I join in affirming the judgment. As the majority correctly concludes, plaintiff Vincent A. Gantt’s employer violated public policy, as embodied in Government Code section 12975 (see also, Lab. Code, § 1102.5), when it constructively discharged him for refusing to testify untruthfully or to withhold testimony in the course of an agency investigation. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to his damages for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. (Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654 [254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373]; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 [164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330, 9 A.L.R.4th 314].) I agree also that this recovery poses no conflict with the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers’ compensation law.
I write separately for two reasons. First, I wish to emphasize that, as the majority opinion states (maj. opn., ante, p. 1086 & fn. 2), this court has not addressed plaintiff’s alternate theory of recovery, namely, that his employer *1102violated public policy when it discharged him for reporting ongoing illegal activity within the company (here, the sexual harassment of plaintiff’s coworker). Thus, nothing in the majority opinion should be read as calling into question those decisions recognizing this theory of recovery. (See, e.g., Collier v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1117 [279 Cal.Rptr. 453]; Jenkins v. Family Health Program (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 440 [262 Cal.Rptr. 798]; Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 525 [249 Cal.Rptr. 5]; Hentzel v. Singer Co. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 290 [188 Cal.Rptr. 159].)
My second reason for writing separately is to respond to the majority’s statement that a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy may be based only on public policies expressed in constitutional or statutory provisions. Plaintiff never attempted to articulate a public policy not grounded in a statute or a constitutional provision. Nevertheless, this court insisted that the parties brief the issue, and now purports to decide it. This purported decision is doubly misguided. The issue is not raised by the facts of the case or the contentions of the parties, so the majority’s comments are purest dicta. And, “[a]s so often happens when a court reaches beyond the confines of the case before it to render a gratuitous advisory opinion, the majority decides the issue incorrectly.” (City of Sacramento v. State of California (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51, 77 [266 Cal.Rptr. 139, 785 P.2d 522] [conc. & dis. opn. of Kaufman, J.].)
Courts should confine their decisions to issues actually raised on the facts of a case. The United States Supreme Court has explained its reluctance to issue “advance expressions of legal judgment upon issues which remain unfocused because they are not pressed before the Court with that clear concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multi-faceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests . . . .” (United States v. Fruehauf (1961) 365 U.S. 146, 157 [5 L.Ed.2d 476, 483, 81 S.Ct. 547].) Similarly, we have stressed that “ ‘[t]he rendering of advisory opinions falls within neither the function nor the jurisdiction of this court.’ ” (Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1102, 1126 [278 Cal.Rptr. 346, 805 P.2d 300].) Witkin has labeled this form of judicial activism, “Have Opinion, Need Case.” (Witkin, Manual on Appellate Court Opinions (1977) § 85, p. 155.)
The question whether an action for wrongful discharge may ever be based on a public policy not originating from statutory or constitutional provisions should await a case in which the public policy at issue has some nonstatutory and nonconstitutional basis. We should not decide this issue in a complete factual vacuum. Because the majority has chosen to address this issue and analyzed it in a faulty fashion, I feel compelled to respond.
*1103As the majority acknowledges, courts have for many decades recognized that public policy may legitimately originate not only from constitutional provisions and legislative enactments, but also from other sources. (Maj. opn. ante, pp. 1091-1094.) These sources include the decisional law of appellate courts, executive orders, administrative regulations and decisions, and rules of professional conduct. For example, in James v. Marinship Corp. (1944) 25 Cal.2d 721 [155 P.2d 329,160 A.L.R. 900], relying on the judicial development of the common law and on a federal executive department order, this court held that a labor union could not discriminate against members on the basis of race.
After quoting from many cases that present various views on the application of public policy in general and in the wrongful discharge context, the majority concludes, with only perfunctory analysis, that its rule that a wrongful discharge cause of action may be based only on public policies expressed in constitutional or statutory provisions “strikes the proper balance” because “[t]he employer is bound, at a minimum, to know the fundamental public policies of the state and nation as expressed in their constitutions and statutes . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1095.) This creates the impression that only statutes or constitutional provisions provide employers with adequate notice of what is forbidden by public policy, and that it is somehow unfair for employers to be bound by other legitimate sources of public policy. This is wrong. Other legitimate sources of public policy, such as judicial decisions or codes of professional ethics, for instance, are readily available to employers or their counsel and thus provide no less “notice” than do statutes or constitutional provisions.
Implicit in the majority’s objection to requiring employers to adhere to fundamental public policy set forth in published sources other than statutes or constitutional provisions is the notion that other sources express policies that are not “fundamental” or “substantial” enough. It may be somewhat easier to characterize as “fundamental” a public policy that is plainly based on the terms of a statute or constitutional provision than to so characterize one that is not so based. But it is a mistake to assume that only those policies based on statutes or constitutional provisions are firmly established and important.
An example is helpful. In Verduzco v. General Dynamics, Convair Div. (S.D.Cal. 1990) 742 F.Supp. 559, the plaintiff, a production supervisor for a national defense project, alleged that he was terminated because he complained that workers without required security clearances had access to restricted documents, and that “security was so lax that workers at the plant could walk off with blueprints and other material,” compromising the national security of the United States. (Id. at p. 560.)
*1104The federal court found no statute that addressed this issue; it stated that “Verduzco is asking this court to recognize a public policy that is not based on or derived from a statute.” (Verduzco v. General Dynamics, Convair Div., supra, 742 F.Supp. at p. 560.) Nevertheless, applying California law on wrongful termination, the court held that Verduzco had stated a cause of action for retaliatory dismissal in violation of “a fundamental public interest in preventing unauthorized persons from obtaining access to important technical data relating to military projects.” (Id. at p. 562.)
Under the majority’s approach, a plaintiff in Verduzco’s position could be discharged without fear of consequences, because he could point to no statute or constitutional provision that was violated by his discharge. But the absence of a statute or constitutional provision should not prevent the recognition of a fundamental public policy in preserving national security that would be violated by the dismissal of an employee who complained that national security was compromised by lax procedures. Indeed, because the policy “inures to the benefit of the public at large rather than to a particular employer or employee,” our cases demand its recognition. (Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 669; accord, Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 90 [276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373].)
Other examples are no doubt available. But the point is plain. Courts should not be foreclosed from adjudicating wrongful discharge cases based on violations of public policy springing from nonstatutory and nonconstitutional sources. The majority’s attempt to constrain the development of the law in a one-size-fits-all judicial straight]acket ignores the essential wisdom of the common law: law is best developed case by case, with attention to the facts of particular cases and the patterns of cases as they develop over time.
Mosk, J., concurred.