Lawson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

Hunt, Justice,

dissenting.

In reaching its decision, the majority concludes that: “The apparent purpose of the legislature in enacting the 30/60-day requirements of OCGA § 33-34-6 was to assure prompt payment of claims by imposing penalties and damages on insurers failing to meet those deadlines.” I disagree. In my view, a plain reading of the statute shows that its purpose is to assure prompt payment by imposing penalties and damages where the statutory deadline is not met and the claimant finds it necessary to resort to litigation. Besides distorting the language of the statute, the majority opinion sets the stage for the filing of collateral lawsuits after the underlying claims have long been resolved and the matter should have been conclusively put to rest. This, in turn, wreaks havoc with a fundamental purpose of our no-fault law — that of reducing collateral litigation. Teasley v. Mathis, 243 Ga. 561, 563 (255 SE2d 57) (1979). I respectfully dissent.

I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Weltner join in this dissent.