dissenting.
Because I believe that Pylant had at least equal if not superior knowledge of any dangerous condition in the showers, I respectfully dissent. As the majority states, an invitee may recover if he can show that the owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard and that the invitee lacked knowledge of the hazard, despite the exercise of ordinary care, due to the actions or conditions within the control of the owner. Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 748-749 (493 SE2d 403) (1997). In this case, Samuels moved for summary judgment on the second prong of Robinson, claiming that Pylant had equal or superior knowledge of the condition of the showers and, in light of this knowledge, did not exercise ordinary care for his own safety. The trial court agreed and the record supports this holding.
Pylant stated that he looked at the shower and it had bars of soap on the floor and “the floor looked like maybe somebody had grease all over ‘em or something and took a bath in the shower, that’s how black the floor was.” He said it looked like “somebody may have been working on their truck or changing oil or something” and went in the shower and dripped it on the floor. He also stated that he saw two bars of soap on the floor and picked them up. Although the majority quotes his statement that the substance he slipped on was a “smear” on the floor, Pylant said this when he was characterizing the consistency, not the size, of the soap. He said it was “squashed out” and “mashed into the [floor].” When asked how big a bar of soap he slipped on, Pylant responded, “just a small bar.” When asked if it was three or four inches, Pylant said, “I guess.” When asked why he did not see this bar of soap when he was picking up the other bars, *362Pylant said he did not know and “I guess I wasn’t looking for any more soap.” When asked if there was anything preventing him from using one of the other showers, Pylant says he does not remember how many stalls there were or if he looked in the other showers.
Samuels, the owner of the truck stop, testified in his deposition that there were four shower stalls. He said that the floors of the showers were terra cotta tiles with a nonslip surface, in other words, not glazed. He also stated that the shower área was well lit and he had owned the truck stop for 25 years, and, with the exception of Pylant, no other customer had slipped or fallen in the showers.
The proprietor has the duty to take reasonable precautions to make its premises safe, but the invitee also has a duty to exercise ordinary care for his own safety, so, where the proprietor fails to exercise reasonable care to make the premises safe, nevertheless if the invitee by exercising ordinary care could have discovered and avoided the dangerous condition, his knowledge of the danger is deemed equal to the proprietor’s knowledge. The determining factor in most cases is, therefore, whether in the exercise of ordinary care the plaintiff could have discovered a dangerous condition, including one created by the proprietor.
Anderson v. Reynolds, 232 Ga. App. 868, 869-870 (502 SE2d 782) (1998); Stephens v. Ernie’s Steakhouse &c., 215 Ga. App. 166, 168 (450 SE2d 275) (1994).
In Martin v. Consolidated Stores Corp., 248 Ga. App. 812 (547 SE2d 380) (2001), the plaintiff entered a restroom and saw standing water on the floor. He did not inform the store and ask to have the floor mopped, but instead chose to walk through the water to the urinal. The plaintiff slipped and fell while walking out of the restroom. Id. at 813. This Court held that the plaintiff’s actual knowledge of the hazard precluded any recovery. Id. at 814. Similarly, in Means v. Marshalls of MA, 243 Ga. App. 419 (532 SE2d 740) (2000) (physical precedent only), the plaintiff entered a dressing room and noticed “between five and seven pieces of ‘tags and garment paraphernalia’ on the floor.” Id. at 420. Nevertheless, she chose to use the dressing room anyway, and at some point slipped on the garment debris and fell. Id. Although the plaintiff claimed that “while she may have known that the garment debris was on the floor of the dressing room, she did not subjectively perceive that it might cause her to fall,” we rejected this argument, holding that the hazard was in plain view and was one which “any person with ordinary, common sense would recognize as something that might cause a . . . fall.” Id. at 420-421.
Likewise, in this case, the potential hazard was in plain view *363when Pylant inspected and then chose to enter the shower. He stated that the floor of the shower looked like someone had dripped grease on it, and there were pieces of soap on the floor of the stall. He also acknowledged that the soap he claims to have slipped on was three or four inches long, was white, and should have been clearly visible against the brown tile floor.
Decided July 15, 2003 Kenney & Solomon, Thomas S. Kenney, Lisa H. Baggett, Lara E. Smith, for appellant. Webb, Zschunke, Miller & Dikeman, William E. Zschunke, Melissa C. Duffey, for appellee.In light of this, Pylant cannot show that he did not have actual knowledge of any hazard involved in using this shower. Because his knowledge of the danger was at least equal to, if not superior to, the knowledge of the proprietor, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Samuels.