This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a judgment. Because the order appealed from is on a form titled “Court Minute”, and we have not been furnished with an order of the trial court meeting the form for appealable orders required by the recent statutory changes, we dismiss the appeal as premature.
The trial was for back-due child support, modification of child support, and contempt. The court modified child support, and determined the amount owed by Defendant Williams to the State of Oklahoma for A.F.D.C. support expended by the State. It determined that the Defendant owed Plaintiff $5,145.70 for child support arrearage. The order was filed on September 9, 1993.
On October 8, 1993 Plaintiff filed a combined motion for new trial and motion to vacate the order of September 9, 1993. Plaintiff argued that because her motion was filed within thirty days of the order the court could vacate, modify, or amend the order. On November 16,1993 the trial court filed an order that denied the motion to vacate. The petition in error was filed in this Court on December 15, 1993.
Our consideration of this appeal must be limited to the trial court’s order in denying the motion to vacate. A motion for new trial authorized by 12 O.S.1991 § 653 will not extend the time to appeal from the judgment if the motion is filed after the ten-day statutory period for such motions. Estate of *1131Heimbach, 827 P.2d 170 (Okla.1992).1 Plaintiffs counsel on appeal (different from that at trial) is correct in stating that the post-judgment motion did not extend the time to appeal the judgment of September 9, 1993. This appeal is limited to challenging the trial court’s order of November 16, 1993 on Plaintiffs motion to vacate the judgment. Schepp v. Hess, 770 P.2d 34, 36 n. 2 (Okla.1989).
The order denying the motion to vacate is on a printed form titled “Court Minute”. We have explained that recent statutory changes effective October 1, 1993 made minute entries an unappealable form for a filed judgment. Mansell v. City of Lawton, 877 P.2d 1120 (Okla.1994); Aven v. Reeh, 878 P.2d 1069 (Okla.1994). We requested a response from Plaintiff on the applicability of Mansell.
Plaintiff, in asserting that this particular minute order was appealable, argues that this Court looks to the substance of an instrument and not its form. Generally speaking, she is correct. “[Fjorm does not rule over substance in evaluating documents filed in this Court.” Markwell v. Whinery’s Real Estate, Inc., 869 P.2d 840, 847 (Okla.1994). We followed this principle in Manning v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 876 P.2d 667, 669-671 (Okla.1994) and explained that a “court minute” could be a filed judgment, in a decision where the minute predated the statutory changes effective October 1, 1993.
However, the Legislature has taken considerable trouble to declare that it is the form that shall determine whether a judge-signed instrument starts appeal time. The recently enacted 12 O.S.Supp.1993 § 696.3 states that a filed judgment must be in a certain form to be appealable. The court minute in this case contains a caption setting forth the name of the court, the names and designations of the parties, the file number of the case, a title, a disposition of the action and the relief awarded, and the signature and title of the court. This minute facially meets the requirements of § 696.3.
But since October 1, 1993 certain types of instruments are deemed to not be a “judgment, decree or appealable order” for the purpose of commencing the time to appeal. 12 O.S.Supp.1993 § 696.2(C). One of these is a “minute entry.”2 Pursuant to § 696.2(C) a minute entry, even though it might meet the other requirements of § 696.3, is not an ap-pealable order or judgment.
Plaintiffs interpretation of § 696.2 is that some court minutes are appealable while others are not. She would have us examine the content of each instrument bearing a “minute” label to determine its appealability. It is clear to us that the legislature wants a brighter line to distinguish appealable orders from non-appealable ones than we have recognized in the past. We believe this is a useful reform, with one of its aims to reduce the amount of judicial energy expended on determining when time to appeal starts to run. We therefore decline this invitation to create a body of caselaw delineating the type of minutes that are appealable. We conclude that an order of the District Court titled “Court Minute” is not a judgment, decree or appealable order for the purpose of commencing the time to appeal. Mansell v. City of Lawton, 877 P.2d 1120 (Okla.1994); Aven v. Reeh, 878 P.2d 1069 (Okla.1994).
The only disposition of Plaintiffs post-judgment motion appearing in the appellate record is the court minute. No filed judgment complying with the form of § 696.3 appears in the appellate record. A judgment or appealable order conforming to § 696.3 is *1132“a jurisdictional prerequisite to the commencement of an appeal.” 12 O.S.Supp.1993 § 696.2(C). We dismiss the appeal as premature. 12 O.S.Supp.1993 § 990A(F).
ALMA WILSON, C.J., KAUGER, V.C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER, SUMMERS and WATT, JJ., concur. SIMMS, HARGRAVE and OPALA, JJ., dissent.. The recent amendment to § 653 is found in Okla.Session Laws 1994 Ch. 343 § 1, effective September 1, 1994, and states that "an application for a new trial, if made, must be filed not later than ten (10) days after the judgment, decree or appealable order prepared in conformance with Section 696.3 of this title has been filed,....” It goes on to provide that if a new trial motion is filed after the judge's pronouncement, but before the filing of a judgment, the motion will be "deemed filed” immediately after the filing of the judgment.
. 12 O.S.Supp.1993 § 696.2(C) provides in part:
The following shall not constitute a judgment, decree or appealable order: A minute entry; verdict; informal statement of the proceedings and relief awarded, including but limited to, a letter to a party or parties indicating the ruling or instructions for preparing the judgment, decree or appealable order.