concurring in part and dissenting in part:
If, as the majority opinion holds, the commission erred when it “accepted and utilized the referee’s conclusion that Swanson’s intent was irrelevant for the purpose of determining whether she voluntarily quit, once the resignation was submitted,” ante at 609, 759 P.2d at 900, then the appropriate remedy is to remand this case to the Industrial Commission to reconsider the case based upon all the evidence, including the evidence relating to Swanson’s intention. See, e.g., Hanson v. BCB, Inc., 114 Idaho 131, 754 P.2d 444 (1988). However, this Court errs when it takes over the Industrial Commission’s factfinding function and decides this case without referring it back to the Industrial Commission to make the appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The question of whether the claimant voluntarily quit is still a factual question to be determined by the Industrial Commission. Contrary to the majority’s statement, the evidence regarding her intent was conflicting, rather than uncontradicted, as the Court’s opinion states. Her trial testimony, which the Court interprets as merely intending to “open up discussion with her employer,” ante 114 Idaho at 609, 759 P.2d at 900, stands in stark contrast to her written resignation which stated, “Please consider this my resignation as of now.” The evidence is conflicting, and the commission — not this Court — has the right to resolve that conflict. Pierstorff v. Gray’s Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 74 P.2d 171 (1937), does not apply under these circumstances.