This appeal presents an issue of first impression for this court, the resolution of which will substantially affect domestic relations law in Wyoming. The question presented is:
Did the district court, acting under § 20-2-113(a), W.S.1977,1 have the power *49to order continued support for appellant’s disabled daughter, even though the child had attained the age of majority?
We will affirm.
FACTS
In 1958, Mariana Kamp was born to ap-pellee Marguerite Kamp and appellant Peter Kamp. From birth, Mariana has suffered from severe mental deficiencies, cerebral palsy, and spastic paraplegia. The Kamps were divorced in August of 1960, and custody of Mariana was awarded to Marguerite who has continued to care for her daughter. They are presently living in the home of Marguerite’s mother in Kenyon, Rhode Island. The parties agree that Mariana is severely incapacitated and that caring for her is expensive. The love, care and attention that Mariana requires is a minute-by-minute obligation — one that Marguerite Kamp discharges with devotion and abiding affection.
Peter Kamp resides in Carbon County, Wyoming, and is a man of means. From the date of the divorce until the present dispute Mr. Kamp has provided support for his daughter as ordered by the court. Support payments were originally set at $100.00 per month, but this amount had been increased until, on November 1, 1976, the obligation was increased to $300.00 per month.
On August 24, 1978, Marguerite petitioned the district court to raise the monthly child support payments to $850.00 a month. In response, Mr. Kamp challenged the court’s jurisdiction to require further support, on the ground that Mariana had attained the age of majority,2 and that § 20-2-113, supra, gives to the courts of this state jurisdiction over minor children only. The district court heard testimony on October 27, 1980 and February 18, 1981, then on April 8, 1981 ordered Mr. Kamp to pay $850.00 per month for Mariana’s support. Mr. Kamp takes his appeal from this decision.
Does § 20-2-113(a), W.S.1977, Impose a
Duty On Appellant to
Support Mariana?
The issue structured by the appellant must be divided into two areas of inquiry. The first asks whether the parent has a duty to support an incapacitated child once the child has reached' the age of majority; the second has to do with whether the district court possesses jurisdiction which will permit ordering the parent to furnish support for an incapacitated child under § 20-2-113(a), supra.
In essence, this appeal asks this court to construe the legislative intent reflected in the language of § 20-2-113(a), supra. (See n.l for language.)
Mr. Kamp argues that the legislature intended the word “children” in § 20-2-113(a) to mean “minor children” only. In support of this position, he refers us to an annotation which says that, as a general proposition, courts are without authority to award support for adult incapacitated children under their state divorce statute jurisdiction. See Annot. 152 A.L.R. 1084 and cases cited therein. Kamp also urges a position which holds that, at common law, the duty of parental support for a child ends when the child reaches majority. In support of this theory, he cites two opinions of this court, namely, Wantulok v. Wantulok, 67 Wyo. 22, 214 P.2d 477, 483-484 (1950) and Worth v. Worth, 48 Wyo. 441, 49 P.2d 649, 660 (1935). See also: Annot., 162 A.L.R. 1084. In reliance upon this authority, the appellant concludes that the legislature must have intended that the term “children” as used in § 20-2-113(a) contemplates “minor children” only.
The two Wyoming cases cited above are not dispositive of the issue here because we were not there concerned with a statutory interpretation where the question was *50whether the statute included or excluded an incapacitated adult child nor are we here involved with a common-law duty-of-support question. We are, on the other hand, asked in the case at bar to ascertain the meaning, intent and purpose of a statute.
In pursuit of this task, we look to the general rules of statutory construction in order to ascertain the legislature’s intent when it referred to “children” in § 20-2-113(a). In interpreting a statute, where the plain and ordinary meaning of the words are not clear, we are bound by what we perceive to be the legislative intent. Of course, if this intent is expressed clearly and unambiguously through the language of the statute, the apparent intent must be given effect. Oroz v. Hayes, Wyo., 598 P.2d 432 (1979); Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., Wyo., 568 P.2d 908 (1977). When the statute is ambiguous, the intent of the legislature must be ascertained from its terms in light of the objects and purposes intended to be accomplished. School District Nos. 2, 3, 6, 9, and 10, Campbell County v. Cook, Wyo., 424 P.2d 751, 756 (1967); Hoffmeister v. McIntosh, Wyo., 361 P.2d 678, 679 (1961); In re Lambert, 53 Wyo. 241, 80 P.2d 425, 428 (1938). Finally, we have said that if a statute has in view an object of great public importance it is entitled to a liberal construction in order, if possible, to carry out the legislative purpose. Woolley v. State Highway Commission, Wyo., 387 P.2d 667 (1963), citing Edwards v. City of Cheyenne, 19 Wyo. 110, 114 P. 677, 687 (1911).
Applying these rules to § 20-2-113(a) we come unerringly to the conclusion that the legislature, in utilizing the word “children”, meant all children and not just “minor children.” “Children” is not a technical term, nor is it peculiar to the law. Rather, the word has always connoted all offspring, American Heritage Dictionary (1978), at p. 233, and not just those offspring who have not yet reached majority. Other courts have adopted a similar interpretation. In construing the Colorado support statute in Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 41 Colo.App. 364, 585 P.2d 599 (1978), the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that if it had been the legislature’s intent that the term “children” was to mean “minor children,” it could easily have included the word “minor” in the statute. Even though, in holding that there was a duty to support the couple’s retarded adult son, the court in Wilkinson attached significance to the fact that the legislature had deleted a reference to “minor children” appearing in an earlier support statute, we feel that the reasoning of that case is still applicable. Wilkinson, supra, 585 P.2d at 600. Likewise, in Dehm v. Dehm, Utah, 545 P.2d 525, 528 (1976) the Utah Supreme Court gave the term “children,” in a statute similar to ours, its plain and ordinary meaning where the legislature had neither limited nor defined it. Similarly, in French v. French, 117 N.H. 696, 378 A.2d 1127 (1977) the New Hampshire Supreme Court supported its affirmation of a trial-court award which provided for the payment of education expenses for a divorced father’s children, who had attained majority, by relying on the fact that the legislature had not limited support awards to minors only. Once again the court observed that if the legislature had intended such a limitation it would have said so. French, supra, 378 A.2d at 1129. Finally, in Young v. Young, Tex., 609 S.W.2d 758 (1980) the Texas Supreme Court refused to hold that the word “children” meant “minor children,” when construing a property-division statute. The court noted that the word “minor” and the word “child” were not always synonymous, and that if the legislature had desired to modify the word “children” with the term “minor” it could have done so. Young, supra, 609 S.W.2d at 760.
We find the analysis of the above-cited cases to be persuasive and consistent with the intent and purpose of the legislative enactment with which we are concerned in this appeal. We therefore hold that the Wyoming legislature, in utilizing the term “children” in § 20-2-113(a), intended to impose a duty on parents to support their “children” when the need for support is apparent. The language is not ambiguous, nor has the legislature chosen to limit it, *51and we are not called upon to inquire any further than the language of the section itself. Geraud v. Schrader, Wyo., 531 P.2d 872 (1975).
In further support of our conclusion, we note that in only one instance has the legislature chosen to limit the effect of the divorce statutes to minor children. See: § 20-2-112(b), W.S.1977. On all other occasions the term is not modified by the word “minor.” The appellant would have us hold that this singular reference to minor children reflects that all legislative references to “children” were intended to mean “minor children.” We cannot agree with this position. It is a well-accepted principle of statutory construction that in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of a statute, we should look at all statutes which relate to the same subject or which have the same general purpose. Stringer v. Board of County Commissioners of Big Horn County, Wyo., 347 P.2d 197, 200 (1959). To apply this rule in the manner appellant desires would be to ignore the clear intent of the legislature. When the legislature used “minor children” in § 20-2-112(b) it had a purpose in mind, but we cannot conclude that its purpose was to change to “minor children” the references to “children” in all of the other sections of the divorce statutes.3
Thus, our only remaining consideration has to do with whether the child in this case falls within the category of “children” with respect to whom the legislature intended the divorced parent would be called upon to support. The facts of this case clearly show that Mariana Kamp is such a child. As was said in Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 618, 44 S.E.2d 31, 34 (1947):
“The obligation to support such a child ceases only when the necessity for the support ceases.”
We hold that the legislature intended such an application in enacting § 20-2-113(a), supra.
JURISDICTION TO ORDER SUPPORT
On numerous occasions this court has held that the provisions of § 20-2-113(a), supra, n.l, grant a district court continuing jurisdiction, at any time, to modify a decree respecting custody or the payment of support money — the paramount consideration always being the best interests and welfare of the children. Rose v. Rose, Wyo., 576 P.2d 458 (1978); Strahan v. Strahan, Wyo., 400 P.2d 542 (1965). The legislature has provided this because parents’ obligation to support their children is a continuing one. Redman v. Redman, Wyo., 521 P.2d 584 (1974).
In the case at bar, the district court was properly acting under its authority, pursuant to § 20-2-113(a), supra, when it ordered an increase in the support payments for the incapacitated daughter Mariana. According to this section, the court had continuing jurisdiction to modify the November, 1976 decree, and such power will continue until the necessity for the support of Mariana ceases or other changes in circumstances become apparent.
We hold that § 20-2-113(a), W.S.1977, grants the district court jurisdiction to provide for support of the children of divorced parents when the need for support is necessary. Such power is conferred upon the court notwithstanding the age of the child. The keystone consideration is the need for support, and, as always, the ability to pay. We are not, however, in this case, required to determine in what situations the parental duty of support will cease. We simply say that here there was a duty to support and the court had the power to enforce it.
Affirmed.
. Section 20-2-113, W.S.1977, reads in pertinent part:
“(a) In granting a divorce or annulment of a marriage, the court may make such disposition of the children as appears most expedient and beneficial for the well-being of the children. The court shall consider the relative competency of both parents and no award of custody shall be made solely on the basis of gender of the parent. On the peti*49tion of either of the parents, the court may revise the decree concerning the care, custody and maintenance of the children as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children requires.”
. The age of majority in Wyoming is 19 years pursuant to § 14-1-101, W.S.1977.
. The divorce statutes are embodied in §§ 20-2-101 through 20-2-117, W.S.1977.