This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the dismissal of his cross-complaint against the intervener, William T. Waggoner, respondent herein, in which appellant sought to enjoin him from constructing a residence in accordance with a building permit issued by the proper Kang county authorities, which included an accessory boathouse objectionable to the appellant.
The property, located on Mercer Island in King county* is zoned for single-family residences, which are permitted to have garages, boathouses, or other structures accessory thereto.
The appellant contends that the structure will be a nuisance by reason of violating the spirit of the zoning ordinance. His theory is that the architect’s specifications for the structure, upon the basis of which respondent had obtained the building permit, are plans for a boathouse rather than a residence. This is predicated upon the fact that the living quarters will occupy only about one fifth of the total building. Hence, he contends the small residence is accessory to the large boathouse, which is to be completely equipped for the storage and repair of two hydroplanes.
The appellant does not contend that in issuing the permit the King county authorities did not strictly comply with all the regulations pertaining to residences in the zone in question, nor that the plans for the boathouse accommodations violated any of the building regulations. He contends the spirit of the zoning law is violated, because the respondent’s purpose is to build a boathouse, and the residence quarters are mere accessories thereto.
The appellant does not contend that respondent will conduct any business activities of any kind in the boathouse, or do anything other than indulge his formidable private hydroplane hobby. He concedes that boathouses can be accessory to residences within the zone in question.
*576The zoning ordinance in question is unambiguous and needs no court interpretation to ascertain its meaning and intent. Zoning ordinances are in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed. Morin v. Johnson, 49 Wn. (2d) 275, 300 P. (2d) 569. The administrative authorities issued the building permit because the plans of the building conform to all pertinent regulations now in effect.
If appellant would address his arguments to the zoning commission and the board of county commissioners, he might induce them to exercise their legislative powers and amend the ordinance to limit the size of accessory buildings. The court has no such legislative authority in police power matters. 8 McQuillin Municipal Corporations (3d ed.) 525, § 25.278.
We have said in State ex rel. Ogden v. Bellevue, 45 Wn. (2d) 492, 275 P. (2d) 899, that
“The discretion permissible in zoning matters is that which is exercised in adopting the zone classifications with the terms, standards, and requirements pertinent thereto, all of which must be by general ordinance applicable to all persons alike. The acts of administering a zoning ordinance do not go back to the questions of policy and discretion which were settled at the time of the adoption of the ordinance. Administrative authorities are properly concerned with questions of compliance with the ordinance, not with its wisdom. To subject individuals to questions of policy in administrative matters would be unconstitutional. Art. I, § 12, of the constitution of the state of Washington, provides:
“ ‘No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.’ ”
The appellant has no cause of action.
The dismissal of his cross-complaint is affirmed.
Donworth, Weaver, and Rosellini, JJ., concur.