dissenting:
I respectfully dissent only on that portion of the majority opinion dealing with the issue of restitution. A.R.S. § 13-603(A) states: “Every person convicted of any offense defined in this title or defined outside this title shall be sentenced in accordance with this chapter.” (Emphasis added.)
A.R.S. § 13-603(A) and (C) requires that at the time of sentencing, after the full amount of economic loss to the victim is determined, the court shall order the restitution to be paid “in the manner as determined by the court after consideration of the economic circumstances of the convicted person.”
The majority opinion in effect nullifies the above-quoted requirement from A.R.S. § 13-603(C) as to persons sentenced to prison. The fact that the defendant and others can come into court after the defendant is released from prison and apply for modification of the payment order does not in any *609way comply with the requirements of the statute even though the court can at that time consider the economic circumstances.
The case of City of Phoenix v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 265, 419 P.2d 49 (1966), referred to by the majority opinion did not nullify a statutory provision. The court stated:
If “ * * * a literal [interpretation] of the language leads to a result which produces an absurdity, it is our duty to construe the act, if possible, so that it is a reasonable and workable law * * * ” (Emphasis added)
101 Ariz. at 267, 419 P.2d at 51, (citing Garrison v. Luke, 52 Ariz. 50, 78 P.2d 1120 (1938)).
In the City of Phoenix case, the City and Maricopa County sought to nullify an order of the superior court prohibiting them from holding concurrent elections in the same polling places. The respondents asserted that the holding of concurrent elections in the same polling places violated the statutory provision requiring that no person shall be allowed to remain within the fifty-foot limit while the polls are open except for the purpose of voting and except for election officials and one representative of each political organization represented on the ballot.
The court held that holding concurrent elections at the same polling places was consistent with the spirit of the law as people would be there for the purpose of voting. The decision did not nullify the statutory requirement.
In this case, the trial court made no attempt to determine the economic circumstances of the defendant when he made the restitution order. In my opinion, the trial judge must make a good faith effort at the time of sentencing to determine to the extent possible the economic potential and circumstances of the defendant and based thereon, he must then set the manner of payment. This would not preclude the defendant and others from coming in for modification of the restitution order post-release.
In my opinion this case should be reversed solely on the issue of restitution and remanded for the trial court to make a good faith effort to set the manner of payment as required by the statute.