with whom LAVENDER, HARGRAVE and OPALA, JJ., join, dissenting:
The majority opinion refers to the press release as rhetorical hyperbole, and concludes that there is no dispute that the basic facts in the release are true. The majority then affirms the summary judgment by the trial court. To this I must dissent.
The majority opinion does not address the issue of whether the press release is libel per se because the opinion finds that the statements were privileged. Title 12 O.S.1991, § 1443.1(A)(Third) defines a privileged communication as one made:
“By a fair and true report of any legislative or judicial or other proceeding authorized by law, or anything said in the course thereof, and any and all expressions of opinion in regard thereto and criticisms thereon, and any and all criticisms upon the official acts of any and all public officers, except where the matter stated of and concerning the official act done, or of the officer, falsely imputes crime to the officer so criticized.”
If under the evidence reasonable persons might reach different inferences or conclusions, summary judgment must be denied. Buckner v. General Motors Corp., 760 P.2d 803, 812 (Okla.1988). Because reasonable persons could disagree on whether the content of the press release in the case at bar was fair and true, summary judgment was improper.
The majority cite Crittendon v. Combined Communications Corp., 714 P.2d 1026, 1028 (Okla.1986), to support the statement that where the circumstances of the publication are not in dispute then the issue of whether the publication was privileged under section 1443.1 is a question of law for the court. The Crittendon Court labeled whether the television broadcast was a “fair and true report” the “core issue” of the ease. That case involved the television broadcast of a default judgment against a physician in a medical malpractice case and its defamatory effect on the physician. Crittendon observes: “A statement is substantially accurate if its ‘gist’ or ‘sting’ is true, that is, if it produces the same effect on the mind of the recipient which the precise truth would have produced.” Crittendon, 714 P.2d at 1029, quoting Williams v. WCAU-TV, 555 F.Supp. 198, 202 (E.D.Pa.1983). The Court concluded that the “gist of the reported statement was the same as the statement actually made during the judicial proceeding.” But reasonable persons could find that the gist of the press release in the ease at bar was neither fair nor true, and that it would not produce the same effect in the mind of the reader as the precise truth would have produced. The case at bar is not a Crittendon case.
The headline of the press release states: “Price Broke Law, Fined $1.74 million By Federal Government.” The facts are that Seneca Oil Company sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the enforcement of a Department of Energy (DOE) Interpretive Ruling that would continue a price ceiling regulation on oil Seneca discovered in 1977 and 1978. Seneca subsequently sold that oil at the higher market price in 1979 and 1980. Seneca set aside the difference in an interest-bearing suspense account. In re Seneca Oil Company, 906 F.2d 1445, 1448 (10th Cir. *13791990). Seneca actually prevailed on its interpretation of the federal regulations in district court, which held that the DOE’s ruling was invalid. In re Seneca Oil Company, 906 F.2d at 1449. The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that the DOE’s interpretation of the pricing regulations was valid “and that Seneca had violated the pricing regulations by miscertifying its crude oil and by overcharging for oil.” In re Seneca Oil Company, 906 F.2d at 1449, citing Seneca Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 712 F.2d 1384 (Temp.Emer.Ct.App.1983). The Tenth Circuit’s report of the holding in that case correctly superimposes the word “Seneca” over the word “appellees” in quoting the order of remand by the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals. The Tenth Circuit states, “The TECA remanded to the district court ‘to grant motions for appropriate orders to secure recovery from [Seneca] of the overcharges in violation of Ruling 1980-3 and the May 2, 1979, legislative regulation, interest thereon and costs.’ ” In re Seneca Oil Company, 906 F.2d at 1449, citing Seneca Oil Co., 712 F.2d at 1402. Apparently the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals viewed the use of the term “appellees” as a misstatement on the part of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals.
Given the facts taken from the two Seneca cases, two sources for the press release, is the gist of the entire report fair and true? The headline does not appear to be supported by the two Seneca cases. The Tenth Circuit case specifically holds “that the DOE’s claim is not a fine, penalty, or forfeiture” and specifies the court’s reasoning for its holding. In re Seneca Oil Company, 906 F.2d at 1455.
The subheadline read: “GOP Candidate Gouged Consumers at Gas Pump While Working as Federal Lawyer.” What “basic fact” is true about this statement of “rhetorical hyperbole?” It is true that the appellant was the GOP candidate. The style of the Temporary Court of Appeals case lists one of the appellees as “William S. Price as Trustee for Joel S. Price, Virginia K. Price Trust.” As trustee for his parents’ trusts, he certainly was not responsible for the actions of Seneca Oil Company. To be responsible for “gouging” consumers the actions of Seneca would first have to be imputed as an act of the working interest owners, then their actions would have to be imputed to the trustee. That is too far removed for even arguable liability.
What about the text of the press release? What may reasonable persons conclude? ‘While working as a federal prosecutor and being sworn to uphold the laws of the country, GOP gubernatorial candidate Bill Price was fined $1.74 million for gouging consumers by selling oil at higher than allowable prices.” It is true that Bill Price was the GOP gubernatorial candidate and that he was a federal prosecutor, but, as established above, the Tenth Circuit specifically held that no fines or penalties were levied.
The next sentence reads: “Court documents on file in Oklahoma City and Fort Worth on case CV 81-215 and a later bankruptcy case reveal Price and a group of oil companies and investors were found guilty by two courts and the U.S. Department of Energy of violating federal oil price guidelines in the late 1970’s.” Is the gist of this sentence that the appellant was found guilty in a criminal case and subsequently he filed bankruptcy along with others? Does the “gist” or “sting” of that sentence produce the same effect on the mind of the recipient that the precise truth would have? Reasonable persons could conclude otherwise.
“ We now know what type of businessman Bill Price is,’ said Democratic gubernatorial candidate David Walters. ‘He has been accused and found guilty by the very courts he worked in.’ ” Based on the content of the two Seneca cases, reasonable persons could find that the content is false.
The case at bar is arguably more egregious than Winters v. Morgan, 576 P.2d 1152 (Okla.1978), in which the district court sustained a general demurrer to the petition and dismissed with prejudice. This Court reversed and remanded. In Winters, a news*1380paper complained that the state treasurer, who had been indicted by a federal grand jury, was seeking to move the trial out of Oklahoma City because he could not receive a fair trial here due to pretrial publicity. The newspaper commented that the state treasurer and the others indicted “are just as guilty in Guymon in the panhandle, Idabel in Southeastern Oklahoma, Bartlesville in the northeast, Lawton in the southwest, or right smack in downtown Oklahoma City.... Seeking out possible weak juries or less fair federal judges is not the American Way of justice.... ” The Winters Court, after considering the article in its entirety, its thought, ideal, impression, or opinion conveyed to the reader, found that it engendered in the mind of the reader a conclusion, impression, or opinion of the state treasurer that was defamatory, tending to expose him to public hatred, contempt and obloquy. Winters, 576 P.2d at 1154. This Court observed that the logical conclusion of a reader is that the plaintiff is guilty of the crime of which he has been charged, and that he is seeking a weak judge or incompetent jury to acquit him in spite of his guilt. The Court found that the language was libelous per se, and that there was no privilege since it falsely imputed the commission of a crime to a public officer. Winters, 576 P.2d at 1154.
The Winters Court found the language of the newspaper article to be libelous per se because the editorial could have indicated that the state treasurer “was just as innocent or guilty in the country as he was in the city.” Winters, 576 P.2d at 1154. The Court remanded the case for a jury trial. Winters, 576 P.2d at 1154. The editorial in Winters is not nearly as explicit as the press release in the case at bar. The state treasurer had been.indicted by a grand jury. The appellant had not been indicted for any crime, much less convicted.
The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed a defamation award in favor of a gubernatorial candidate against a television broadcasting company and its majority shareholder in Nevada Indep. Broadcasting Corp. v. Allen, 99 Nev. 404, 664 P.2d 337 (1983). In a live televised interview with Allen, the gubernatorial candidate, Hernstadt, who was the majority stockholder in the company made three remarks that the Nevada court agreed were defamatory. Allen had hired Golden West Advertising Agency to handle his campaign. Hernstadt discovered in the afternoon prior to the broadcast that a check in the amount of $697.00 for political advertising and issued by the agency, had been returned to the station because of insufficient funds. While on the air, Hernstadt initially accused Allen of passing a check with insufficient funds, then he mentioned the advertising agency, but questioned what a political candidate who did not pay his bills would do if allowed to handle state funds. Finally, he referred to another candidate as honorable in a manner intended to contrast him with Allen. Nevada Indep. Broadcasting Corp., 99 Nev. at 408, 664 P.2d at 340. The Nevada court concluded that the comments taken as a whole clearly implied a want of qualities expected of a public officer and supported a case for slander per se. Nevada Indep. Broadcasting Corp., 99 Nev. at 410, 664 P.2d at 341. The court noted that the questioning of Allen’s handling of state funds was really the defamatory sting, which arose from the factual statement that Allen did not pay his bills. Nevada Indep. Broadcasting Corp., 99 Nev. at 412, 664 P.2d at 343, n. 4. Like Winters, the Nevada case would appear to be less flagrant than the facts before this Court in the case at bar.
I would submit that reasonable persons could conclude that the appellees published a defamatory statement that was false, and unprivileged. This case is not one in which summary judgment is appropriate.
This state ought to be the vanguard in protecting its public figures against outright falsehoods. Free speech was intended to protect the public by allowing issues to be freely and vigorously discussed. Grave public injury is certain if this state tolerates reckless disregard for the truth in political campaigning. . Such is certain to dimmish public confidence. Those who seek public office must be responsible for their defama*1381tory statements that injure campaign opponents and that egregiously destroy the integrity of our representation. For these reasons I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for trial.