concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in that portion of the majority’s opinion which: (1) holds Cabarrus Memorial Hospital d/b/a Northeast Medical Center’s (“defendant”) assignments of error constituted “gross” and “substantial” violations of Appellate Rule 10(c)(1); (2) holds defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a change of venue for convenience of the witnesses to be interlocutory; and (3) declines to treat defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a change of venue for convenience of the witnesses as a petition for writ of certiorari.
I disagree with that portion of the majority’s opinion which imposes a sanction of double costs against defendant’s attorney. I vote to dismiss defendant’s unperfected and contradictory arguments on the remaining issue and respectfully dissent.
*198I. Interlocutory Appeal
The majority’s opinion correctly states, defendant conceded in its brief that its appeal of the trial court’s denial of its “motion to change venue for convenience of witnesses is interlocutory and denial of such a motion does not necessarily affect a substantial right entitling a party to an immediate appeal.” Defendant’s assignment of error numbered 2 is properly dismissed as interlocutory.
II. Defendant’s Remaining Assignment of Error
With the dismissal of defendant’s assignment of error numbered 2 as interlocutory, only one purported assignment of error remains:
1. Rendition and entry of the Order of the Hon. Richard D. Boner rendered May 7, 2007 during the May 7, 2007 Civil Session of Mecklenburg County Superior Court denying [defendant]’s motion to change venue pursuant to G.S. §§ 1-77 and 1-83 as a matter of right in accordance with Rule 12(b)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The Order was subsequently entered on May 22, 2007. (R. pp. 211-216).
Many previous cases have addressed similar unperfected and contradictory assignments of error. “This assignment-like a hoop-skirt-covers everything and touches nothing.” State v. Kirby, 276 N.C. 123, 131, 171 S.E.2d 416, 422 (1970). I concur with the majority’s opinion that this violation of Appellate Rule 10(c)(1) “rise[s] to the level of a ‘substantial failure’ or ‘gross violation.’ ” Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 199, 657 S.E.2d 361, 366 (2008).
As the majority’s opinion correctly notes, “North Carolina courts historically have dismissed such assignments of error.” (Citing Kirby, 276 N.C. at 131, 171 S.E.2d at 422, Calhoun v. WHA Med. Clinic, PLLC, 178 N.C. App. 585, 602, 632 S.E.2d 563, 574 (2006); State v. Patterson, 185 N.C. App. 67, 72-73, 648 S.E.2d 250, 254 (2007); Wetchin v. Ocean Side Corp., 167 N.C. App. 756, 759, 606 S.E.2d 407, 409 (2005); State v. Mullinax, 180 N.C. App. 439, 443, 637 S.E.2d 294, 297 (2006)). Consistent with our Supreme Court’s reasoning in Kirby, and this Court’s numerous precedents, defendant’s “broadside and ineffective[]” assignment of error numbered 1 is unperfected, contradictory, vague, and should be dismissed. 276 N.C. at 131, 171 S.E.2d at 422. The majority’s opinion erroneously holds that a sanction of double costs should be imposed against defendant’s counsel under Appellate Rule 34(b).
*199Having determined that defendant’s “broadside and ineffective []” assignment of error numbered 1 should be dismissed, I turn to “whether the circumstances of the case justify invoking [Appellate] Rule 2____” Id.-, Dogwood, 362 N.C. at 201, 657 S.E.2d at 367.
Appellate Rule 2 states:
To prevent manifest injustice to a party, or to expedite decision in the public interest, either court of the appellate division may, except as otherwise expressly provided by these rules, suspend or vary the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a case pending before it upon application of a party or upon its own initiative, and may order proceedings in accordance with its directions.
N.C.R. App. P. 2 (2007).
In Dogwood, our Supreme Court stated, Appellate Rule 2 “may only [be invoked] on rare occasions and under exceptional circumstances . . . .” 362 N.C. at 201, 657 S.E.2d at 367 (citation omitted). “ ‘Rule 2 relates to the residual power of [the] appellate courts to consider, in exceptional circumstances, significant issues of importance in the public interest or to prevent injustice which appears manifest to the [c]ourt and only in such instances' ” State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309, 315-16, 644 S.E.2d 201, 205 (2007) (quoting Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 66, 511 S.E.2d 298, 299-300 (1999)) (emphasis supplied).
Before exercising [Appellate] Rule 2 to prevent a manifest injustice, both this Court and the Court of Appeals must be cognizant of the appropriate circumstances in which the extraordinary step of suspending the operation of the appellate rules is a viable option. Fundamental fairness and the predictable operation of the courts for which our Rules of Appellate Procedure were designed depend upon the consistent exercise of this authority.
Id. at 317, 644 S.E.2d at 206.
The decision whether to invoke Appellate Rule 2 is purely discretionary and is to be limited to “rare occasions” in which a fundamental purpose of the appellate rules is at stake. Dogwood, 362 N.C. at 201, 657 S.E.2d at 367. Appellate Rule 2 is most consistently invoked to prevent manifest injustice in appeals in which the substantial rights of a criminal defendant are affected. Hart, 361 N.C. at 316, 644 *200S.E.2d at 205 (citing State v. Sanders, 312 N.C. 318 320, 321 S.E.2d 836, 837 (1984)).
Nothing in the record or briefs demonstrates and defendant has failed to show any “exceptional circumstances” to suspend or vary the rules in order “to prevent manifest injustice to a party, or to expedite decision in the public interest.” Id. at 315-16, 644 S.E.2d at 205 (citation omitted). There is no basis to exercise our discretion to invoke Appellate Rule 2 to review defendant’s assignment of error numbered 1. Dogwood, 362 N.C. at 201, 657 S.E.2d at 367. Defendant’s assignment of error numbered 1 presents no meritorious issue for this Court to consider and should be dismissed as “broadside and ineffective.” Kirby, 276 N.C. at 131, 171 S.E.2d at 422.
Here, our Supreme Court’s order, which remanded this case to this Court, stated in toto:
Defendant’s (Cabarrus Memorial Hospital) Petition for Discretionary Review is allowed for the limited purpose of remanding this matter to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Dogwood Development and Management Co., LLC v. White Oak Transport Co., Inc., 362 N.C. 191, 657 S.E.2d 361 (2008).
By order of the Court in Conference, this 10th day of April, 2008.
Odom v. Clark, 362 N.C. 360, 661 S.E.2d 736, 736 (2008).
Our analysis on remand is entirely different from that originally articulated by this Court in Odom v. Clark, 188 N.C. App. 165, 654 S.E.2d 833 (2008) (unpublished).. On remand, defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a change of venue for convenience of witnesses is evaluated on the merits and is dismissed as interlocutory. This Court did not conduct this analysis in its original opinion. See id. Defendant’s remaining assignment of error is then properly analyzed “in light of Dogwood Development and Management Co., LLC v. White Oak Transport Co., Inc., 362 N.C. 191, 657 S.E.2d 361 (2008)[]” as requested by our Supreme Court. Odom, 362 N.C. at 360, 661 S.E.2d at 736. Nothing in our Supreme Court’s order on remand or in Dogwood validates “hoopskirt” assignments of error nor alters the Supreme Court’s precedent in Kirby or this Court’s numerous precedents cited above. Dogwood, 362 N.C. at 191, 657 S.E.2d at 361; Kirby, 276 N.C. at 123, 171 S.E.2d at 416.
III. Conclusion
■ I concur that defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of its motion for a change of venue for convenience of witnesses is inter*201locutory and agree not to view defendant’s appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. The majority’s opinion also correctly concludes that defendant’s remaining assignment of error constitutes a “gross” and “substantial” violation of Appellate Rule 10(c)(1).
Defendant’s remaining assignment of error with regard to its motion for a change of venue based on a matter of right is “broadside and ineffective[]” and should be dismissed. Kirby, 276 N.C. at 131, 171 S.E.2d at 422; see also Calhoun, 178 N.C. App. at 602, 632 S.E.2d at 574; Patterson, 185 N.C. App. at 72-73, 648 S.E.2d at 254. I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part.