(concurring).
I cannot subscribe to the majority’s apparent conclusion that the superior court’s explanation of the nature of the charge would have been adequate if Else had been represented by counsel. For in my view, Rule 11(c)(1), Rules of Criminal Procedure, makes no distinction between the plea situation where the accused is represented and where the accused is unrepresented by *1216counsel. In light of the unambiguous text of Rule 11(c)(1),1 and the construction placed upon the substantially parallel Rule of Criminal Procedure by federal courts, I conclude that the trial court must scrupulously comply with the mandate of Rule 11(c)(1) whether or not the accused is represented by counsel.
Under Rule 11(c)(1) the trial court must make the determination whether the defendant understands the nature of the charge against him. This requires the trial court to explain the elements of the offense and what basic acts must be proven to establish guilt. Henderson v. Morgan, — U.S. —, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1968) ; United States v. Cantor, 469 F.2d 435, 438 (3d Cir. 1972); Woodward v. United States, 426 F.2d 959, 962 (3d Cir. 1970). In the case at bar the trial court’s perfunctory inquiry of Else falls far short of compliance with Rule 11.
. Criminal Rule 11(e)(1) provides:
Pleas of Guilty or Nolo Contendere The court should not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere from a defendant without first addressing the defendant personally and (1) determining that he understands the nature of the charge!.]