dissenting as to sentencing phase only.
I concur in the result reached by the Court as to the guilt phase of defendant’s trial. I dissent only as to the sentencing phase of the trial.
One of the preservation issues raised by defendant relates to the applicability of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 100 L.Ed. 2d 384 (1988), to the unanimity requirement for mitigating circumstances in determining whether death is the appropriate punishment in a given case. This issue is now pending before the Supreme Court of the United States. See State v. McKoy, 323 N.C. 1, 372 S.E.2d 12 (1988), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 103 L.Ed. 2d 180 (1989). I continue to believe that Mills is applicable to North Carolina. See State v. Lloyd, 321 N.C. 301, 364 S.E.2d 316, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 486 U.S. —, 102 L.Ed. 2d 18, reinstated, 323 N.C. 622, 374 S.E.2d 277 (1988) (Exum, C. J., and Frye, J„ dissenting). Based on Mills, I therefore dissent from that portion of the Court’s opinion which rejects defendant’s request for a new sentencing hearing.