dissenting as to sentence.
I concur in the result reached as to the guilt phase of the trial but find it necessary to dissent as to the result reached regarding the sentencing phase. As to the sentencing phase, defendant contended that the two requirements of unanimity and proof of miti*81gating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence unconstitutionally limited the jury’s consideration of mitigating circumstances in Issue Three, and thus tainted the jury’s response on Issue Four. The majority rejects defendant’s argument regarding unanimity on the authority of State v. McLaughlin, 323 N.C. 68, 108, 372 S.E. 2d 49, 74-75 (1988). For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in McLaughlin, I continue to believe that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. —, 100 L.Ed. 2d 384. (1988), is applicable to the North Carolina death sentencing procedure. I also note that the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the case relied on by the majority of this Court in McLaughlin. State v. McKoy, 323 N.C. 1, 372 S.E. 2d 12 (1988), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 103 L.Ed. 2d 180 (1989).