dissenting in part and concurring in part. I concur in the rulings and judgment in Division 1, and dissent from the rulings and judgment in Division 2.
I differ with the majority’s construction of the petition in these respects: The allegations which, in the majority view, show that the seller learned that the plaintiff procured the purchaser after a contract of sale was entered into- (Pars. 14, 15, 16) are simply allegations that on a certain date plaintiff learned that The Citizens & Southern National Bank had made a bid and Brittain Bros. Company had accepted it, whereupon plaintiff took certain action, i.e., informed Brittain Bros. Company that he claimed his commission. The allegations that the plaintiff informed Brittain Bros. Company that The Citizens & Southern National Bank was his client and that he claimed his commission (Par. 16) do not say that Brittain Bros. Company did not already know, through the purchaser or some other source, that the plaintiff had procured The Citizens & Southern National Bank. The allegations of the petition as a whole show that Brittain Bros. Company offered to pay plaintiff a commission for finding a purchaser who consummated a purchase; that plaintiff procured The Citizens & Southern National Bank as a purchaser, and a sale to The Citizens & Southern National Bank was consummated; that Brittain Bros. Company and The Citizens & Southern National Bank attempted to conceal the sale transaction from the plaintiff; that the plaintiff informed both defendants of his claim to his commission but *510they closed the sale and refused to pay him; that the defendfendants conspired to deprive plaintiff of his commission with ■full knowledge that he had procured the purchaser. With regard to when the seller became aware that the plaintiff procured the purchaser, no time is alleged.
As to pleading a conspiracy, Bishop v. Peoples Loan &c. Corp., 101 Ga. App. 53, 57 (113 SE2d 161), held: “So far as the conspiracy is concerned, no further specification is required than the general terms in which it is pleaded in the declaration . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) This is true even against a special demurrer. National Bank of Savannah v. Evans, 149 Ga. 67 (99 SE 123). “The law recognizes the intrinsic difficulty of proving a conspiracy. . . The rule is to allow great latitude in setting out in the complaint the particular act upon which the conspiracy is to be inferred. . . To show conspiracy it is not necessary to prove an express compact or agreement among the parties thereto. The essential element of the charge is the common design; but it need not appear that the parties met together either formally or informally and entered into any explicit or formal agreement; nor is it essential that it should appear that either by words or writing they formulated their unlawful objects. It is sufficient that two or more persons in any manner either positively or tacitly come to a mutual understanding that they will accomplish the unlawful design.” Cook v. Robinson, 216 Ga. 328 (5) (116 SE2d 742).
The facts in the present case are not identical with Palmer v. Malone, 97 Ga. App. 666 (104 SE2d 131), cited by the majority, or State Life Ins. Co. v. Whitehurst, 67 Ga. App. 646, 647 (21 SE2d 474). In neither of those decisions were there any facts alleged showing bad faith on the part of the seller. Conduct with the intent to deprive the plaintiff of his right to a commission would constitute a tort. Davidson v. Collier, 104 Ga. App. 546, 550 (122 SE2d 465); Glassman v. Melrose Const. Co., 100 Ga. App. 763 (112 SE2d 282).
As to the proper construction of pleadings, the Supreme Court has said: “We are not unmindful of the rule that on general demurrer the plaintiff’s petition will be construed most strongly against him, but there is another rule that the peti*511tion must be construed as a whole . . . and the final test of the sufficiency of a petition as against a general demurrer is whether the defendant can admit all that is alleged and escape liability.” Frazier v. Southern Ry. Co., 200 Ga. 590, 597 (37 SE2d 774). In addition, the rule as to construing the plaintiffs petition most strongly against him on demurrer “. . . should not be perverted by unwarranted and strained construction.” Neal v. Stapleton, 203 Ga. 236, 245 (46 SE2d 130); Toler v. Goodin, 200 Ga. 527, 535 (37 SE2d 609); New Cigar Co. v. Broken Spur, Inc., 103 Ga. App. 395 (119 SE2d 133). “. . . a strained and unnatural construction will not be given [pleadings] in order to raise an inference against the pleader.” National Fire Ins. Co. v. Banister, 104 Ga. App. 13 (1) (121 SE2d 46).
It is clear that the present petition, construed as a whole, alleges that the plaintiff was entitled to a commission, that the defendants tried to conceal the buying and selling from him, and with knowledge that plaintiff was entitled to a commission conspired to defeat his right.
Decisions should be on the merits of the particular case and not on procedural niceties. “Appellate courts should strive to eliminate, not encourage unnecessary technicalities serving no useful purpose, but which tend to divert or nullify justice.” General Accident Fire &c. Corp. v. Titus, 104 Ga. App. 85, 87 (121 SE2d 196). Today our pleading rules are implemented by pre-trial discovery and summary judgment to disclose, in many cases, the true nature of the action, narrow the trial to real controverted issues, and permit either a plaintiff or a defendant to have judgment, in a relatively short time, where there is no bona fide, cause of action or defense. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 217 Ga. 234, 246 (123 SE2d 115); Setzers Super Stores v. Higgins, 104 Ga. App. 116, 120 (121 SE2d 305). These procedures are designed to make unnecessary and supplant the ancient strict rules of pleading, the purpose of which was to assure that the opposing party might have adequate notice of the nature of the claim he must defend.
In my opinion the allegations of the petition are sufficient to cover knowledge by the seller of plaintiff’s rights before a con*512tract of sale was entered into, and I would not on general demurrer deprive the plaintiff of his historic and constitutional right to a jury trial on this issue. If the defendants had wished to contend that there was in fact no such knowledge and that there was no- genuine issue on this very material fact, they could have easily availed themselves of any one or more of the pretrial procedures mentioned above, and forced the plaintiff to come forward immediately with his evidence on this point or else be subjected to an adverse summary judgment.
The defendants have not availed themselves of the ancient pleading device (special demurrer) by which they might have obtained more specific notice of the time the plaintiff claimed the seller first knew of plaintiff’s right. “When called upon to do so by special demurrer, the date of every traversable fact, unless some sufficient reason to the contrary is shown, should be stated. Warren v. Powell, 122 Ga. 4 (49 SE 730).” Allen v. Gates, 145 Ga. 652 (5) (89 SE 821). (Emphasis supplied.) However, the question of specific time cannot be raised by a general demurrer or by an oral motion to dismiss. Moon v. Atlas Auto Finance Co., 101 Ga. App. 260 (2) (113 SE2d 462).
Here we are considering the conspiracy petition on general demurrer. Even if the defendants had filed a special demurrer, the plaintiff could possibly have met such special demurrer, if he in fact did not know the time of the conspiracy, with an allegation that the time was unknown to the plaintiff but well known to the defendants. Wright v. Lester, 105 Ga. App. 107 (2) (123 SE2d 672). The Wright case was a suit for alienation of affections and the time and dates sought were as to alleged rendezvous between the plaintiff’s wife and the male defendant. Activities of that type and conspiracies are, due to their peculiar nature, presumably consummated without notice or publication to the injured party or the general public.
Over one hundred years ago Judge Lumpkin stated that the “. . . Legislature and the courts have combined to lay the axe to . . .” the technicalities of common-law pleading, “. . . and under their joint blows this Upas tree of fiction and folly must fall.” Tuggle v. Wilkinson, 17 Ga. 90. The view of the majority is, in my opinion, a new sprout upon the old stump.
*513For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment as to Brittain Bros. Company and The Citizens & Southern National Bank, and reverse as to the National City Bank of Rome.
I express no opinion concerning the matter dealt with in Judge Felton's additional dissent.
I am authorized to say that Felton, C. J., and Nichols, P. J., concur in this dissent.