concurring specially.
It is with reluctance that I concur with the decision in this case. Although I am compelled to accept the reasoning and the interpretation of federal law on which the decision is based, I am also moved to express my dismay at the heartlessness inherent in the regulations which govern the issue in this cáse. The bottom line of the regulatory scheme is that those unfortunate enough to be of limited financial means and of such ill health that they must be institutionalized are required to forbear meeting their legal and moral obligations in order that the state’s contribution to their support and maintenance will be reduced. It is apparent that no genuine consideration is given to the burden imposed on those dependent upon the fulfillment of the legal and moral obligations of those in Mr. Flanagan’s situation, or to the likelihood that those who are bereft of the support owed them by persons in Mr. Flanagan’s circumstances will themselves become wards of the state, further burdening the public purse and adding to the expense of administering programs of social welfare, or to the loss of simple human dignity of those as unfortunate as Mr. Flanagan, who are forced to abandon their legal and moral obligations.
While I recognize that the problems here are not within the power of this court to correct, and while I cannot fault the legal reasoning employed by this court today, I am saddened by the necessity *712of joining it.
Decided June 24, 1986 Rehearing denied July 9, 1986 Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, H. Perry Michael, First Assistant Attorney General, Carol A. Cosgrove, William Joy, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Vivian D. Egan, David C. Will, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant. Mary S. Peterson, Samuel F. Furgiuele, Jr., for appellee.I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen joins in this special concurrence.