with whom THOMAS, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I must respectfully but seriously and emphatically dissent from the majority. I feel that they have made a superficial approach for hypertechnical reasons and are dangerously intruding upon the prerogatives of the Crook County school board and its administrators, to manage its school system.
To explain my reasons, the procedural and factual background and situation must be set out in my own way and more fully developed than has been done in the majority opinion, which has been devoted more to rhetoric than fact. The majority attempts to leave an impression that the complaints against appellant were insignificant, practically bordering on the frivolous. That was far from the case.
Powell, the appellant-teacher, was having disciplinary problems in the control of his students during the school year 1972-73, previous to the school year 1973-74, with which this case is principally concerned. An evaluation of Powell as a teacher for the 1972-73 school year, made by one of his administrator superiors, showed him to be below average in discipline and in gaining the attention and response of his pupils. It was especially noted on the Teacher Evaluation Summary that: “Discipline problems have arisen due to a lack of rapport and student interest in the course.” The report was discussed with the contestant by Mr. Nebelsick, principal of the Moorcroft school, and contestant initialed it as noted. He was, however, retained and given another chance.
Following a rash of disciplinary problems in Powell’s classroom shortly after commencement of the 1973-74 school year, the school principal “because of incidences [sic] which had arisen in Mr. Powell’s classroom up to this date [October 17, 1973,] * * * ” in writing, recommended target goals to the contestant to improve the learning situation and eliminate the *1122disciplinary problems. These were a series of suggestions to inspire the students by offering a type of instruction creating enthusiasm to learn and developing respect of the student for the teacher.1
Apparently Powell was unable or unwilling to implement the goals because there was no improvement in discipline and incidents continued unabated. The school principal attended a session of the class and talked to the assembled students himself, in an attempt to promote and create a greater respect for the contestant. A review of the evidence shows that during the 1973-74 school year 17 cases for the discipline of his students were referred by the contestant to the principal of the high school as compared to only five from all the other more than 25 teachers of the Moorcroft Public School.
Powell failed to follow school operating procedures in preventing and dealing with minor discipline problems himself. As far as he was concerned, an offending student was ejected from the class and sent for action to the principal-teacher without his initial attempt to correct without referral and getting to the basic causation. There seems little question but what the students involved violated good standards of student conduct and punishment was invoked by the assistant superintendent, through class suspensions, loss of credit and removal of privileges. In all instances, there was a showing that the offenders lacked respect for the teacher. An incident additional to the 17 itemized involved a girl student. She was found in the hall crying and trying to telephone her mother because she thought Powell had deliberately pulled a chair from under her and, as a result, hurt her back. It seems that she was in the middle of a class disturbance which Powell had moved to quiet down. While it was never clear that he did as she accused him, *1123still the disruption and the scene that ensued pointed to indiscreet handling and a showing of anger by the contestant resulted in what could have been a minor incident becoming enlarged out of proportion to its initial seriousness.
This case has a refreshing feature brushed off by the majority. Every one of the 17 incidents, plus that of the girl student, was carefully documented as to date and detail and maintained as a school record. The school administrators should be commended in this regard. The principal and assistant were, in their lengthy testimony, able to and did explain, with understanding, Powell’s inadequacies. There was no lack of evidence of the teacher’s inability to maintain discipline. These were the facts presented by and the opinions of the principal-teacher and the assistant superintendent for the Moorcroft school. They both made every effort to help Powell and elevate his effectiveness.
That background is preliminary to a discussion of the major thrust of the majority opinion that the reasons for his termination were not the same as those set out in the notice to Powell that the school district superintendent was recommending a non-renewal of his contract for the following year. It is by this device that the majority circumvents ever reaching the real reason for the contestant’s discharge, i. e., his inability to maintain discipline. The majority must be saying that the teacher did not know what he was to defend against and was discharged for reasons of which he was not aware and not prepared to meet because that is the only objection that can be made with respect to notice. If that were actually the case, I would be amongst the first to join in a reversal.
While the letter notice to Powell was not the most artful, still it set out enough to let him know that he was unable to maintain discipline among his students because of an inability to develop and maintain rapport with his students.2
The letter to Powell, advising of his termination, specifically referred to the school district regulations at particular pages. The pertinent one was page 31. That page dealt with discipline, as follows:
“2. Discipline — Meaningful classroom activity and motivation of students through preparation and planning should be the rule.
Teachers should stress broad standards of conduct, not ‘rules and regulations.’ Students should be expected to fulfill their obligations to themselves in obtaining more than a ‘minimum standards’ type of education. Therefore, within a humanistic context, teachers will provide necessary guidance for continuing student self actualization. In those instances that students are continuously disruptive, the resources of the district, i. e., adminstrators, guidance counselors, etc., will be used to attempt to rehabilitate the student prior to taking action designed to remove the student from school.
“The following procedures will be followed in student discipline:
“a. The student will be informed of his unacceptable behavior by the teacher.
“b. The principal and/or counselor shall be informed of a student’s unacceptable behavior.
“c. Parents will be informed of a student’s unacceptable behavior.
“d. A parental conference will be arranged.
“e. If [the] behavior continues, a one day suspension.
*1124“f. If the behavior continues, a three day suspension.
“g. If the behavior continues, a 10 day suspension as outlined in the Wyoming Code.
“h. Referral to the superintendent.” There was never any question raised that Powell was not aware of this general regulation. Even without the abundant other notice he had, this alone should have caused him to know and be fully aware that his classroom discipline was going to be the subject matter of the hearing and the grounds for his dismissal.
Prior to the hearing, the appellant asked for copies of everything in the school files pertaining to his problem. Those were furnished and they included all the exhibits in the case which deal with the disciplinary incidents — all 18 of them — which Powell then had in all their detail. A discussion of those particular exhibits makes up the major portion of the testimony. The defendant’s testimony embraces each one of the 17 incidents plus the one with the girl. He presented other witnesses who dealt specifically with the question of his classroom discipline.
There is not the slightest suggestion anywhere in the record that Powell was ignorant of what he was required to defend against. Section 9-276.25, W.S.1957, as amended, a part of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, subsection (b)(4), provides, with respect to notice, that it will contain,
“A short and plain statement of the matters asserted. If the agency or other party is unable to state the matters in detail at the time the notice is served, the initial notice may be limited to a statement of the issues involved, and thereafter upon application a more definite and detailed statement shall he furnished.’’ (Emphasis added.)
The appellant never made any application for any more detailed statement than was given to him. As a matter of fact, the parties prior to the hearing entered into a written stipulation, the opening words of which were, “The Contestant waives service of a formal Notice of Hearing * * (Emphasis added.) He well knew what the hearing was all about.
In Glenn v. Board of County Commissioners, Sheridan County, Wyo.1968, 440 P.2d 1, 4, this court recognized that the courts have always been quite liberal with respect to the matter of pleadings before administrative agencies and observed that: “The important question is whether or not the parties'had fair notice of the issues involved." Glenn also notes that since neither party there raised any question of notice before or during the hearing, and not until on appeal, it would turn to the merits without considering any question of insufficient notice.
1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 8.04, p. 523, drives that home dramatically, when he says:
“The most important characteristic of pleadings in the administrative process is their unimportance. And experience shows that unimportance of' pleadings is a virtue.. In the judicial system the long-term movement has been from the common-law system of pleading to formulate issues, to the early code ideal of stating all material facts, to the view now prevailing in the federal courts that fair notice is the objective. Of pleading in the courts, Profession [sic] Moore says in his treatise: ‘The modern philosophy concerning pleadings is that they do little more than indicate generally the type of litigation that is involved. . A generalized summary of the case that affords fair notice is all that can be expected.’ A court has observed: ‘The whole thrust of modern pleading is towards fulfillment of a notice-giving function and away from the rigid formalism of the common law. It is now generally accepted that there may be no subsequent challenge of issues actually litigated, if there has been actual notices and adequate opportunity to cure surprise.’ ”
*1125What is said by Davis is reflected in our own Rule 15(b), W.R.C.P., providing:
“When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such amendment.”
No more should be or is by competent authority required of an administrative agency.
The hearing before the Crook County school board was tried entirely upon the experience of the Moorcroft school principal and the assistant superintendent with Powell’s complete failure to maintain discipline in his classes because he had no rapport with his students. Not objection one was made on the ground that he was surprised and he made no motion for a continuance in order to meet some evidence he did not expect. He came prepared to try the very issues litigated. 1 Davis, goes on to say at page 525:
“The key to pleading in the administrative process is nothing more than opportunity to prepare. Pleading is only one of many ways of providing opportunity to prepare. Deficiencies in a pleading may be cured by informal communication, by formal amendment, by a bill of particulars, by pre-hearing conferences, or by ample continuances at the hearing. And the question on review is not the adequacy of the original notice or pleading but is the fairness of the whole procedure, * *
In Jergeson v. Board of Trustees of School District No. 7, Sheridan County, Wyo.1970, 476 P.2d 481, where complaint was made by the teacher that the board had failed to give him notice of all the ■ charges against him, this court approved a general charge as opening up a range of incidents in which the teacher was involved and pointed out that the discovery procedure provided in the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 3 was available to him. Here, Powell used pre-hearing discovery and obtained every bit of information in the school file which was the entire case against him. He well knew the complaints against him. In Fahl v. School District No. 1 in City and County of Denver, 1947, 116 Colo. 277, 180 P.2d 532, an opportunity to inspect the records of the board supplied the additional particulars and the teacher was not prejudiced for want of additional specifications.
The attorney, employed to litigate the matter of the teacher’s inadequacy on be*1126half of the school district, made an opening statement in which he outlined all the evidence that would be introduced to include all of the incidents of Powell’s inability to control his students. Counsel for Powell made no objection or showed any surprise at the course the evidence would take. The superintendent of schools testified that the reason he would not recommend rehiring of Powell and the basis for his letter to Powell to be “lack of rapport, lack of discipline.” Contestant made no objection that they were outside the reasons being tried. An examination of the record will disclose that at no time did the appellant ever make objection to the introduction of any evidence on the ground that it was something new and surprising to him that he did not expect nor did he ever object upon the ground that the evidence was not within the notice which he received. His own testimony was designed to defend against every one of the multitude of incidents.
This is an objection that was first raised in the district court on appeal and now in this court. We must remember that this was not a court proceeding but was a hearing before an agency and it seems to me clear that under the rules that we cite so many times, if no objection is made at the trial level, it is too late to do so at the appellate level, unless it is something of a fundamental nature.4 I realize that notice is a matter of seriousness, but the appellant would have to have been unconscious to not know what the hearing would encompass and there is no indication that he suffered such disability.
As said in United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 1952, 344 U.S. 33, 37, 73 S.Ct.67, 69, 97 L.Ed. 54, 58:
“ * * * Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.”
Our own rule, 72.1 (i), W.R.C.P., dealing with administrative appeals, declares as follows:
“The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record as supplemented pursuant to the provisions of subdivision (h) of this rule, and to the issues raised before the agency. The court’s review shall be limited to a determination of the matters specified in section 14(c) of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. The court may receive written briefs and may in its discretion hear oral argument.
jji jJC ⅜ }f
(Emphasis added.)
It would be unusual for us to make new rules as we go along from case to case, to suit our fancy. See Glenn v. Board of County Commissioners, Sheridan County, supra.
By the majority’s failure to follow these established doctrines, they have improperly deleted from their consideration Powell’s inability and failure to maintain discipline in his classes. They are left talking about only rapport, which is nothing more than a reason for the lack of discipline. Failure to establish rapport is not and cannot be left standing by itself but remains associated with absence of discipline, as one of the latter’s basic causes. Rapport and discipline cannot be separated but must be considered together.
The next step then is to determine the adequacy of the board’s findings of fact, conclusions of law and order. They are required by § 9-276.28, W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp.:
“ * * * The final decision shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law separately stated. Findings of fact if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts sup-
*1127porting the findings. Parties shall be notified either personally or by mail of any decision or order. A copy of the decision and order shall be delivered or mailed forthwith to each party or to his attorney of record.”
The board in its order terminating the contestant set out as a separately stated fact:
“2. That the Contestant has been unable to control the conduct of his students as evidenced by the unusual amount of disciplinary problems that have developed in his classroom during the 1973-1974 school year, which in turn has caused a great amount of dissention [sic] between the Administration and the Contestant.”
The board then by its order set out the following as separately stated conclusions of law:
* * *
“2. That the Contestant failed to establish rapport with his students during the 1973-1974 school year.
“3. That the Contestants [sic] continued employment will cause irreparable damage to the orderly administration of Crook County School District No. 1.
“4. That it is for the best interests of Crook County School District No. 1 that the Contestant’s employment with the District be terminated at the conclusion of the 1973-1974 school year.
“5. That the Administration has shown good cause why the Contestant’s employment with the district should be terminated.”
It is conceded that “2.” of the conclusions of law is a finding of fact. That misarrangement of a fact is of minor consequence and only a matter of form. (I do not recommend it as good form.) The only statutory words appearing in the board’s order are “good cause.” The remainder of the order concisely and explicitly explains the good cause for termination. The words “good cause” come from § 21.1-160, W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp., Laws, 1969, Ch. Ill, § 160, which provides that, “The [school] board may suspend or dismiss any teacher for incompetency, neglect of duty, immorality, insubordination, or any other good or just cause.” (Emphasis added.)
There is no precise formula as to the extent to which underlying facts must be set out. The ultimate fact is usually stated in the words of the pertinent statute. Underlying facts are basic forms from which the ultimate facts in the terms of statutory criteria are inferred. They represent the meaning of the evidence as viewed by the agency. The agency need not recite the evidence in detail.5 Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 1938, 68 App.D.C. 282, 96 F.2d 554, 559-561, cert. den. Gross v. Saginaw Broadcasting Co., 305 U.S. 613, 59 S.Ct. 72, 83 L.Ed. 391; 2 Davis, Administrative Law *1128Treatise, § 16.06, p. 450.6 The board has explained why Powell should be terminated, as it views the evidence. The entire evidence was taken up with the inability of Powell to maintain discipline among his students which the school superintendent stated was caused by a lack of rapport. The principal’s testimony devoted pages to lack of rapport, as did that of the assistant principal. The remaining testimony concerned the details of the heavy volume of disciplinary incidents. Boiled down, these were the major, if not the only, reasons for the existence of “good cause” for the contestant’s termination. The only other reason I can find in the record is in the testimony of the psychological technician of the Moorcroft school that Powell’s students had no respect for the contestant. But that is probably related to his lack of rapport with his students. The presence of those two reasons are enough to send us to the record to see if they are supported by substantial evidence. They were concise and explicit.
Admittedly, it would have been insufficient for the school board to merely cite the words “good cause” as its reason for terminating. It is the duty of the administrative agency to point out in its decision how it arrived at its final facts and conclusions and a statement only of statutory language is not enough. Geraud v. Schrader, Wyo.1975, 531 P.2d 872, 879, cert. den. 423 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 205, 46 L. Ed.2d 134. In Geraud, only statutory language was used. The school board, however, went further and premised that conclusion on the sub findings that Powell was (1) unable to control the conduct of his students which was caused by the further fact that (2) the contestant failed to establish rapport with his students, leading to (3) a great amount of dissension between the administration and the contestant, all of which persuaded the board that it was in the best interests of Crook County School District No. 1 that Powell’s employment should be terminated at the conclusion of the 1973-1974 school year. Put into a logical sequence, a syllogism is formed:
Premises: (1) Contestant had no rapport with his students; (2) Contestant was unable to control the conduct of his students as evidenced by the unusual amount of disciplinary problems that developed in his classroom in the 1973-1974 school year. [There was &, lack of discipline in contestant’s classes.] ; (3) There was dissension between the administration and the contestant as a result of contestant’s continued problem of discipline; and (4) The best interests of the school district are not served when such conditions prevail.
Conclusion: There is good cause to terminate the contestant.
While the board's order is not in either of the foregoing forms of paraphrasing, it nevertheless gives clear and sufficient reasons, if supported by sufficient evidence appearing in the record, why the board terminated the appellant.
It would be my view that if the board made any error, it would have been failure to find specifically that this teacher was incompetent rather than using the more general term “good cause.” No one can argue, however, that incompetency is not good cause. Good cause includes any ground which is advanced in good faith *1129and is not arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable or irrelevant to a school board’s task of building up and maintaining an efficient school system. Davis v. School Committee of Somerville, 1940, 307 Mass. 354, 362, 30 N.E.2d 401, 406. If the cause assigned is at least fairly debatable and asserted honestly and not as subterfuge, that is enough. Rinaldo v. Dreyer, 1936, 294 Mass. 167, 169, 1 N.E.2d 37, 38. I have no objection to the definitions of good cause set out in the majority opinion because the cause for firing Powell falls well within them. There is really no appreciable difference in the definitions. The board was not obligated to accept the excuses advanced by the contestant for the breakdown of discipline in his classes. Powell’s position was that students were using brushfire tactics and guerilla warfare on him. It is believable that poor teacher practices result in poor discipline.
Is failure to maintain discipline good cause for removal of a teacher? This is the critical issue that the majority bypasses. It is noted by the author of an Annotation, “What Constitutes Tncompetency’ or ‘Inefficiency’ as a Ground for Dismissal or Demotion of Public School Teacher,” 4 A.L.R.3d 1090, 1102, that the inability to maintain discipline is one of the most common characteristics of those teachers who have been held to be incompetent. The cases bear out this conclusion. Robel v. Highline Public Schools, District No. 401, King County, 1965, 65 Wash.2d 477, 398 P.2d 1; Guthrie v. Board of Education of Jefferson County, Ky.1957, 298 S.W.2d 691; Singleton v. Iberville Parish School Board, La.App.1961, 136 So.2d 809; Fox v. San Francisco Unified School District, 1952, 111 Cal.App.2d 885, 245 P.2d 603; Schrader v. Cameron Tp. School District, Cameron No. 6, Audubon County, 1936, 221 Iowa 799, 266 N.W. 473; Biggs v. School City of Mt. Vernon, 1909, 45 Ind.App. 572, 90 N.E. 105; In re Lane, 1940, 141 Pa.Super. 259, 14 A.2d 573. In Board of Education of City of Albuquerque v. New Mexico State Board of Education, 1975, 88 N. M. 10, 536 P.2d 274, it was held that it is basically a decision of policy to be determined by the agency as to whether a teacher unable to control his classes should be terminated. A board of education has a right to demand that a teacher be capable of arousing and holding the interest of his pupils and maintaining discipline. Conley v. Board of Education of City of New Britain, 1956, 143 Conn. 488, 123 A.2d 747.
Was the matter of Powell’s inadequacy supported by the record and. the evidence substantial ? What is substantial evidence? In Howard v. Lindmier, 1950, 67 Wyo. 78, 87, 214 P.2d 737, 740, it was said with approval that substantial evidence “does not include the idea of weight of evidence, although it is more than a mere scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Before the board can be overruled, the court must have evidence before it that the conclusion of the board was wrong and unreasonable. The weight of credibility given witnesses by an administrative agency should not be lightly disregarded on an appeal from the agency’s decision. L. L. Sheep Co. v. Potter, 1950, 67 Wyo. 348, 359, 224 P.2d 496, 499.
The majority turn their backs on the controlling and convincing testimony of experienced school administrators and teachers. The testimony of experienced teachers and administrators is of significant importance. Those testifying before the board spoke with reason. Information as to the art of teaching can be imparted by one who is versed and aware of required qualifications. Who were those witnesses in this case with an understanding of the educational process? Hugo Hendrickson, superintendent of schools, Crook County, School District No. 1; he has a master’s degree in teaching and a master’s degree in education and has done postgraduate work at the University of California, the University of Duluth, Minnesota, and the University of Wyoming. He has studied and is experienced especial*1130ly in the field of evaluating the performance of teachers. He attributed weight to the extremely high frequency of disciplinary incidents and considered it a result of the teacher’s failure to maintain rapport with his students and a failure to follow the steps in handling disciplinary problems set out in the district regulations (see pages 1123 and 1124).
Another witness was Richard Haglund, teacher-principal at Moorcroft high school, with a teaching background of 10 years in the Moorcroft high school, five years as head teacher and the past three years teaching principal. His duties are not only teaching but the supervision and evaluation of teachers as well as handling discipline problems. He has a master’s degree in educational administration from the University of Wyoming, which includes a study of teacher evaluation. He has had special instruction in professional skills of the instructor, classroom management and teaching techniques and skills. He testified that, “Classroom management would involve the development of general rapport with students, developing a program whereby you can communicate with the students, work with students and present a good learning situation. With good rapport you generally will not have many disciplinary problems.” He testified as to each of the large number of disciplinary incidents. He considered the lack of discipline as symptomatic of lack of rapport; there was a lack of understanding between the pupils and teacher. It is expected that teachers develop a good learning climate and Powell there failed.
Earl Nebelsick testified. He is assistant superintendent at the Moorcroft school, responsible for the general supervision of that institution. He has a master’s degree in the field of educational administration from South Dakota State University as well as some 30 hours of additional work in the area of education. He has been a teacher since 1960. His testimony was that the contestant had been unable to establish a teaching-learning situation, to gain the respect of his students.
Kelly Birchfield, psychological technician for the Moorcroft schools, testified. He has a master’s degree in education with a speciality in educational psychology work with emphasis on guidance and counseling. During the course of his work, he had occasion to talk with students with discipline problems. It is his work to pinpoint why the behavior is taking place. His conclusion was a lack of respect for Powell by the students and, consequently, he had an undue amount of discipline problems within his classroom.
As said in Barger v. Board of Trustees of School District No. 3, Goshen County, Wyo. 1972, 494 P.2d 544, 546, there is “no reason why a school board cannot and should not rely upon evaluations made by administrators, who are hired for purposes such as evaluating the work of teachers and administering school systems in general.” We cannot disregard the skills of those witnesses testifying from experience and special education in their fields and scorn their testimony as nonsense.
The majority pooh-poohs the term “rapport” as a basic fact contributing to or being a part of good cause for termination. “Rapport,” according to Webster, is a relation characterized by harmony, conformity, accord or affinity. Those skilled and experienced in the profession of teaching testified that this relation did not exist between Powell and his students and it is of basic importance. I believe it reasonable that when this does not exist, the teacher is ineffective, leading to the disrespect the evidence indicates did exist, expanding into class disruptions and a breakdown in discipline. A teacher thus loses his primary purpose. Teaching and learning is disrupted; concentration is upset; disorder prevails; and the subject of instruction is lost in the commotion. He is not doing that for which he was hired in the efficient manner expected. There is no excuse for overlooking ineffective teachers and it is *1131the duty of school administrators to eliminate from teacher ranks those who do not perform the important mission of education. The teaching profession itself must prefer that the ineffective be removed from its ranks. Schools can be no better than their teachers.
Rapport has meaning to educators and is a part of their jargon. If this term had meaning to the participants, and the record shows it did, there is no justification for insisting that it was inadequate because it was not understood by lawyers or judges in the same way.
Courts must not administer the Crook County school system. Courts must not substitute their judgment in educational matters for those of school boards and administrators. This court has consistently recognized the importance of administrative boards and their decisions. It has adhered to the rule that we will not substitute our judgment for theirs. Shenefield v. Sheridan- County School District No. 1, Wyo. 1976, 544 P.2d 870, 874, and the cases there collected. The majority piously reaffirms that canon, worships at its shrine and then sins in its shadow.
The board of trustees shall be the governing body of the school district. Section 21.1-21, W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp. (same as in 1973). It shall prescribe and enforce rules, regulations and policies. Section 21.1-26(a), W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp. (same as in 1973). It is empowered to discharge employees. Section 21.1 -27(g), W. S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp. (same as in 1973). Thus, the statutory duty rests in the school board, not the courts. They are better qualified than courts. We have enough judicial duties to dispatch without undertaking to run a school system, as well. It was recognized in Baird v. School District No. 25, Fremont County, 1930, 41 Wyo. 451, 463, 287 P. 308, 311, that someone must judge whether a school is operating in a proper fashion. Discretion to do that must be reposed somewhere and the trustees and school administrators have special knowledge of schools and school problems. Courts will not interfere with the discretion of elected school officials in matters which have been assigned to their judgment unless there is an abuse of discretion or arbitrary or unlawful action. It is up to the governing board to say what is best for successful management and not for the courts to interfere. It is on the ground and can see the effect an unproductive teacher has on its whole system. There must be a chain of authority — there must be the right to manage and control subordinates, otherwise there is no use in designating certain personnel as superintendents, principals and teachers. The most important function of the school board is to assure a first-rate instructor staff. That is what schools are all about.
The views of this court in Baird are consistent with the limitations placed upon our scope of review by § 9-276.32(c), W. S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp., Laws, 1973, Ch. 24, § 1, of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, enacted after the date of that case:
“The court’s review pursuant to the provisions of this section shall be limited to a determination that:
“(i) The agency acted without or in excess of its .powers;
“(ii) The decision or other agency action was procured by fraud;
“(iii) The decision or other agency action is in conformity with law;
“(iv) The findings of facts in issue in a contested case are supported by substantial evidence; and
“(v) The decision or other agency action is arbitrary, capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion.”
The agency had the power; there is no question of fraud; it followed the law; there is no arbitrariness; the board was not capricious and it acted within the limits of its discretion.
Consistent failure of a teacher to maintain discipline in the classroom is good cause for termination. Unfitness for a (ask is best shown by numerous or a series *1132of incidents. There is a sound, reasonable basis for the board’s action in terminating the contestant. I can find no justification within the statutorily authorized scope of our review to alter the decision of the board of trustees or the district court.
I would have affirmed the board of trustees and the district court.
. The written goals delivered to the teacher were as follows:
“October 17, 1973
“Recommended Target Goals for: Hr. Tom Powell
“I. Improve planning and organizing
“A. Develop short and long-range goals
1. Have the appropriate materials available for the student to occupy the entire class period
2. Submit to the administration weekly a complete set of goals, objectives, procedures and techniques in the implementing of each subject instructed
“B. Provide for better motivation of students and more enthusiastic participation
1. Add diversity to daily program in each class
2. Students to be involved in structured, learning experiences during entire class period. The accomplishment of this goal is to be evaluated through administrative visitations
“II. Improve rapport with pupils — have better two-way communication to develop mutual understanding and respect
“A. Tighten up class management techniques
1. Don’t identify with a favorite student
2. Don’t show partiality when developing classroom rapport and discipline
“B. Use more care in the evaluation of student accomplishment
1. Have adequate grades in grade-book to justify a student’s grade for a marking period
2. The accomplishment of this goal to be evaluated through cooperative study of student evaluation techniques and grading procedures
“III. Personal characteristics
“A. Use more discretion in behavior inside and outside school
1. Close teacher-student contact outside of school is not educationally sound
“B. Improve being punctual to class and leave the classroom for immediate business purposes only
“IV. Parent-Community
“A. Build respect and confidence of parent and child and school
1. Parent-teacher conferences with students who may not be progressing adequately or are discipline problems”
. The full list of reasons is as follows:
“1. Neglect of duty (leaving the classroom and students unattended).
“2. Failure to follow district policy as outlined under general regulations. (N) Page [sic] 31 and 32.
“3. The inability to establish rapport with students.
. “4. Insubordination.”
. Section 9-276.25 (g), W.S.1957, 1975 Cum. Supp., of the Administrative Procedure Act, provides as follows:
“(i) In all contested cases the taking of depositions and discovery shall be available to the parties in accordance with the provisions of Rules 26, 28 through 37 (excepting Rule 37(b)(1) and 37(b)(2)(D) therefrom) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure in effect on the date of the enactment of this act [§§ 9-276.19 to 9-276.33] and any subsequent rule amendments thereto. Provided, however, all references therein to the ‘court’- shall be deemed to refer to the appropriate ‘agency’; all references to the use of the subpoena power shall be deemed references to section 1(c) [§ 9-276.25(c)] ; all references to to ‘trial’ shall be deemed references to ‘hearing,’ all references to ‘plaintiff’ shall be deemed references to ‘a party.’ ”
. Oedekoven v. Oedekoven, Wyo.1975, 538 P.2d 1292, 1295.
. Appellee school district in its brief very effectively illustrates this by setting out that the school board could have made the following findings of fact:
“that Contestant was rated ‘below average’ in disciplinary ability during the 1972-1973 school year, and was at that time identified as having ‘disciplinary problems’ (R.A. 254, 424) ; that there were seventeen disciplinary incidents involving Contestant during the 1973-1974 school year (R.A. 86-87) ; that the Administration considered this number to be high in relation to teachers in the same school and other schools in the district (R.A. 86-87, 173, 177, 188, 255) ; that the Principal believed that Contestant was not handling minor discipline problems satisfactorily (R.A. 127-129) ; that the Administration took measures to improve the situation, but did not detect any improvement (R.A. 178, 182) ; that the Superintendent, the Assistant Superintendent, the Principal, and the Counselor all considered the reason for the problems to be that Contestant had failed to gain the respect of his students, or equivalently, had failed to establish rapport with them (R.A. 86-87, 91, 150, 165, 173, 255, 257, 286-287) ; and that the Assistant Superintendent and the Principal had recommended that Contestant be terminated (R.A. 91, 182).”
However, these “findings” are merely a recitation of the evidence and say no more than the concise and explicit findings set out by the board.
, “ * * * An ultimate fact is usually expressed in the language of a statutory standard. Examples: the rate is reasonable; ⅜ * * the action is in the public interest; * * * , Facts might theoretically be lined up on a scale from the most specific to the most general. At one end is each statement of each witness, then a summary of the testimony of each witness, then a summary of the testimony and other evidence on each side, then the basic findings, and at the opposite end the ultimate findings. Courts do not want agencies to include detailed summaries of testimony in their findings; they want what they call the basic facts. The ultimate finding may be and usually is mixed with ideas of law or policy. The Supreme Court has said: ‘The ultimate finding is a conclusion of law or at least a determination of a mixed question of law and fact.’ ”