dissenting, with whom RAMIL, Justice, joins.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the victim’s awareness of the theft is a necessary element of robbery pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 708 — 840(l)(b)(ii) (1993).
In contrast to the majority, I would hold that it is the perpetrator’s intent, specifically, the intent to compel acquiescence to the perpetrator’s taking of or escape with the property, that is the necessary element of robbery. The victim’s awareness of the theft does not need to be examined and is not a necessary element of robbery.
The statute in question is HRS § 708-840(l)(b)(ii), which states in pertinent part:
§ 708-840 Robbery in the first degree. (1) A person commits the offense of robbery in the first degree if, in the course of committing theft:
(b) The person is armed with a dangerous instrument and:
(ii) The person threatens the imminent use of force against the person of anyone who is present with intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property.
(Emphasis added.)
The prosecution was required to show that defendant-appellant Scott Yoshio Mitsuda (the defendant): (1) while committing a theft; (2) was armed with a dangerous weapon; (3) which the defendant used to threaten with the imminent use of force; and (4) with the intent to compel acquiescence to the defendant escaping with property.
Under the statute, the prosecution must prove that the defendant, while in the course of theft, threatened the imminent use of force against Mr. Watanabe with the “intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property.” The prosecution must prove that the defendant “intended to compel acquiescence,” but was not required to show Mr. Watanabe actually acquiesced to the defendant’s actions. Cf. State v. Robins, 66 Haw. 312, 314, 660 P.2d 39, 41 (1983) (offense of burglary requires person to enter property with intent to commit a crime against person or property rights; however, the crime intended to be committed does not actually have to be committed for the offense to be completed, only the intent must be formed). It was incumbent on the prosecution to prove the Defendant’s intent to compel Mr. Watanabe to acquiesce to his escape with the property. The state of mind of Mr. Watanabe and his awareness of the theft were not at issue because only the defendant’s intent was relevant.
Although I do not agree with the rationale by the majority in dismissing the charge of robbery in the first degree, the evidence supporting the charge, insofar as the theft of *48the property, was skimpy. However, giving full weight to the apparent findings by the jury, I would be compelled to affirm the conviction of robbery in the first degree.