(dissenting) — I dissent. The majority has given too much breadth to CR 41(b)(1). The majority construes the first paragraph of CR 41(b) and CR 41(b)(1) together and makes the failure-to-prosecute language in the first paragraph of CR 41(b) meaningless. I believe that the first paragraph of 41(b) has independent effect from CR 41(b)(1) and preserves the trial court's inherent discretionary dismissal powers.
Under the majority's analysis, a plaintiff can always avoid a dismissal under CR 41(b)(1) simply by noting a case for trial. However, I find it unreasonable to hold that a court cannot dismiss a case for a plaintiff's failure to comply with court orders or rules simply because the plaintiff has noted the case for trial.
The more reasonable result would be to hold that CR 41(b)(1) only governs those circumstances to which it expressly applies, that is, where a party fails to "note the action for trial or hearing within 1 year after any issue of *171law or fact has been joined ..." Only if these circumstances alone are present should a timely notation for trial thwart dismissal. Where a dismissal is raised for reasons independent of and in addition to CR 41(b)(1), the trial court in its discretion may dismiss the case in exercise of its inherent powers or pursuant to the first paragraph of CR 41(b).
The power set forth in the first paragraph of CR 41(b) is inherent in a court of general jurisdiction and exists whether or not it is embodied in a court rule or statute. The power set forth in CR 41(b)(1) and its predecessors arises because it has been specifically granted. Just because mandatory dismissal is avoided under CR 41(b)(1), the court should not be prevented from dismissing for other reasons.
This approach accommodates the need for the court to preserve its equitable powers while insuring that the notation for trial exception of CR 41(b)(1) is not abrogated by unwarranted reliance on authority outside the rule. Only by interpreting the first paragraph of CR 41(b) and CR 41(b)(1) this way will independent meaning be given to both.
The majority concedes that the first paragraph of CR 41(b) and CR 41(b)(1) have independent effect. Majority opinion, at 169 (citing 4 L. Orland, Wash. Prac., Rules Practice § 5502, at 241 (3d ed. 1983)). But the majority by its holding denies such independent effect. The majority relies on dicta in Gott v. Woody, 11 Wn. App. 504, 524 P.2d 452 (1974), which stated that the 1967 revision to CR 41 limited the court's inherent discretionary power to dismiss for a party's "failure to bring a case on for trial in a timely fashion." Majority opinion, at 168 (citing Gott, at 507). However, the precise holding of Gott is:
[Wjhere the mere inaction of a party gives rise to a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution by the adversary, CR 41(b)(1) limits the discretionary authority of the court to dismiss on that ground.
*172(Italics mine.) Gott, at 507. Mere inaction was the only reason for dismissal in Gott, and noting the case for trial correctly thwarted mandatory dismissal. Gott does not address what happens if there are reasons to dismiss other than mere inaction.
Judge Holman, in his dissent in Snohomish Cy. v. Thorp Meats, 46 Wn, App. 13, 728 P.2d 1084 (1986), correctly distinguished Gott from the present case:
[I]n Gott, the only ground adduced in support of the motion to dismiss was the 8-month delay in noting the case for trial setting after joinder of issues; in the instant case, the comparable delay of 19 months between joinder and noting for trial setting must be viewed in context with the prejoinder periods of practically zero prosecutorial activity on the part of the County. During this period prior to joinder, the land in question had already been graded, planted, and put to beneficial community use. Thus, the defendant in Gott could only raise an issue of the type described in CR 41(b)(1), not subject to the exercise of discretion, whereas in the instant case, the equities involved are of a nature typically subject to the court's discretion.
Approximately 17 months for Thorp Meats and 14 months for Fiorito Brothers.
(Italics mine.) Snohomish Cy., at 19-20. As Judge Holman correctly pointed out, Gott is precisely the type of case contemplated by the enactment of CR 41(b)(1). In the present case, more is involved than just a delay in noting the case for trial; thus, this case does not fall entirely under CR 41(b)(1).
The present case should be decided in the same manner as State ex rel. Dawson v. Superior Court, 16 Wn.2d 300, 133 P.2d 285 (1943). In Dawson, the defendant was precluded from invoking RPPP 3 (predecessor to CR 41(b)(1)) because the plaintiff failed to note the case for trial within 1 year after joining of issues had technically been caused by the defendant. Therefore, since Dawson fell within an exception to RPPP 3's mandatory dismissal requirements, *173it could not be dismissed pursuant to RPPP 3. Nevertheless, this court held that Dawson should be dismissed on equitable grounds pursuant to the court's inherent discretionary dismissal powers. The court reasoned that dismissal was justified because the plaintiff's lengthy delay in prosecuting his action had produced a hardship for the defendant.
Gott misconstrues Dawson. Dawson did not hold that the civil dismissal rule was intended to restrict the court's inherent dismissal power. Rather, RPPP 3, as well as the current CR 41(b)(1), created a specific grant of power in addition to that which the court inherently possesses. See Snohomish Cy., at 21 (Holman, J., dissenting).
Judge Holman further correctly noted that:
If the case is appropriate for the exercise of the court's inherent power, there is nothing a plaintiff can do to avoid the consequences of his dilatoriness; in comparison, if the case involves the court's power to dismiss as provided in CR 41(b)(1), a plaintiff is afforded an escape hatch because he can avoid dismissal by noting the action for trial before the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Finally, the court's inherent power must be exercised with judicial discretion, necessarily requiring that the trial court and any reviewing court consider not only the state of the record but also, under recognized equitable principles, the facts established outside the record; in contrast, the court's power under CR 41(b)(1) is mandatory and based solely on the record.
Snohomish Cy., at 22.
Finally, providing each paragraph of CR 41(b) with meaning is consistent with Miller v. Patterson, 45 Wn. App. 450, 725 P.2d 1016 (1986). While Miller was concerned with the application of CR 41(b)(2), dismissal on the clerk's motion, Miller noted that under CR 41(b) there were three other provisions for involuntary dismissal. These three were the first paragraph of CR 41(b) as well as paragraphs (1) and (3). Miller recognized the inherent discretionary power of the court to dismiss the case outside of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3).
*174In the present case, I would hold that the trial court had the power to dismiss Snohomish County's claim. The trial court's power was both inherent and by virtue of the first paragraph of CR 41(b). The remaining question then would be whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the dismissal. See Hayes v. Quigg, 46 Wn.2d 453, 456, 282 P.2d 301 (1955).
The trial court here based its dismissal on a "laches" theory, pursuant to the court's inherent equitable power to dismiss dilatorily prosecuted cases. Laches is most commonly asserted in response to a delay in filing an action; however, it may also serve to bar a suit for a plaintiff's post-filing delay. See Stewart v. Johnston, 30 Wn.2d 925, 934, 941, 195 P.2d 119 (1948); 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 155 (1966). Laches may be invoked whenever there has been unreasonable neglect in prosecuting an action coupled with an intervening change of condition making it inequitable to enforce the claim. Arnold v. Melani, 75 Wn.2d 143, 147-48, 437 P.2d 908, 449 P.2d 800, 450 P.2d 815 (1968); Stewart, at 935. These requirements of unreasonable delay plus prejudice are the identical factors this court has addressed in reviewing a trial court's exercise of its inherent discretionary dismissal power. See, e.g., State ex rel. Washington Water Power Co. v. Superior Court, 41 Wn.2d 484, 494, 250 P.2d 536 (1952); Hayes, at 456.
In the present case, Thorp Meats' unchallenged affidavit alleged a change in condition (improvement of the property) which would make it inequitable for the County to enforce its claim after a total of nearly a 3-year post-filing delay. These facts support the trial court's finding of laches. I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the County's claim.
I dissent because the majority incorrectly holds that CR 41(b)(1) limits the power of the first paragraph of CR 41(b). Rather, I would hold that the first paragraph of CR 41(b) has independent effect and maintains the trial court's inherent discretionary dismissal power. Therefore, I would *175reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of the County's action.
Utter and Callow, JJ., concur with Goodloe, J.