concurring in part and dissenting in part.
This Court has repeatedly stressed that “[t]he very purpose of the Open Records Act ‘is to encourage public access to government *200information and to foster confidence in government through openness to the public.’ [Cit.]” Howard v. Sumter Free Press, 272 Ga. 521, 522 (1) (531 SE2d 698) (2000). See also McFrugal Rental of Riverdale v. Garr, 262 Ga. 369 (418 SE2d 60) (1992); Athens Observer v. Anderson, 245 Ga. 63 (2) (263 SE2d 128) (1980). Hence, we have recognized that “[b]ecause public policy strongly favors open government, ‘any purported statutory exemption from disclosure under the Open Records Act must be narrowly construed.’ ” (Footnote and emphasis omitted.) City of Atlanta v. Corey Entertainment, 278 Ga. 474, 476 (1) (604 SE2d 140) (2004). At issue in this case is the construction to be given the exemption for pending investigations or prosecutions in subsection (a) (4) of OCGA § 50-18-72 of the Open Records Act. Consistent with the legislative purpose of the Act and the narrow construction given the “pending” exemption in Parker v. Lee, 259 Ga. 195,198 (4) (378 SE2d 677) (1989), which interpretation has become “an integral part of the statutory exemption” so that “any subsequent ‘reinterpretation’ would be no different in effect from a judicial alteration of language that the General Assembly itself placed in the statute,” Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 281 Ga. 137, 139 (1) (637 SE2d 14) (2006), I would construe OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4) as applying only to those investigations and prosecutions being actively, definitely and imminently pursued. Thus, I would recognize that the criminal investigation by Athens-Clarke County Police Department (ACCPD) into the 1992 murder of Jennifer Stone is no longer pending and that appellee Athens Newspapers, LLC is entitled under the Open Records Act to access and copy ACCPD’s files. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent to the majority’s holding in Division 1. Because the majority’s holding in Division 2 is wholly consistent with the purpose of the Open Records Act, I concur fully in that division.
In Parker v. Lee, supra, 259 Ga. at 195, this Court expressly declined to apply a limited construction to OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4). The Open Records Act request in Parker v. Lee arose out of habeas corpus proceedings in which Parker, who had been convicted of murder and rape and sentenced to death, sought the criminal investigatory file on the rape charge. Although in an earlier appeal this Court had upheld Parker’s murder conviction and death sentence, Parker v. State, 256 Ga. 543 (350 SE2d 570) (1986), we had reversed the rape conviction in a manner that left the State free to retry Parker on that charge.1 Id. at 196. Parker’s request for the rape investigatory file was denied on the basis that “Parker’s indictment for rape [was] outstanding,” id., and thus came within the “pending *201investigation or prosecution” exemption in OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4). On appeal, this Court thoroughly discussed the legislative history of subsection (a) (4) and the existing case law. Striving to “give effect to the purpose and intent of the legislature [cit.]” and to “construe that portion of the act in view of the legislative intent found in the act as a whole [cit.],” Parker v. Lee, supra at 198 (4), we interpreted “the pending-prosecution exemption of [subsection] (a) (4) to refer to imminent adjudicatory proceedings of finite duration.” Id. at 198 (4). This Court then explicitly held that the final phrase in subsection (a) (4)2 is not the exclusive means of proving when an investigation or prosecution has ceased to “pend” for purposes of the exception, when we stated, “[m]oreover, we construe the last phrase of that exemption as but one example of when a prosecution should not be considered ‘pending’ for purposes of the exception.” Id. Applying that construction, we rejected the interpretation the trial court gave to the word “pending,” id. at 197 (3), and held that because the Sheriff and District Attorney had “evidenced no intent to retry Parker” on the rape charge, id. at 198 (5), and had “made no showing that Parker would be prosecuted in the near future,” id. at 199, the mere possibility that Parker could be retried on the rape charge “does not warrant non-disclosure of the investigatory files.” Id. at 196. We thus concluded that the trial court “erred in concluding that the pending rape charge was a valid reason to prevent access to the files.” Id. at 199 (5).
The factual circumstances reflecting a “pending” matter were far stronger in Parker v. Lee, supra, than in the instant case, given that an accused had been identified, an indictment had been obtained and evidence sufficient to support a conviction had been compiled. Had this Court construed OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4) using the strict dictionary definition the majority applies in this case, there is no question that the rape prosecution in Parker v. Lee should have been deemed “pending.”
The majority’s holding is wholly inconsistent with Parker v. Lee and its interpretation of “pending,” but the majority does not overrule this controlling precedent. It cannot do so because of the well-established rule that
[o]nce the court interprets the statute, the interpretation has become an integral part of the statute. This having been done, (over a long period of history) any subsequent “rein*202terpretation” would be no different in effect from a judicial alteration of language that the General Assembly itself placed in the statute. The principle is particularly applicable where an amendment is presented to the legislature and the statute is amended in other particulars.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., supra, 281 Ga. at 139 (1). The Legislature has taken no action to amend the language in OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4) or otherwise alter any aspect of the interpretation given that language 19 years ago in Parker v. Lee, even though in 16 of those 19 years it has revisited that statute to add or amend other provisions.
Instead, the majority “distinguishes” Parker v. Lee on the basis that it deals with prosecutions, not investigations. That distinction is not supported by the plain language in OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4). Subsection (a) (4) exempts “[rjecords of law enforcement, prosecution, or regulatory agencies in any pending investigation or prosecution of criminal or unlawful activity.” The Legislature did not create one exemption for pending prosecutions and a separate one for pending investigations with this language. “Pending” is the crucial word in the exemption because whether or not a matter is “pending” determines when the exemption applies, not whether the pending matter is an investigation or a prosecution. The majority’s holding creates the anomalous result that the same word in the same statute is given two diametrically opposite meanings. “Pending” requires proof of definite and imminent action when it comes to prosecutions but no amount of proof of inactivity can ever suffice when it comes to investigations: only official closure of the file by the government authority in charge of the investigation can authorize access of the investigation information to the public.
Because nothing in the plain language of OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4) supports the majority’s creation of two separate exemptions, it turns to Houston v. Rutledge, 237 Ga. 764 (229 SE2d 624) (1976) and asserts that the exemption must be construed “in connection and harmony with” this decision. Maj. Op., p. 195. I agree with the majority that this Court in Houston “recognized the need for a strong ‘pending investigation’ exemption.” Id. at p. 194. However, the legislative history of OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4) clearly shows that the General Assembly did not agree with this Court, given that the exemption was not added to the Open Records Act until 12 years after Houston was rendered. Rather than construing subsection (a) (4) in light of Houston, I would recognize that the Legislature by enacting that exemption expressly rejected Houston and the balancing test it proposed. Indeed, the majority itself recognizes that OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4) so greatly superseded the analysis in Houston that *203Houston no longer reflects valid Georgia law. Maj. Op., p. 197.
The majority holds that a criminal investigation is no longer deemed to be pending only when the investigative file is closed. Maj. Op., p. 196. Nothing in OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4) supports the majority’s holding that closing of the file is the exclusive means of proving that an investigation has ceased to be “pending” for purposes of the exemption. When this Court in Parker v. Lee explicitly construed the last phrase of subsection (a) (4) as “but one example” of when a prosecution is no longer included within the exemption, we recognized that each case must be assessed in light of its unique facts in order to determine whether the exemption applies. There may be instances in which the closing of the file is indeed the point at which the investigation ceases to be pending. But the majority’s “bright line rule” allows for no exceptions, even in cases such as this one. It is not setting an “arbitrary time limit” to recognize under the particular facts established by the record in this specific case that the ACCPD’s investigation into Jennifer Stone’s murder is no longer “pending.” It is uncontroverted ACCPD has made no arrests and, indeed, has never identified anyone as a suspect. No litigation or prosecution has been undertaken in the 16 years since the crimes were committed. In addition to this undisputed lack of progress on the case, the record reflects that there has been no active investigation into the Stone case in years.3 The reality is that ACCPD has ceased all meaningful efforts to solve the Stone case. Thus, I cannot agree with the majority that the mere fact ACCPD has not “officially closed” the file into the 1992 murder of Stone is alone sufficient to exempt the file from public scrutiny by Athens Newspapers.4
The majority’s bright line rule broadly construes an exemption this Court is obligated to construe narrowly. City of Atlanta v. Corey Entertainment, supra, 278 Ga. at 476 (1). It is contrary to both the purpose and the spirit of the Open Records Act by limiting rather than promoting freedom of information. I would recognize that OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4), like its Federal counterpart,
is particularly important, both because of the potency of the police power and because police abuse is the type of govern*204ment corruption that the FOIA [and OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4)] ha[ve] been successful in allowing the public to see. .. . Law enforcement records require a heightened level of openness given the expansive nature of the police power and the primary motivation of open records laws. They enable the public to serve the “watchdog” function of making sure their law enforcement officials are serving the public interest. The Rodney King beating,. . . the shootings at Ruby Ridge, and the FBI’s actions at Waco all underscore this need.Decided June 30, 2008 Reconsideration denied July 25, 2008. William, C. Berryman, Jr., for appellant. Hull, Towill, Norman, Barrett & Salley, David E. Hudson, Davis A. Dunaway, for appellee. Susan J. Moore, Delong, Caldwell & Bridgers, Michael A. Caldwell, Charles C. Olson, James E Grubiak, Kemuel A. Kim-brough, Ted C. Baggett, Arnall, Golden & Gregory, Robert L. Roth-man, Christopher K. Withers, amici curiae.
Jamison S. Prime, A Double-Barrelled Assault: How Technology and Judicial Interpretations Threaten Public Access to Law Enforcement Records, 48 Fed. Comm. L.J. 341, 345, 368 (1996). Because I would interpret the pending investigation exemption in the Open Records Act in a manner that encourages governmental officials and agencies to remain accountable to the people of Georgia, I respectfully dissent to Division 1 of the majority’s opinion.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Sears and Justice Thompson join this dissent.
See Parker v. State, 255 Ga. 167 (5) (336 SE2d 242) (1985) (evidence sufficient to uphold Parker’s rape verdict).
That final phrase states that an investigation or prosecution “shall no longer be deemed to be pending when all direct litigation involving said investigation and prosecution has become final or otherwise terminated.” OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4).
I agree with the Court of Appeals that neither the “availability” of crime analysts to assist in investigating a case in which no work is being done nor an “extensive review” of a police file establishes that an investigation remains pending.
Even should a DNA profile match be made, there is no evidence that disclosure of the investigative file will hinder any subsequent prosecution. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 406 (651 SE2d 12) (2007) (CODIS match enabled Fulton County “cold case” squad to identify suspect in 12-year-old rape).