(dissenting)-
The sole question presented for our determination is whether the existence of an automobile liability insurance policy with limits sufficient to satisfy the minimum statutory requirements, but insufficient to satisfy admittedly valid multiple tort claims, renders that vehicle an uninsured motor vehicle under the provisions of the claimants’ automobile policies. I believe it does.
The obvious purpose behind 36 O.S.1971 § 3636 was to close the chasm inherent in the Financial Responsibility Act, 47 O.S. 1971 § 7-101 et seq., when it was discovered that the Act did not adequately protect those injured by financially irresponsible motorists. This lack of protection was so apparent that by 1968, forty-six states, including Oklahoma, had enacted statutes requiring uninsured motorist coverage to be included in standard automobile liability policies unless expressly waived by the insured.
Uninsured Motorists Statutes are remedial. They are to be liberally construed to accomplish their legislative purpose, that of providing coverage for injuries which would' otherwise go uncompensated, and to provide the same protection to a person injured by an uninsured motorist as he would have enjoyed as if the uninsured motorist himself carried effective liability insurance. Balestrieri v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Ins. Co., 22 Ariz.App. 255, 526 P.2d 779, 781 (1974); Webb v. United States Auto. Ass’n., 227 Pa.Super. 508, 323 A.2d 737, 742 (1974); Charest v. Union Mut. Ins. Co. of Providence, 113 N. H. 683, 313 A.2d 407 (1973); Chavez v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 100 (N.M.1975).
Contracts of insurance as well as the statutes regulating insurance are to be liberally construed in favor of the object to be accomplished. If the provisions of the policy or the statute are capable of being construed in two ways, the interpretation which is most favorable to the insured should be placed on the provisions. Purchasers of insurance are to be awarded protection and benefits for which they have paid when such benefits can be justified on sound legal reasons. Leist v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 311 N.E.2d 828, 835 (Ind.App.1974); Continental Cas. Co. v. Beaty, 455 P.2d 684 (Okl.1969); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Zoblotsky, 481 P.2d 761 (Okl.1971).
The purpose of the uninsured motorist law is not to provide coverage for the uninsured vehicle. Its object is to afford the insured additional protection in the event of an accident, and to provide benefits in specified amounts for the person who pays for such coverage based on the contract between the parties. The right- to recovery is not, and should not, be dependent upon the decision of a third party as to the amount of liability coverage he should buy. *1389Hanlon v. Buckeye Union Insurance Co., 324 N.E.2d 598, 604 (Ohio 1975); Rhodes v. Automotive Ignition Co., 218 Pa.Super. 281, 275 A.2d 846, 848 (1971).
Reliance on the literal meaning of the word “uninsured” motorist as adopted by the majority opinion is contra to the clear legislative intent of the statute. The majority opinion states that a vehicle covered by a statutorily adequate policy is not uninsured. The statutes, 36 O.S.1971 § 3636 and 47 O.S.1971 § 7-204(a) clearly provide that a limit of five thousand dollars is required for bodily injury or death to one person.
In construing a contract of insurance, the court should determine whether a proposed construction has a rational relationship to the object sought to be obtained. The object to be achieved by the statute and the contract is to make available to an injured insured the full amount of his damages up to the minimum amount prescribed by the Financial Responsibility Act. This is so whether the sum is recoverable from a tort-feasor’s liability policy, the injured uninsured motorist coverage, or both. Hanlon v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co., 324 N. E.2d p. 603 supra.
In the Hanlon case and the case at bar the question is whether an interpretation which excludes an insured from participating in benefits for which he paid insurance premiums, solely for his own benefit, is reasonable and if construction of an insurance contract and the statute which excludes a party to the contract from its benefits is so unreasonable as to be contrary to the public policy of Oklahoma. If so, it mandates an interpretation which affords the protection that the purchaser of the coverage understood he would receive.
At 324 N.E.2d page 604 of Hanlon v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co., supra, the court stated:
“Very little reflection is required to decide that it was the legislative intent and that it was within the contemplation of the parties to the insurance contract that an insured is entitled to recover from his own insurance company up to the amount of his uninsured coverage if his damages can not be compensated by a tort-feasor’s insurance up to such amount.”
The basic result of the majority opinion is that if a tort-feasor motorist has no insurance, an insured has the right to recover on his uninsured coverage, but if that tort-feasor had minimum limits liability coverage there could be no recovery on the uninsured provision, even though he has paid for the coverage. The reason given for denying such benefits is that there is no right to recovery when the tort-feasor carries limits which are statutorily sufficient.
Our statute, 36 O.S.1971 § 3636(A), provides “no automobile liability policy” shall be issued unless it offers coverage for payment within limits of what an uninsured motorist would be liable for to an insured for bodily injuries. This unambiguously grants the victim prima facie recourse to any and all applicable policies.
The aim of this legislation is to provide financial protection in the minimum amount of $5,000.00. An automobile or a motorist is "uninsured” within the meaning of our statutes to the extent that the liability exceeds the amount of insurance actually available to the victim who has paid for uninsured motorist coverage. This construction is the only one which is reasonable, and permits the legislative intent of the statutes to be exercised. In a multiple victim accident caused by a minimally insured tort-feasor, individual recoveries from the tort-feasor’s insurance carrier can be minute compared with the damage incurred. When a tort-feasor’s liability is greater than his insurance coverage, he is clearly uninsured for the difference.
This position is supported by Porter v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 106 Ariz. 274, 475 P.2d 258 (1970). Porter, who carried uninsured motorist coverage, was *1390one of five persons injured in an automobile accident caused by a tort-feasor who carried the minimum liability coverage required by law. Porter’s share of that insurance came to $2500.00. The Arizona Supreme Court held that under the Uninsured Motorist Statute, Porter was entitled to recover an additional $7500.00 of his admitted damage under his own uninsured motorist coverage. The court at p. 263, 475 P.2d at p. 263 determined:
“The uninsured policy is issued for the protection of the insured in the minimum amount provided in the Financial Responsibility Act. Otherwise, . . . the insured might be better off if the offending motorist had no insurance whatsoever. We agree with the principle that the person who avails himself of the protection afforded by uninsured motorist coverage should be permitted to recover as if the tort-feasor had the minimum amount of liability insurance; provided that there be available to him the full amount of his damages, up to the minimum amount prescribed by the Financial Responsibility Act, which in this case is $10,000. This is so whether this sum is recoverable under the insured’s policy alone or in combination with those funds actually receivable from the tort-feasor’s liability coverage.”
In an identical situation, it was recently determined in Hanlon v. Buckeye Union Insurance Co., supra, that although the tort-feasor had coverage in the amount of the statutory limits, it was not logical or just to hold that an insured motorist’s right to recover on a contract between himself and his insurance company be dependent on how the proceeds of the tort-feasor’s liability policy are spent. The court stated at 324 N.E.2d page 605:
“We repeat, it definitely is not consistent with the public policy of Ohio to so construe a contract or a statute as to hold that a person’s right to recover benefits for which he paid a premium is eliminated because some other person gets to the courthouse before he does or because some other party failed to have unlimited liabilities insurance coverage.”
I believe it is also against the public policy of the State of Oklahoma.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent.