaintiff also satisfies
§ 600.715(1).

According to Plaintiff, a second enumerated relationship between LG Chem and
Michigan—created by “[t]he doing or causing any act to be done, or consequences to occur, in
the state resulting in an action for tort” gives rise to personal jurisdiction. See Mich. Comp.
Laws § 600.715(2). “A plain language reading of these words reveals that either the tortious
conduct or the injury must occur in Michigan.” Green, 565 N.W. 2d at 817 (emphasis added)
(finding no jurisdiction where neither the act nor the consequence occurred in Michigan). Thus,
Michigan courts tell us that, under § 600.715(2), when a “defendant’s tortious conduct [or] the
consequent injury to [a] plaintiff[] occur[s] in Michigan, [a] defendant bec[o]me[s] subject to the
exercise of personal jurisdiction by Michigan courts.” See W.H. Froh, 651 N.W.2d at 477; see
also Dobronski v. United Final Expense Servs., Inc., No. 357057, 2022 WL 1194419, at *3
(Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2022), appeal denied, 979 N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 2022) (“Michigan’s
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 19

long-arm statutes bring within their grasp individuals and corporations who, personally or
through their agents . . . commit a tort in Michigan[] or cause an act to be done that results in an
action for tort in Michigan.” (emphasis added)). Thus, § 600.715(2) encompasses a defendant’s
“acts outside the state which have consequences inside the state.” Dornbos v. Kroger Co., 157
N.W.2d 498, 500 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968); see also 1 Mich. Pl. & Pr. § 2:38 (2d ed.) (explaining
that § 600.715(2) covers “acts outside [Michigan] that have consequences inside [Michigan]”); 6
Mich. Civ. Jur. Corps. § 538 (“[Section 600.715(2)] applies to situations in which the act or
conduct of the foreign corporation outside of Michigan leads to an event in Michigan that gives
rise to the tort claim”).

Here, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s alleged out-of-state acts (negligently making
the 18650 battery) caused a consequence to occur (the explosion of the battery in Plaintiff’s
pocket)—in Michigan, which gives rise to his negligence action. The facts before us differ from
Green. The Green court asked (1) where the act itself occurred and (2) where the consequences
of the act occurred. 565 N.W. 2d at 817. Because the act of dangerously driving occurred in
Canada and “[t]he consequences of the act”—the plaintiff’s injury—“also occurred in Canada,”
the defendant’s “acts d[id] not fit under the . . . long-arm statute.” Id. The present circumstances
also differ from Metry, where the Michigan Court of Appeals found that a Michigan court could
not exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants because their acts occurred outside of
Michigan and “it [wa]s difficult to conclude that the effects of the alleged act were felt in
Michigan,” 2021 WL 4005883, at *3, see also id. at *4. In Woods v. Edgewater Amusement
Park, where a Florida corporation manufactured an amusement-park ride in Florida and sold it to
an individual in “New Jersey for installation at Haslett, Michigan,” the Michigan Supreme Court
found that both § 600.715(1) and (2) were satisfied because the plaintiff was injured on the ride
in Michigan. See 165 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Mich. 1969); see also id. at 13–17 (considering the long-
arm statute and the Due Process Clause together).

LG Chem asks us to interpret § 600.715(2) in a manner that limits specific personal
jurisdiction to instances in which a defendant causes a consequence to occur in Michigan that
results in a tort action only when the “defendant has some role in causing its product to be used
in Michigan.” Appellee Br. at 26. LG Chem contends that Woods found personal jurisdiction
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 20

under § 600.715(2) only because the Woods defendant sold the injuring product “to a New Jersey
individual specifically ‘for installation at Haslett, Michigan.’” Appellee Br. at 25 (quoting
Woods, 165 N.W.2d at 14). But such an interpretation lacks support in the reasoning of Woods’s
§ 600.715(2) holding or the text of § 600.715(2) itself. Because Woods, which was decided
before Green, addressed § 600.715(2) and the Due Process Clause together, we must look with a
careful eye to its § 600.715 analysis only, and not incorporate its due-process analysis into our
interpretation of § 600.715.

In Woods, when describing the facts of the case, the Michigan Supreme Court noted that
the manufacturing defendant from Florida had sold the injuring ride “to a Roger Haney in the
State of New Jersey for installation at Haslett, Michigan; that said Roger Haney sold said
amusement ride to Harry Stahl, individually, and in July 1959, and subsequently as an
accommodation to Roger Haney who had purchased said ride on installment contract, B. A.
Schiff & Associates, Inc., refinanced the ride at the Coral Gables First National Bank in Coral
Gables, Florida, to assist Harry Stahl to acquire same.” 165 N.W.2d at 14. The court never
emphasized that the defendant was specifically aware of the Michigan location of the
installation, see id., and never relied on the fact that the defendant perhaps acknowledged the
product’s installation location in reaching its § 600.715(2) holding that the record “satisfies the
Michigan statutory requirement that defendant [had] . . . caus[ed] an act to be done or a
consequence to occur resulting in the present actions for tort,” id. at 17 (emphasis in original);
see also id. at 15–16.

LG Chem points to what it believes is a similar factual distinction in Behlke v.
Metalmeccanica Plast, S.P.A., 365 F. Supp. 272 (E.D. Mich. 1973). Appellee Br. at 25. Here,
too, Behlke does not support LG Chem’s position. In Behlke, the district judge in the Eastern
District of Michigan determined that the court could exercise personal jurisdiction over an Italian
company that manufactured a product that it sold to a Canadian distributor that then sold it to a
company that resold it to a Michigan company whose employee was injured by the product. Id.
at 273. After noting the “broad[ness]” of Michigan’s long-arm statute and discussing the Woods
holding, it concluded—very emphatically—that “[i]t is quite apparent that the Michigan
Supreme Court would hold the Italian defendant . . . to be properly before this court on the
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 21

negligence count, it certainly having been properly alleged that the defendant caused a
consequence to occur within this state.” Id. at 274. Behlke makes no mention of the defendant’s
“role in causing its product to be used in Michigan.” Appellee Br. at 26; see generally 365 F.
Supp. 272.

At bottom, Defendant points to no authority that suggests that § 600.715(2)
independently7 requires that a defendant specifically contemplate the forum state when engaging
in acts that cause the consequence to occur in Michigan. It has not provided us with any
authority, and we have found none, to support its bold claim that personal jurisdiction under
§ 600.715(2) exists only when a defendant’s product reaches the intended recipient rather than an
unintended recipient. As Behlke described, § 600.715 is “broad” and the Michigan courts have
interpreted it liberally to permit a wide-ranging exercise of personal jurisdiction. 365 F. Supp. at
274. Pursuant to the plain meaning of § 600.715(2), the consequences of LG Chem’s alleged
negligent manufacture or design of the 18650 batteries occurred in Michigan when LG Chem’s
18650 batteries exploded in Plaintiff’s pocket, resulting in an action in tort. Because Plaintiff’s
Complaint contains sufficient allegations that Plaintiff suffered an injury in Michigan due to LG
Chem’s allegedly tortious conduct, we conclude that Plaintiff has carried his statutory burden
under § 600.715(2). See Peters, 40 F.4th at 437–38. Therefore, we hold that the district court,
sitting in Michigan, has the power under Michigan’s long-arm statute to exercise personal
jurisdiction over LG Chem.

B. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

“The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause limits a state court’s power to
exercise jurisdiction over a defendant.” Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1024. We apply “a three-part test to
determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction . . . comports with constitutional due
process.” AlixPartners, 836 F.3d at 549. “First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself
of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state.” Id.
(emphasis in original) (quoting Air Prods., 503 F.3d at 550). Second, the claims “‘must arise out
of or relate to the defendant’s contacts’ with the forum.” Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (quoting

7
Of course, the defendant’s contacts with Michigan and its relation to the plaintiff’s claims must still
comport with the Due Process Clause, which we address below.
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 22

Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780); see also AlixPartners, 836 F.3d at 549. Third, “the acts of the
defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection
with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.”
AlixPartners, 836 F.3d at 549–50 (quoting Air Prods., 503 F.3d at 550).

Without conceding that the district court properly determined that LG Chem purposefully
availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities in Michigan, LG Chem does not make any
argument challenging purposeful availment. See Appellee Br. at 29, 33. Under the Due Process
Clause, LG Chem must have “take[n] ‘some act by which [it] purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.’ The contacts must be the defendant’s
own choice and not ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous.’” Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1024–25 (second
alteration in original) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). This requires a showing “that the defendant
deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its home—by, for example, ‘exploi[ting] a market’ in the
forum State or entering a contractual relationship centered there.” Id. at 1025 (alteration in
original) (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014)); see also Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475–76 (1985). The purposeful-availment requirement prevents the
exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant “solely as a result of . . . the ‘unilateral activity of
another party or a third person.’” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (quoting Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984)). “‘It is the quality of [the]
contacts,’ and not their number or status, that determines whether they amount to purposeful
availment.” CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1265 (6th Cir. 1996) (emphasis and
alteration in original) (quoting Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1119 (6th
Cir. 1994)).

Based on LG Chem’s direct shipments of the 18650 batteries into Michigan and its
supplier contracts, LG Chem purposefully availed itself of the benefits of doing business in
Michigan and the protections of Michigan law. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476; cf. J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 878 (2011) (finding no personal jurisdiction
under a stream-of-commerce theory where the defendant never shipped its product into or
marketed its goods in the forum state). LG Chem shipped 18650 batteries into Michigan under
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 23

one agreement and entered into another “contract made and to be performed in the State of
Michigan’ and has a Michigan forum-selection clause.” Sullivan, 585 F. Supp. 3d at 1003
(quoting R. 24-7 (Ex. 6, Automaker-product Manufacturer Contract at 20) (Page ID #945)).
Entering into contracts in the forum state subject to the forum-state’s laws that create an ongoing
relationship, alongside placing one’s products directly into the forum state, can satisfy purposeful
availment. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1265. LG Chem’s contacts, as the district court found,
demonstrate deliberateness; it made deliberate contact with Michigan. See Sullivan, 585 F.
Supp. 3d at 1003–04. Thus, LG Chem could “reasonably have anticipated being haled into a[]”
Michigan court. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1264. Accordingly, LG Chem purposefully
availed itself “of the privilege of conducting business” in Michigan and having its “activities . . .
shielded by ‘the benefits and protections’ of [Michigan]’s laws.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.

The Due Process Clause next requires that the plaintiff’s claim “‘arise out of or relate to
the defendant’s contacts’ with the forum” state. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (quoting Bristol-Myers,
137 S. Ct. at 1780). The Constitution requires “an affiliation between the forum and the
underlying controversy.” Id. (quoting Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780); see also MAG IAS, 854
F.3d at 903 (“This requires that [defendant]’s contacts be ‘related to the operative facts of the
controversy.’” (quoting Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 875 (6th Cir. 2002))). “[S]pecific
jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very
controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting Goodyear,
564 U.S. at 919). “[T]his is a ‘lenient standard,’ requiring only that the cause of action have a
‘substantial connection’ to the defendant’s activity in the state.” MAG IAS, 854 F.3d at 903
(quoting Bird, 289 F.3d at 875). The Sixth Circuit, even before Ford, “explained that the cause
of action need not ‘formally’ arise from defendant’s contacts.” Air Prod., 503 F.3d at 553
(quoting Bird, 289 F.3d at 875).

The Supreme Court recently rejected a “causation-only approach” when interpreting the
“requirement of a ‘connection’ between a plaintiff’s suit and a defendant’s activities.” Ford, 141
S. Ct. at 1026 (“None of our precedents has suggested that only a strict causal relationship
between the defendant’s in-state activity and the litigation will do.”). Rather, the standard—“that
the suit ‘arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum”—contains two parts
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 24

separated by a disjunctive conjunction. Id. (quoting Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780); see also
id. at 1034 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). “The first half of that standard asks about causation; but
the back half, after the ‘or,’ contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction
without a causal showing.” Id. at 1026 (majority opinion). The Court stated that “[i]n the sphere
of specific jurisdiction, the phrase ‘relate to’ incorporates real limits, as it must to adequately
protect defendants foreign to a forum.” Id. But it does not require “proof that the plaintiff’s
claim came about because of the defendant’s in-state conduct.” Id. The Due Process Clause
does not limit specific jurisdiction over a defendant to the states only where a product “was
designed, manufactured, or first sold.” Id. at 1028.

LG Chem argues that because “none of [its] contacts [with Michigan] involved serving a
consumer market for standalone 18650 batteries,” its contacts cannot relate to Plaintiff’s claims.
Appellee Br. at 32. Specifically, it contends that “[n]one of [its] limited contacts with Michigan
had anything to do with Plaintiff’s claims for personal injury from use of an 18650 lithium-ion
battery cell as a standalone battery for his vaping device.” Id. at 33. Thus, according to LG
Chem, “[a]ny connections that exist between Michigan and this lawsuit were formed entirely by
Plaintiff, Montrose Smokers Palace, and other third parties; none by LG Chem.” Id. at 31. This
is too narrow a framing, and one disguising the rejected causation analysis. LG Chem, in
essence, asks us to hold that the only way a court could have personal jurisdiction over LG Chem
when a consumer plaintiff suffers an injury from one of LG Chem’s 18650 batteries is if LG
Chem served the consumer market for 18650 batteries in the forum state, even if it distributes
that same injuring product within the forum state for a different market. It offers no authority in
support of that bold assertion. And none exists. To reach this holding, we would need to require
“proof that the plaintiff’s claim came about because of the defendant’s in-state conduct.” Ford,
141 S. Ct. at 1026. That we cannot do.8

LG Chem suggests that Ford does not apply here because, unlike LG Chem, Ford
marketed the exact same vehicles that injured the plaintiffs to consumers in the forum states even
though it had not shipped those specific injuring vehicles into the forum states. Appellee Br. at

8
Whether LG Chem sold its batteries for limited types of commercial use as opposed to individual use may
be relevant to liability, but LG Chem cites no authorities suggesting that this factor would implicate jurisdiction.
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 25

30–31. This argument is misplaced and confuses the standard. The caselaw requires deliberate
acts by the defendant to establish the minimum contacts required to demonstrate purposeful
availment. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1027. But, when next looking for the requisite connection
between the claims and the defendant’s contacts under the second prong, our caselaw does not
require that courts examine why that connection exists, so long as it sufficiently exists. Cf.
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (finding the court lacked personal jurisdiction where
nonresidents had not been injured by a defendant’s product in the forum state and explaining that
“a defendant’s relationship with a . . . third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for
jurisdiction” (alterations in original) (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286 (2014))). It is
true that Bristol-Myers had extensive contacts with California, including selling the drug in
California, yet the nonresident plaintiffs “were not prescribed Plavix in California, did not
purchase Plavix in California, did not ingest Plavix in California, and were not injured by Plavix
in California.” Id. Here, however, Plaintiff is a Michigan resident who was injured by
Defendant’s product in Michigan—the same type of product that LG Chem shipped into
Michigan around this time period.

Because due process requires that Plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum,” Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026 (quoting Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct.
at 1780), we look under this prong at a defendant’s specific contacts with the state and consider
their connection to a plaintiff’s claim. LG Chem conducted business with Michigan companies
regarding its 18650 batteries and shipped its 18650 batteries into Michigan, and Sullivan suffered
injury from LG Chem’s 18650 battery in Michigan. See Tieszen, 2021 WL 4134352, at *1, *5–6
(finding that a plaintiff’s claim stemming from his injury allegedly caused by LG Chem’s 18650
batteries sufficiently related to LG Chem’s contacts with South Dakota because LG Chem sells
its 18650 batteries to commercial customers in South Dakota, the plaintiff is a South Dakota
resident, the plaintiff purchased the injuring batteries in South Dakota, and the batteries exploded
in the plaintiff’s pocket in South Dakota); cf. McLaughlin, 599 S.W.3d at 903–04 (“[Plaintiff]
alleged only that LG Chem’s model 18650 batteries made their way into Missouri by way of an
independent, third-party distributor that sold the batteries into Missouri. While [Plaintiff] alleged
LG Chem designed, manufactured, and sold the subject battery, [Plaintiff] did not allege
LG Chem sold its batteries directly into Missouri.”). Either Plaintiff ultimately purchased an
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 26

18650 battery that LG Chem directly shipped into Michigan, or the battery came from another
state at the same time that LG Chem was contracting for and and shipping that same type of
battery in Michigan. Either way, LG Chem had fair notice that it could be sued in Michigan for
the Michigan consequences of defects relating to its 18650 battery, and even agreed with one
company to be governed by Michigan law regarding the 18650 batteries. See, e.g., Tieszen, 2021
WL 4134352, at *6 (considering Ford and finding relatedness and explaining that the plaintiff
“alleges that: (1) LG Chem sells and distributes 18650 lithium-ion cell batteries in South
Dakota, (2) [plaintiff] purchased such a battery online while in South Dakota, and (3) [plaintiff]
was injured by an 18650 lithium-ion cell battery in South Dakota. Thus, [plaintiff]’s claim and
LG Chem’s contact with South Dakota both revolve around the 18650 lithium-ion battery.”).
Because due process does not require a causal showing, Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026, the district
court correctly determined that Plaintiff’s claims related to LG Chem’s contacts with Michigan.

“Lastly, we consider whether exercising personal jurisdiction over [LG Chem] would be
reasonable, i.e., whether it would ‘comport with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’” CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1267–68 (quoting Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1117). When a
defendant “avail[s] himself of the privilege of conducting business” in the forum state and “his
activities are shielded by ‘the benefits and protections’ of the forum’s laws it is presumptively
not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well.”
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476. Put another way, when we find purposeful availment and
relatedness, “an inference arises that this third factor is also present.” CompuServe, 89 F.3d at
1268. We “must consider several factors in this context, including ‘the burden on the defendant,
the interest of the forum state, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief, and the interest of other
states in securing the most efficient resolution of controversies.’” Id. (quoting Am. Greetings
Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1169–70 (6th Cir. 1988)).

The district court correctly determined that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be
reasonable and would not offend the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1267–68 (quoting Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1117); see also Sullivan, 585 F.
Supp. 3d at 1006–07. LG Chem has already contracted in Michigan; has agreed to litigate in its
courts; and has litigated other lawsuits in Michigan, suggesting that doing so again is not too
 No. 22-1203 Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd. Page 27

burdensome. See Sullivan, 585 F. Supp. 3d at 1007. Michigan—whose laws govern a LG Chem
contract for 18650 batteries and who received shipments of 18650 batteries—has a strong
interest in providing a forum for lawsuits relating to their residents’ injuries allegedly caused by
these products. Plaintiff suffered severe injuries and has a strong interest in adjudicating LG
Chem’s liability. Ultimately, the district court properly determined that the Constitution permits
a court sitting in Michigan to exercise personal jurisdiction over LG Chem. The district court
did not err in reaching this constitutional determination.

IV. CONCLUSION

Michigan law requires that courts separately analyze whether a court sitting in Michigan
can properly exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant under the state’s long-arm statute
and under the Due Process Clause. Though the two questions may often rise and fall together
because of Michigan’s broad interpretation of its long-arm statutes, parties should not presume
that the two inquiries are always coextensive and should independently address each. Because of
LG Chem’s contacts with Michigan, we hold that the district court sitting in Michigan has
personal jurisdiction over LG Chem under Michigan’s long-arm statute and that the exercise of
jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district
court’s judgment and REMAND for further proceedings.