concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that respondent may intercept petitioner’s North Carolina tax refund to satisfy a delinquent child support obligation but dissent from its anomalous conclusion that respondent may not intercept petitioner’s federal tax refund to offset further the same delinquent support obligation.
Title 42, section 664(c)(1) of the United States Code defines “past-due support” as “the amount of a delinquency, determined under a court order, . . . for support and maintenance of a child, or of a child and the parent with whom the child is living.” 42 U.S.C. § 664(c)(1) (emphasis added). Under the federal regulations interpreting section 664(c)(1), “past-due support” is defined as “the amount of support determined under a court order or an order of an administrative process ... which has not been paid.” 45 C.F.R. § 301.1 (1997).
Notably, the majority wholly ignores the contextual definition of delinquency provided in the federal regulations, and instead relies heavily on a non-contextual definition of the term “delinquency”— “[s]tate or condition of one who has failed to perform his duty or obligation,” Black’s Law Dictionary 428 (6th ed. 1990). Despite our Supreme Court’s clear mandate to construe ambiguous statutory language contextually rather than textually, see Greensboro v. Smith, *391241 N.C. 363, 366, 85 S.E.2d 292, 295 (1955) (“in cases of ambiguity . . . the language of the statute must be read not textually, but contextually . . . .”), the majority nonetheless applies its textual definition and opines that section 664(a)(2)(A) “necessarily requires that a supporting parent fall behind in his or her court-ordered payments before having his or her federal tax refund intercepted.”
To the contrary, on 29 January 1987 petitioner was adjudged $1,391.00 in arrears on his child support obligation. The term “arrear-age” is unambiguous and, whether read textually or contextually, has but one definition — money owed to another which is overdue and unpaid. Black’s Law Dictionary at 109. Thus, the 29 January court order, which found petitioner owed $1,391.00 in arrearages, clearly indicates petitioner was delinquent on his support obligation. Therefore, relying solely on the plain language of section 664 and the 29 January order, respondent should be entitled to offset petitioner’s arrearages with his federal income tax refund.
The majority also relies on Laub v. Zaslavsky, 534 A.2d 1090, 1092-1093 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), aff’d, 565 A.2d 158 (Pa. 1989) (per curiam), and In re Biddle, 31 B.R. 449, 452 n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983), to support its interpretation of section 664.
Laub, however, accords no support to the majority’s interpretation of section 664. The Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded only that “the federal intercept program does not encompass situations where a parent has continually complied with his child support obligation, but where, nonetheless, arrearages are created as a result of the retroactive effect of [a modified] order of support.” Laub, 534 A.2d at 1092 (emphasis added). In other words, the arrearages at issue in Laub, unlike here, were artificially created by operation of a procedural statute,1 not by expenditure of state welfare resources. Id. at 1091. Admittedly, the underlying policy of the federal intercept program, as detailed infra., supports the Laub Court’s limited conclusion. Laub nonetheless remains factually inapposite to the present case because, here, petitioner’s support obligation was initially covered by payments from state welfare funds. Simply put, unlike Laub, *392respondent is invoking the federal intercept statute to recoup expended state resources — the precise harm the intercept statute was created to alleviate, see id. at 1093.
Further, the majority’s reliance on Biddle to support its overly narrow interpretation of section 664 is belied by the legislative history underlying creation of the federal intercept program. Specifically, the federal intercept program was created to alleviate “the growing problem of parents defaulting on their child support obligations with a consequent drain ■ on limited state welfare resources.” Presley v. Regan, 604 F. Supp. 609, 612 (N.D.N.Y. 1985). The program accomplishes this goal by accelerating reimbursement to “state welfare agencies for monies spent to aid families who have not received support payments from a parent obligated to make such payments.” Id. at 611. Simply put, the federal intercept program is a mechanism through which a state welfare agency can recoup support payments advanced “because [an obligor] has defaulted.” Rucker v. Secretary Treasury U.S., 634 F. Supp. 598, 602 (D. Colo. 1986). See Black’s Law Dictionary at 417 (“default” means “the omission or failure to perform a legal. . . duty”). Thus, in the present case, the purpose of the federal intercept program is best effectuated, as evidenced by the plain language of section 664, by permitting respondent to use petitioner’s federal tax refund to offset his arrearage.
The majority would nonetheless allow a delinquent party to reap a monetary windfall by merely complying with an interest-free payment plan. This holding clearly overlooks the economic realities of past-due support. A remedial court-ordered payment plan is only instituted where a party defaults on his or her support obligations. Such a default is often, as here, initially covered by the expenditure of state resources. Recognizing our state possesses finite welfare funds, sound public policy mandates that section 664 be liberally construed to accelerate discharge of arrearages thereby maximizing the utility of our limited welfare resources.
Accordingly, as the majority’s interpretation of section 664(c)(1) is inconsistent with the legislative intent behind the federal intercept program, I respectfully dissent.
. Rule 1910.17(a) “provides, in pertinent part: (a) An order of support shall be effective from the date of the filing of the complaint unless the order specifies otherwise . . . .” Laub, 634 A.2d at 1091 n.1. In Laub, approximately six years after entry of the original support order, the trial court modified appellant’s support obligation. Id. at 1091. Thus, pursuant to Rule 1910.17(a), the modification immediately created $11,825.00 in arrearages without any actual expenditures by Pennsylvania’s state welfare agency. Id.