Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In my view Mathews II dictates the result of these appeals. Even if it did not, I would conclude that the failure of defense counsel to pursue a motion to suppress evidence based on the lack of a magistrate judge’s signature on the warrant did constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Also, I would conclude that the execution of the search warrants for search of residences located on the Nez Perce Indian Reservation without approval of the tribal court infringed upon the tribe’s sovereignty and right to self-government.
By an order dated November 29,1994, this Court consolidated “for purposes of argument” the rehearing of the direct appeal (Mathews I), No. 20154, and the appeal of the summary dismissal of the post-conviction petition, No. 21127. The remittitur in Mathews II disposed of the appeals in both Mathews I, No. 20154, and the summary dismissal of the post-conviction petition, No. 21127. The opinion in Mathews II addresses only the merits of the issues raised in No. 21127, the post-conviction appeal. Part V of the Mathews II opinion, including the title of the part, reads as follows:
V.
REMAINING ISSUES RAISED ON POST-TRIAL HEARING APPEAL AND APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
Having found the warrant deficient, we need not address the balance of the issues raised on appeal as they are rendered moot.
This clearly indicates that those of us who concurred in the opinion intended that the resolution of the post-conviction appeal, referred to as the “post-trial hearing appeal,” resolved both appeals. I believe this is made even clearer by Part VI of the opinion in Mathews II, which reads as follows:
VI.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred in summarily disposing of Mathews’s postconviction application. We vacate and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
This disposition necessarily assumes that the trial court would grant the post-conviction relief sought. Otherwise, there was no reason to declare that the issues in the direct appeal were “rendered moot.” The legend on the slip opinion issued by the Court in Mathews II states as follows: “SUBSTITUTE OPINION ON REHEARING 1994 OPINION NO. 91, FILED JULY 18, 1994, IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN.” This meant that the Court found no further reason to rule on the direct appeal because of its disposition of the post-conviction appeal. The remittitur making the opinion in Mathews II a final disposition of the direct appeal makes this even more clear, when it states:
The Court having announced its Opinion in this cause July 18, 1994, and its Substitute opinion on March 20, 1997, which withdraws the earlier opinion and which is now FINAL; therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the District Court shall forthwith comply with the directive of the Substituted Opinion, if any action is required.
Because the Court declared the issues raised in the direct appeal from the conditional plea to be moot and addressed only the issues raised in the post-conviction appeal, the remand necessarily directed the trial court to address only the relief sought in the post-conviction appeal. See Walters v. Industrial Indem. Co., 130 Idaho 836, 838, 949 P.2d 223, 225 (1997).
Concerning the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, while we might defer to a decision of counsel not to file a suppression motion if counsel had investigated all the facts and found a strategic reason not to do so, that is not the case here. In his affidavit *316to the trial court in the post-conviction case, Mathews’s trial counsel stated as follows:
That had I discovered that [the magistrate judge] had not actually signed the search warrant for the Henry residence in Lapwai, Idaho until January 14, 1992 I would have raised the issue in the Motion to Suppress Evidence. That I would not have allowed Marcus W. Mathews to plead guilty to the charge of First Degree Murder without first raising the issue of the date on the search warrant.
In my view, trial counsel’s failure to investigate to verify whether the magistrate judge had signed the warrant was a clear violation of the ABA Standards, Defense Function, 4-4.1.
I would also conclude that the execution of state search warrants on reservation land infringes on tribal sovereignty and right to self-government. The execution of the state search warrants in this case without tribal court approval denied the tribal court the opportunity to exercise tribal authority to control searches of Indian property located on the reservation. Indian tribes are distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights in matters of local self-government. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557, 95 S.Ct. 710, 717, 42 L.Ed.2d 706, 716 (1975). These natural rights include the power to enact their own laws for the government of their people, and to establish courts to enforce them. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220, 79 S.Ct. 269, 270, 3 L.Ed.2d 251, 253 (1959). The actions of the State of Idaho in this case in executing the warrants on the Nez Perce Indian Reservation infringed on this right of the Nez Perce to make their own laws and be ruled by them, specifically, on their right to regulate searches of Indian property located on the reservation.
In her affidavit, the judge of the Nez Perce Tribal Court stated that it was her understanding that state search warrants were presented to the tribal court for approval prior to execution, and that, in the past, other search warrants executed by the state on the reservation had been presented for her review. She stated that she would concur with a warrant presented to her by non-tribal authorities if it complied with the Tribal Law and Order Code. The state officers in this case were aware that the tribal judge had been contacted concerning the warrants and was on her way to review them. Their conscious decision to proceed with the search without the authorization of the tribal court directly infringed on the tribe’s sovereignty and right to self-government.