I respectfully dissent. In my view, the unauthorized practice of medicine “under circumstances or conditions which cause or create a risk of great bodily harm, serious physical or mental illness, or death” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2053) fully supports application of the second degree felony-murder rule.
Relying on hypertechnical and irrelevant distinctions between great bodily harm, serious physical and mental injury, and the risk of death, the majority ignores the “rational function that [the felony-murder rule] is designed to serve.” (People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 783 [44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130].) As we have frequently reiterated, that purpose “is to deter those engaged in felonies from killing negligently or accidentally (see People v. Washington, supra, 62 Cal.2d 111, 781-783; . . .).” (People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 34 [98 Cal.Rptr. 33, 489 P.2d 1361, 50 *855A.L.R.3d 383]; accord, People v. Henderson (1977) 19 Cal.3d 86, 93 [137 Cal.Rptr. 1, 560 P.2d 1180].)
In those cases in which we have found the felony-murder doctrine not to apply, the felony, properly viewed in the abstract, contained by definition elements which did not usually entail any risk of harm to the victim. Thus the possibility of negligent or accidental death did not flow logically from each possible element of the crime. (See People v. Henderson, supra, 19 Cal.3d 86 [false imprisonment effectuated by “violence, menace, fraud or deceit” with no distinction in the statute between violent and fraudulent or deceitful means]; People v. Lopez (1971) 6 Cal.3d 45 [98 Cal.Rptr. 44, 489 P.2d 1372] [escape, where statute encompassed both violent and nonviolent escapes]; People v. Satchell, supra, 6 Cal.3d 28 [possession of a concealable firearm by a felon]; People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574 [51 Cal.Rptr. 225, 414 P.2d 353] [grand theft]; People v. Williams (1965) 63 Cal.2d 452 [60 Cal.Rptr. 472, 430 P.2d 30] [conspiracy to obtain methedrine].)
In contrast, the statute at issue here explicitly requires a risk of actual harm or “injury” to a person. (See People v. Mattison (1971) 4 Cal.3d 177, 186 [93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d 193].) In Mattison, we considered the application of the felony-murder doctrine where the underlying felony was the wilful administration of poison “with intent that the same shall be taken by any human being to his injury . . . . ” (Former Pen. Code, § 347, italics added.) We noted that, “Absent section 347, a defendant who administered poison to another not with conscious disregard for life, but only for the purpose of making the other mildly ill or intoxicated, could at most be found guilty only of involuntary manslaughter if an unexpected death resulted. (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. 2.) By making it a felony to administer poison with the intent to cause any injury, the Legislature has evidenced its concern for the dangers involved in such conduct, and the invocation of the second degree felony-murder rule in such cases when unforeseen death results serves further to deter such dangerous conduct.” (P. 186, italics added.) Accordingly, we held that even though the felony was not sufficient to sustain a first degree felony-murder conviction because there was no requirement of a “conscious disregard for life,” instructions on second degree felony murder were indeed appropriate. (Ibid.)
In so holding, we relied in part on People v. Taylor (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 57 [89 Cal.Rptr. 697], where the Court of Appeal upheld a second degree murder conviction under the felony-murder rule when the underlying felony *856was furnishing of heroin to the victim. As we enunciated in Mattison, “In other words the felony was not done with the intent to commit injury which would cause death. Giving a felony-murder instruction in such a situation serves rather than subverts the purpose of the rule. ‘While the felony-murder rule can hardly be much of a deterrent to a defendant who has decided to assault his victim with a deadly weapon, it seems obvious that in the situation presented in the case at bar, it does serve a rational purpose: knowledge that the death of a person to whom heroin is furnished may result in a conviction for murder should have some effect on the defendant’s readiness to do the furnishing.’ (People v. Taylor, supra, 11 Cal.App.3d 57, 63.)” (People v. Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 185.) Similarly, here, knowledge that the death of a “sick or afflicted” person whom the unauthorized practitioner treats, “willfully, under circumstances or conditions which cause or create a risk of great bodily harm, serious physical or mental illness, or death,” may have an effect on such person’s willingness to so practice.
The majority’s fine distinctions become even more dubious when one considers the holding in People v. Nichols (1970) 3 Cal.3d 150 [89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673], approving a second degree murder conviction premised on the burning of an automobile. While we have questioned that holding to the extent that the underlying felony had not been considered in the abstract and it contained a “proscription against a variety of burnings of personal property not all of which are dangerous to human life” (People v. Henderson, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 96), we did not imply that if the crime of arson of a motor vehicle were contained in a separate discrete section it would not serve as a sufficient basis for invocation of the felony-murder rule. In Nichols, we declared that “the burning of a motor vehicle, which usually contains gasoline and which is usually found in close proximity to people, is inherently dangerous to human life. We therefore conclude that the wilful and malicious burning of a motor vehicle calls into play the second degree felony-murder rule.” (3 Cal.3d at p. 163.) How can the underlying felony at issue here be less “inherently dangerous to human life” than the burning of an automobile?
In enacting Business and Professions Code section 2053, the Legislature clearly sought to impose a greater penalty in those cases where the unauthorized practice of medicine causes significant risks that may lead to death. The use of the felony-murder rule in this context clearly furthers the goal of deterring such conduct. The underlying conduct proscribed by section 2053 is manifestly “inherently dangerous to life.” Viewed in the abstract, improper treatment of the “sick and afflicted” under the dangerous circum*857stances and conditions specified in that section is almost synonomous with inherently dangerous conduct.
I would affirm the judgment of conviction.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 24, 1984. Lucas, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.