We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in George v. Southwire Co., 217 Ga. App. 586 (458 SE2d 362) (1995), and posed the following query:
Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, is psychic trauma compensable when, while not precipitated by a physical in*740jury, it arose out of an accident in which a compensable physical injury contributes to the continuation of the psychic trauma?
While in the scope of his employment as a truck driver for Southwire Company, Denver George suffered injuries to his knee, hip, and chest when his tractor-trailer hit a passenger vehicle broadside after the other driver ran a stop sign. The driver of the other vehicle was thrown from the impact, and a female passenger was killed instantly. George observed the body of the decedent collide with the grill of his truck. He was placed in the same hospital emergency room with the other driver whose lung had collapsed, whose face was mangled, and who was gurgling and hollering for the deceased passenger. George became so upset that he had to be removed from the room.
Approximately two months later, George was released to return to full duty work by his treating orthopedist. He continued, however, to be treated by a psychiatrist who deposed that shortly after his knee injury claimant “began having recurrent nightmares, insomnia, flashbacks of the accident, and recurrent irritability and crying episodes, and could not get the picture of these people [sic] who were killed in the accident out of his mind.” The psychiatrist concluded that George suffered post-traumatic stress disorder which may have been brought on or intensified by his knee injury.1 This condition necessitated continuing psychiatric treatment and resulted in his inability to perform work as a truck driver.
The ALJ denied benefits to the claimant for psychiatric disability resulting from psychic trauma attendant to a compensable automobile accident, finding: “Although there is a definite need for psychological treatment. . . and his psychological problems have resulted in a disability from work, I find that his psychological problems were not precipitated by specific physical trauma to his knee, and that they were caused by the events of the accident which [he] witnessed.” George was awarded temporary total disability benefits for the two months that he was physically unable to work, but no benefits thereafter, “even though he is disabled from working at Southwire or as a truck driver due to psychiatric problems . . . [because] [t]hese psychiatric problems resulting in disability therefrom do not arise from Mr. George’s physical injury, but from the events he witnessed at the accident.” The award was adopted by the full board and affirmed on *741appeal to the superior court.
The Court of Appeals granted discretionary review and reversed, holding that: “George’s mental disability was brought on by a compensable accident in which he was physically injured. Although this physical injury is not the cause of his mental disability, it is part of the reason for its continuation.” George v. Southwire Co., supra at 588.
While this Court has not previously had occasion to examine the question of compensability for mental disability under the Workers’ Compensation Act, it has long been the rule in this state that a psychological injury or disease is compensable if it arises “ ‘naturally and unavoidably’ . . . from some discernible physical occurrence.” Hanson Buick v. Chatham, 163 Ga. App. 127, 129 (292 SE2d 428) (1982). See also Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Loftis, 103 Ga. App. 749 (1) (120 SE2d 655) (1961) (a mental disability is compensable if brought on by an accident and physical injury); Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312 (160 SE2d 424) (1968) (psychic disability must have its origin in injury); Sawyer v. Pacific Indem. Co., 141 Ga. App. 298 (233 SE2d 227) (1977) (psychic disability resulting from physical injury is compensable); Williams v. ARA Environmental Svcs., 175 Ga. App. 661 (334 SE2d 192) (1985) (psychic disability resulting from purely psychological injury is not compensable); Howard v. Superior Contractors, 180 Ga. App. 68 (348 SE2d 563) (1986) (post-traumatic stress syndrome arising from a physical injury is compensable); W. W. Fowler Oil Co. v. Hamby, 192 Ga. App. 422 (385 SE2d 106) (1989) (psychic trauma must arise naturally and unavoidably from some discernible, physical injury).
The claimant herein suffered a discernible physical “injury” as that term is defined in OCGA § 34-9-1 (4). In George v. Southwire Co., supra, the Court of Appeals concluded that a mental disability is compensable under the Act where it was brought on by a compensable accident in which the claimant was physically injured, and the physical injury contributed to the continuation of the psychic trauma. We find this ruling and the precedent upon which it is based to be sound and consistent with the beneficent objective of the Act, which is to provide financial assistance for an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. See generally Travelers Ins. Co. v. Southern Elec., 209 Ga. App. 718 (1) (434 SE2d 507) (1993). Accordingly, we hold that a claimant is entitled to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act for mental disability and psychic treatment which, while not necessarily precipitated by a physical injury, arose out of an accident in which a compensable physical injury was sustained, and that injury contributes to the continuation of the psychic trauma. The physical injury need not be the precipitating cause of the psychic trauma; it is compensable if the physical injury contributes to the *742continuation of the psychic trauma.
To the extent that the ALJ imposed a requirement that claimant’s physical injury must be the precipitating cause of his psychological condition, an incorrect legal standard was applied. “[WJhere an award is entered under an erroneous legal theory, it may be set aside, and the case remanded to the board for further findings.” Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Loftis, 103 Ga. App., supra at 751. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the award must be set aside under OCGA § 34-9-105 (c) (5). But in its further conclusion that, “[u]nder these circumstances, [George should be compensated] for psychic trauma precipitated by psychic stimuli,” George, supra at 588, the Court of Appeals substituted itself as a factfinding body. Neither the superior court nor the appellate court has authority to do so. South Ga. Timber Co. v. Petty, 218 Ga. App. 497, 498 (462 SE2d 176) (1995). The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with direction that the Board determine compensability for claimant’s mental disability and attendant medical expenses under the standard set out herein.
Judgment affirmed and case remanded with direction.
All the Justices concur, except Benham, C. J., Fletcher, P. J., and Sears, J., who concur specially.“Posttraumatic Stress Disorder” is described in the Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 1994) as “the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury. . . .” At 424. It is manifested by “persistent symptoms of anxiety . . . that were not present before the trauma.” Id. at 425.