(concurring specially)—I have signed the majority opinion affirming the trial court for the reasons stated therein 'and for additional reasons of my own, stated briefly as follows:
First, jurisdiction is one of those “weasel words” of the law, and its spectrum of meaning is broad and flexible or viable. Its legal application and significance is too often dependent upon the “eyes of the beholder” in relation to so-called operative facts 'and circumstances.
Second, I think some of our early decisions concerning declaratory judgment actions, in particular Parr v. Seattle, 197 Wash. 53, 84 P.2d 375 (1938), have spoken loosely or too precipitously about the requirement of service on the state Attorney General as a jurisdictional rather than a more simple, less drastic procedural requirement.
The statutory requirement of service on the Attorney General is undeniably a desirable and constructive one, certainly when a lawsuit puts., in issue the constitutionality of a statute enacted by the legislature. This is for the simple reason that more parties than the litigants in a given lawsuit are likely to haye some interest in a statute sub*491jected to constitutional attack. The Attorney General, as attorney for the people of Washington should be apprised of such action and enabled to participate when in his sound discretion a significant public interest is at stake and should be protected by the legal expertise and efforts of his office. But it does not follow that service upon the Attorney General must be categorized so drastically as to be denominated a jurisdictional requirement. As a procedural requirement, such service may be waived by the office of the Attorney General, as was requested by the Assistant Attorney General herein. Where it is apparent to the trial court that the constitutionality of a statute is being challenged, that court, as well as an appellate court, may sua sponte see that the Attorney General is notified thereof, and afforded an opportunity to intervene in the lawsuit. The legislature, in enacting RCW 7.24.110, did not phrase this requirement of service on the Attorney General in terms of “jurisdiction”; in view of the severe sanction of automatic dismissal for a lack of such service, it is evident that service upon the Attorney General should be deemed a procedural requirement. Insofar as Parr and other cases are contrary, I think they should be overruled.
Viewing service on the Attorney General as a sound and constructive requirement, I agree completely with the majority that this procedural requirement has been waived under the unequivocal circumstances present in this appeal.
Third, there is no doubt in my mind that the plaintiff has standing to litigate the issue of the constitutionality of RCW 41.20.110 under which his asserted vested right to a pension is now in jeopardy by the action of the Police Pension Fund Trustees. Watson v. Washington Preferred Life Ins. Co., 81 Wn.2d 403, 502 P.2d 1016 (1972).
Fourth, considering plaintiff’s vested right and his standing to litigate, and even assuming arguendo some substance to the lack of jurisdiction aspect emphasized in the dissent by Stafford, J., the lawsuit should not be voided 'and dismissed. Shorn of the various aspects of a declaratory judgment action, there still remains a traditional, simple law*492suit for a bona fide claim for relief by the plaintiff-litigant herein.
Lastly, it seems to me that dismissal of this action is both inept and circular, and can only result in a second lawsuit and a multiplicity of litigation. This I think very properly and on good legal ground can and should be avoided. For the foregoing rather briefly stated reasons, I have signed and concur in the majority opinion by Hale, J.