concurring:
I am in accord with the views expressed in the majority opinion. However, I wish to add a note regarding our affirmance of that part of the trial court’s grant of declaratory relief to respondents, which upheld the Nevada Gaming Commission’s denial of appellant’s application for a gaming license and our reversal of the determination concerning the work permit.
The gaming industry is one which is subject to complete and careful control by the state due to criminal elements commonly involved in the industry. Nevada Tax Comm’n v. Hicks, 73 Nev. 115, 119, 310 P.2d 852, 854 (1957). Thus, individuals desiring to be employed by or to operate a business in the industry are necessarily required to submit to rigid investigation and regulation. That degree of scrutiny increases when an individual occupies a key position in the industry.
Here, the record shows inter alia that Rosenthal appeared at the payoff window of the racebook when a gaming official *963questioned the racebook’s refusal to pay a wager; that Rosenthal questioned gaming officials’ authority to examine work permits; that he was observed standing in the casino pit; and that he telephoned gaming officials to complain about gaming agents and accompanied Stardust employees to United Coin to view a new type of electronic scoreboard. I agree with the Gaming Commission’s determination, as characterized by the majority, that Rosenthal “continued to significantly influence gaming.” I too believe that there was cause for the Commission’s summoning of Rosenthal to submit an application for a gaming license and that there existed evidence to support a determination that Rosenthal was a key employee and was unsuitable for licensing.
Moreover, in my view, the legislature could properly conclude that a person who cannot meet the requirements to occupy a key position with an employer, cannot be employed in any position by that employer and remain divorced from the decisions made in running the gaming business of that employer. As such, our statutes can be read to prohibit further employment in any capacity of a person whose application for a license to be employed in a key position is denied. Nevertheless, although it is convincingly argued that the statutes themselves provide sufficient notice of the result of a denial of an application and the hearing for the license is a sufficient hearing for the work permit revocation, I also concur with the majority that specific notice and an opportunity to be heard are preconditions to revocation of this existing right. State v. Rosenthal, 93 Nev. at 46, 559 P.2d at 837. See NRS 463.337.