dissenting:
I believe that the arrearages present in this case constitute past due support and are thus subject to the provisions *91of the federal income tax refund intercept program as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 664. Accordingly, I dissent.
On March 2, 1984, Appellant filed a petition for a modification of a support decree seeking an increase in the amount of support payments. On December 28, 1984, a court order was issued increasing the amount of weekly support from $125 to $400. Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.17, the order was made retroactive to March 2, 1984, the date of filing, and was thus effective as of that date. Arrearages resulted from the ordered increase and Appellee was ordered to pay $10 per week toward the arrearages. In October 1985 Appellee was notified that any federal income tax refund to which he might be entitled might be intercepted and used to offset the arrearages. Thereafter Appellee filed a petition requesting that the intercept be deleted on grounds that the arrearages did not result from his failure to make child support payments. The petition was granted.
This case turns on the interpretation of the phrase “past due support” as used in 42 U.S.C. § 664(a)(2)(A). In my view, it is not necessary to glean the dictionary to obtain a definition for “past due”. The term is clearly defined by statute and a thorough and accurate reading of the statute reveals that the arrearages involved in the instant controversy are past due within the meaning of the statute.
The definition of past due support is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 664(c)(1) as follows:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), as used in this part ... the term ‘past-due support’ means the amount of a delinquency, determined under a court order, or an order of an administrative process established under State law, for support and maintenance of a child, or of a child and the parent with whom the child is living.
(2) For purposes of subsection (a)(2), the term ‘past-due support’ means only past-due support owed to or on behalf of a minor child.
42 U.S.C. § 664(c)(1). In spite of this clear language, the majority concludes that “the federal intercept program does not encompass situations where a parent has continually *92complied with his child support obligation, but where, nonetheless, arrearages are created as a result of the retroactive effect of an order of support.” The majority reaches this conclusion by interpreting the statute to mean that “the federal intercept program is intended to encompass those situations where a parent has failed to comply with his obligation to timely remit court ordered child support payments.” I view such a narrow interpretation of the statute as unsound.
In my opinion the majority’s interpretation of the statute places undue emphasis on the obligor parent’s conduct as opposed to the recipient’s right to receive support payments. The primary purpose of the federal income tax refund intercept program is not to regulate or punish the parent’s conduct. Rather the objective of the program is to ensure that a child who is entitled to financial support from his parent in fact receives that support.
Moreover, the source of the delinquency or the reason for the past due status of the support payments is of no import. The statute in no way limits or excludes any source of delinquency. Neither does the statute state that the delinquency must result from any particular source or that it must be caused by an individual’s failure to pay. In fact the statute merely requires that the support be past due. Clearly then the intercept program is meant to encompass any arrearages regardless of their origin.
It is not relevant that the obligated parent has been ordered to make payments on past due amounts and has adhered to the mandated payment schedule. By statute amounts that are past due are subject to the provisions of the intercept program. See 42 U.S.C. § 664(a)(2)(A). The statute does not provide an exception for an individual who makes payments which decrease but do not discharge the delinquency. Such an individual nevertheless remains subject to the intercept program. To conclude otherwise would allow any individual owing past due support but complying with a payment plan to escape the effects of the intercept program. I see no support in the statute for such a *93conclusion and therefore dissent. I do not agree that Appellee’s payment of an additional $10 per week toward the delinquent amount entitles him to an exemption from the intercept program.
Assuming arguendo that the majority’s interpretation of the statute is sound, proper application of that interpretation to the circumstances of the instant case would nevertheless result in the interception of Appellee’s federal income tax refund check.
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the arrearages in the instant case did not result solely from the retroactive application of the support order. More accurately the arrearages arose from the court’s determination that, as of March 2, 1984, Appellee’s children were entitled to receive, and Appellee was obligated to pay, an additional $275 weekly. Thus any portion of the increased amount which was not paid each week when due became past due. As of October 1985, when Appellee was informed of the intercept, the arrearages still remained unpaid, well over a year after the effective date of the support order and several months after the order was entered.
Moreover, contrary to the majority’s position, the case at bar does not involve a parent who has “continually complied with his child support obligation.” As noted above, Appellee’s obligation was to pay $400 weekly child support effective March 2, 1984. Appellee has yet to pay amounts equal to the debt imposed upon him by the support order. Consequently, I fail to see how he has “continually complied with his child support obligation.”
It is my view that the majority’s refusal to apply the intercept provisions in the instant case dilutes the retroactive effect of the support order. While the order by virtue of its effective date clearly indicates that Appellee’s children were entitled to receive increased support as of March 2, 1984, the majority has decided to deny Appellee’s children access to the financial support to which they are entitled. With this I cannot agree.