dissenting:
We took this case en banc to clarify our jurisprudence regarding crimes of moral turpitude. The fractured decision we announce today only compounds the uncertainty attending this arcane subject of criminal opprobrium. Navarro-Lopez’s petition for review of his final order of removal should be denied because the crime of being an accessory after the fact in violation of California Penal Code section 32 is a crime involving moral turpitude under the categorical approach established in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). In reaching the opposite conclusion, the majority employs dubious reasoning and ignores relevant case law from our sister circuits, creating yet another unnecessary circuit split. I respectfully dissent.
I
The opinion authored by Judge Preger-son offers various definitions for “moral turpitude,” some quite vivid,1 before concluding that a conviction under California *1079Penal Code section 32 does not, categorically, fit within the appropriate definition.2 See Maj. op. at 1067-68. For reasons outlined in Part I of Judge Reinhardt’s concurrence, see pp. 1074-75, and which I will not belabor here, there is a fundamental problem with the majority’s approach to defining moral turpitude — it fails to recognize an important distinction in both Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court jurisprudence. Our case law plainly establishes two broad and wholly distinct categories of crimes involving moral turpitude: those “involving fraud and those involving grave acts of baseness or depravity.” Carty v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir.2005) (citing Rodriguez-Herrera v. INS, 52 F.3d 238, 240 (9th Cir.1995)); see also Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 229, 71 S.Ct. 703, 95 L.Ed. 886 (1951) (“[F]raud has consistently been regarded as such a contaminating component in any crime that American courts have, without exception, included such crimes within the scope of moral turpitude.”). Thus, I cannot agree with the attempt to shoehorn fraud crimes within a larger umbrella category of crimes that are base or depraved. Recognizing the two categories as analytically distinct, I would hold that a conviction under section 32 of the California Penal Code qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude under the prong addressing fraudulent conduct.
II
Determining whether section 32 qualifies as a crime of moral turpitude warrants an examination of judicial decisions addressing similar statutes. See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 227, 71 S.Ct. 703 (stating that courts must “look to the manner in which the term ‘moral turpitude’ has been applied by judicial decision”). Indeed, the few circuits that have addressed this issue have all determined that moral turpitude attaches to convictions under statutes criminalizing concealment of crime.3
*1080In Itani v. Ashcroft, the Eleventh Circuit determined that a conviction under the federal misprision of felony statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4, qualified as a crime of moral turpitude. 298 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir.2002). Like a conviction under section 32 of the California Penal Code, a federal conviction for misprision of felony requires a showing that the accused has knowledge of a felony and “conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to [civil authorities].” 18 U.S.C. § 4. Highlighting the fact that the misprision statute requires an affirmative act of concealment, the Itani court concluded that a conviction under the statute is a crime of moral turpitude because it involves “behavior that runs contrary to accepted societal duties and involves dishonesty or fraudulent activity.” 298 F.3d at 1216.
Similarly, in Padilla v. Gonzales, the Seventh Circuit determined that a conviction under Illinois’s obstruction of justice statute was a crime involving moral turpitude. 397 F.3d 1016, 1021 (7th Cir.2005). Under Illinois law, a defendant is guilty of obstruction if he “knowingly furnish[es] false information ‘with intent to prevent the apprehension or obstruct the prosecution or defense of any person.’ ” Id. at 1019 (quoting 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/31-4(a)). Focusing on the statute’s specific intent requirement, our sister circuit noted that a conviction under the statute could be characterized as malum in se — a designation generally associated with crimes involving moral turpitude. Id. at 1020 (“Specific intent is inconsistent with a crime that is malum prohibitum.”).
The Seventh Circuit then addressed two elements of the Illinois statute: knowingly making false statements and intentionally concealing criminal activity. As to the former, the court noted that “[s]ome courts have read ‘fraudulent intent,’ and thus moral turpitude, into conduct ‘the likely effect of which would be to mislead or conceal.’ ” Id. (quoting Smalley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332, 337-38 (5th Cir.2003)); see also Itani, 298 F.3d at 1215 (“Generally, a crime involving dishonesty or false statement is considered to be one involving moral turpitude.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As a result, the appellate court concluded that “Padilla was convicted of ... a crime that specifically entails dishonesty and thus implicates moral turpitude.” Padilla, 397 F.3d at 1020. As to the second element, intent to conceal a crime, the court cited Itani with approval and held that concealment “likewise involves moral turpitude.” Id. at 1021; see also Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193, 197 (1st Cir.1994) (holding that an alien convicted of accessory after the fact to murder committed a crime involving moral turpitude because he intentionally assisted the principal in evading authorities).
Section 32 of the California Penal Code punishes essentially the same behavior addressed by the federal misprision of felony statute and Illinois’s obstruction of justice law. Each statute contains a specific intent element, and each addresses the concealment or protection of a criminal or his crime. It makes little sense to treat the same conduct with different punishments: in the Eleventh Circuit, an alien is removable for actively concealing a known felon, but under the majority’s reading, in the Ninth Circuit a friend who harbors the same criminal in California is not. Moreover, I find persuasive the reasoning cited with approval in Padilla, equating fraudulent intent with conduct intended to mislead or conceal, because, by its very nature, an act in furtherance of evasion from prosecution entails some form of deceit. Cf. Smalley, 354 F.3d at 338. Therefore, I would follow the California Supreme Court’s decision in Young and our sister circuits and hold that a conviction under California’s accessory after the fact statute necessarily involves moral turpitude, ren*1081dering Navarro-Lopez removable from this country.
III
The reasoning employed in Young, Itani, and Padilla is consistent with our prior definition of moral turpitude as a crime involving fraud. Under the test set forth in Goldeshtein v. INS, 8 F.3d 645 (9th Cir.1993), and in conformance with these extra circuit precedents, I would hold that a conviction as an accessory after the fact qualifies categorically as a crime involving moral turpitude.
In Goldeshtein, we determined that a conviction under federal law for structuring financial institutions to avoid currency reports did not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude. Id. at 647-48. In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledged that fraud crimes involved moral turpitude if intent to defraud is (1) an essential element of the crime or (2) “if such intent is ‘implicit in the nature of the crime.’ ” Id. at 648 (quoting Winestock v. INS, 576 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir.1978)); see also McNaughton v. INS, 612 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir.1980) (noting that courts may look to “the statutory definition or ... the nature of the crime”); Matter of Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 228 (BIA 1980) (“[W]here fraud is inherent in an offense, it is not necessary that the statute prohibiting it include the usual phraseology concerning fraud in order for it to involve moral turpitude.”). Because “[t]he offense of structuring financial transactions to avoid currency reports ... does not involve the use of false statements or counterfeit documents[ ]or [the obtaining of] anything from the government,” we concluded that “fraud is not inherent in the nature of this offense.” Goldeshtein, 8 F.3d at 649.
Notably, in Goldeshtein we did not hold that providing false statements or obtaining something from the government for one’s own benefit was required to establish that fraud is inherent in a particular crime; our holding may be read fairly as identifying such conduct as sufficient but not necessary in light of the facts of that particular case. Nevertheless, holding that moral turpitude attaches to a conviction under California’s accessory after the fact statute is consistent with this reasoning.
Goldeshtein suggested that pecuniary gain is not necessary. See id. at 649 & n. 9. Nor need the gain be tangible. See id. at 649 (citing Matter of R—, 5 I. & N. Dec. 29, 38 (BIA 1952) (finding that fraud is inherent where an alien made a false statement to obtain an occupational deferment to which he was not entitled)). Furthermore, we stopped short of holding that the benefit must accrue to the individual, as opposed to a third party. See id. (citing United States ex rel. Popoff v. Reimer, 79 F.2d 513, 515 (2d Cir.1935) (holding that fraud is inherent where an individual makes false statements on behalf of an alien to aid the alien in obtaining naturalization)).
Thus, while an accessory after the fact under California law may not personally gain something of value, he certainly procures a benefit for the principal in the form of prolonged freedom from detection or apprehension. This assistance after the commission of a felony may allow evidence to disappear or become stale, give the principal the opportunity to flee the country, or worse, enable him to commit another crime. Regardless of the exact benefit to the principal, however, the help of an accessory impedes the swift administration of justice, a result which is morally reprehensible.
Section 32 punishes a host of acts intended to assist the principal in evading capture. At base, however, the statute punishes deception, regardless of whether it comes in the form of false statements or some other act of concealment or aid. The *1082intent to assist a felon in evading detection and prosecution remains the same. Indeed, California cases have made clear that a conviction under section 32 is proper only if the accessory engaged in “overt or affirmative assistance.” People v. Duty, 269 Cal.App.2d 97, 74 Cal.Rptr. 606, 609 (1969); see also People v. Elliott, 14 Cal.App.4th 1633, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 430 (1993) (reiterating that a conviction under section 32 must be for something “more than mere encouragement or incitement”). Therefore, simply failing to disclose the location of a felon does not violate the statute; section 32 requires some form of actual assistance intended to aid the principal in avoiding detection by authorities. In many eases, this assistance invariably will manifest itself as false statements. However, as long as the net effect is one of deception to help cover up the crime or delay apprehension of its perpetrator,4 I see no reason to limit narrowly the overt act to statements in order to conclude that fraud is inherent in a conviction under California’s accessory statute.
Thus, in light of the holdings of our sister circuits and the fraud analysis we articulated in Goldeshtein, I would follow the California Supreme Court’s authoritative interpretation of its own laws and hold that a conviction under section 32 of the California Penal Code qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude.
IV
The majority opinion does little to undermine the analysis of extra circuit precedent or Goldeshtein. Instead, the majority proceeds on several faulty and somewhat misleading premises. As an initial matter, the majority is misguided in its attempt to look to “the broad range of acts” punishable under the accessory after the fact statute as support for its conclusion that “providing food or shelter to one who has committed a felony” does not fall within the definition of moral turpitude. Maj. op. at 1072. I fail to see the benevolence of providing shelter to a known felon, at least in the manner prohibited by California’s accessory law. Let us be clear here: the statute does not punish those who merely provide food and shelter to a felon; it punishes those who do so with the specific intent that the felon escape arrest or trial. See Prado, 136 Cal.Rptr. at 523. The majority’s citation to our decision in United States v. Hill, 279 F.3d 731, 736 (9th Cir.2002); see Maj. op. at 1072, is unavailing because in Hill we emphasized that culpability attached under Oregon’s accessory statute only upon a showing that the provision of food or shelter was for the purpose of helping a known felon escape detection. Id. at 738 (“Hill provided [her husband] with food and shelter in northern Mexico so that he would not have to go back to the United States to retrieve their belongings himself and she did so after she knew there was a felony warrant for his arrest.” (emphasis added)).
Moreover, the majority’s analogy to the provision of food and shelter (or any other example intended to evoke sympathy, such as the classic example of a priest offering sanctuary) is misplaced for another reason: this is exactly the type of creative hypothe*1083sizing in Taylor categorical cases that the Supreme Court recently condemned. In Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, the Supreme Court reversed us and held that a conviction under section 10851(a) of the California Vehicle Code for aiding and abetting a vehicle theft falls within the scope of the generic theft definition under federal law. — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 815, 818, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). Rejecting Duenas-Alvarez’s argument that the wording of the California law might lead to punishment for acts outside the relevant federal definition, the Court made clear that
to find that a state statute creates a crime outside the generic definition of a listed crime in a federal statute requires more than the application of a legal imagination to a state statute’s language. It requires a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime. To show that realistic possibility, an offender, of course, may show that the statute was so applied in his own case. But he must at least point to his own case or other cases in which the state courts in fact did apply the statute in the special (nongeneric) manner for which he argues.5
Id. at 822; see also James v. United States, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 1597, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) (reiterating the Duenas-Alvarez reasoning).
The majority’s treatment of Duenas-Alvarez is unpersuasive, and it fails to identify any cases in which an individual has been prosecuted under section 32 for the particularly benign acts of providing food or shelter to a loved one “during a time of trouble.” See Maj. op. at 1071-72. Indeed, finding such a helpful example might prove quite difficult as a brief survey of cases involving the accessory statute demonstrates that the state has not chosen to prosecute those whose actions are easily defensible on moral grounds. See, e.g., People v. Nguyen, 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 323, 328 (1993) (accessory to genital penetration); People v. Wilson, 17 Cal.App.4th 271, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 420, 421-23 (1993) (accessory to attempted voluntary manslaughter and assault with a firearm); Prado, 136 Cal.Rptr. at 522-23 (accessory to armed robbery); Duty, 74 Cal.Rptr. at 607 (accessory to arson); People v. Allsip, 268 Cal.App.2d 830, 74 Cal.Rptr. 550, 550 (1969) (accessory to rape); People v. Kloss, 130 Cal.App. 194, 19 P.2d 822, 822-23 (1933), overuled in part on other grounds, People v. McCoy, 25 Cal.4th 1111, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210 (2001) (accessory to murder).
In addition, the fact that one state within our circuit expressly exempts family members from accessory liability, see Nev. Rev.Stat. § 195.030, has no bearing on whether a conviction under California’s statute is a crime involving moral turpitude. One state’s legislative prerogative to exempt family members is no more important than the other eight states’ individual decisions not to exempt them. Moreover, I cannot say that exempting family members from accessory liability makes much sense as a practical matter because fleeing felons are often most likely to seek assistance from family before anyone else. Indeed, in at least one case, California’s decision to make family mem*1084bers liable illustrates the wisdom of the statutory inclusion. See, e.g., Wilson, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d at 422-23 (noting that a wife could be charged as an accessory where, knowing her husband had committed a felony, she complied with his request to locate and hide a firearm that he had used during a car chase in which he wounded one of the two ,men he was pursuing).
Finally, by focusing on the categorization of the underlying felony, the majority completely ignores the analytically distinct and morally reprehensible nature of a conviction under section 32 of the California Penal Code. The principal's conduct should be irrelevant to the analysis because any attempt to assist in the evasion of the due administration of justice merits society’s reprobation.6 The Supreme Court has reminded us that “[cjoncealment of crime has been condemned throughout our history.” See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972) (emphasizing that each citizen bears the responsibility to “raise the ‘hue and cry’ and report felonies to the authorities”); id. at 697, 92 S.Ct. 2646 (“[Concealment of a crime] deserves no encomium.”). The universal disdain for the concealment of a crime “was an established tenet of Anglo-Saxon law at least as early as the 13th century,” making it no surprise that our first Congress enacted a statute criminalizing such behavior. Roberts, 445 U.S. at 557-58, 100 S.Ct. 1358. As the Roberts Court acknowledged, “gross indifference to the duty to report known criminal behavior remains a badge of irresponsible citizenship.” Id. at 558, 100 S.Ct. 1358. This principle is as true today as it was in the 1200s.7
V
A conviction under section 32 of the California Penal Code qualifies categorically as a crime involving moral turpitude under the fraud analysis of Goldeshtein. Holding otherwise creates an unnecessary tension between us and our sister circuits that have recognized the morally turpitudi-nous nature of convictions involving the concealment of crime. Because the court reaches the opposite conclusion based on dubious reasoning — adding only more confusion to our jurisprudence on crimes of moral turpitude — I respectfully dissent.
. The majority is even content to cite to a dissent in order to support its characterization of moral turpitude. See Maj. op. at 1071 (quoting Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 237 n. 9, 71 S.Ct. 703, 95 L.Ed. 886 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). Indeed, in its zeal to set a high bar for a finding of moral turpi*1079tude, the majority refers to morally turpitudi-nous conduct as that which is “so far contrary to the moral law” that it gives rise to “moral outrage.” Maj. op. at 1071. Not surprisingly, the phrase "moral outrage” (in so far as it pertains to moral turpitude) appears only once in all of federal law — in the dissent to the now-vacated panel decision in this case. See Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir.2006) (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
. Judge Pregerson’s citation to definitions from multiple circuits and dictionaries illustrates a problem our court recognized over fifty years ago — namely, that strict definitions of “moral turpitude” are not very helpful. In Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929, 933 (9th Cir.1957), we observed that we were not unmindful of the "myriad decisions sponsoring various concepts of moral turpitude,” hut that none of them offered any “well settled criteria” which would help us in making this determination. By cobbling together its own definition of the term, the court’s opinion today amounts to saying little more than it knows moral turpitude when it sees it, and California Penal Code section 32 isn't it. The opinion does nothing to clarify the criteria one should employ in determining which fraud crimes are “base, vile, or depraved,” see, e.g., Maj. op. at 1069, and which are not. It concludes, contrary to the opinion of the Supreme Court of California, that Penal Code section 32 can never be a crime of moral turpitude. Compare In re Young, 49 Cal.3d 257, 261 Cal.Rptr. 59, 776 P.2d 1021, 1024 (1989), with Maj. op. at 1074.
. Though the question of whether a crime involves moral turpitude for federal immigration purposes requires an analysis of federal law, it is persuasive that the California Supreme Court has held that a conviction under Penal Code section 32 necessarily involves moral turpitude. See Young, 261 Cal.Rptr. 59, 776 P.2d at 1024 (upholding an attorney's section 32 conviction and declaring that "[t]his crime necessarily involves moral turpitude since it requires that a party has a specific intent to impede justice with knowledge that his actions permit a fugitive of the law to remain at large”).
. Judge Reinhardt cites a handful of California cases to support the argument that a conviction under section 32 does not necessarily involve "false representations or affirmative deceit.” Reinhardt cone, at 1077. However, I cannot see how disposing of a weapon, see People v. Riley, 20 Cal.App.4th 1808, 1816-17, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 676 (1993), or driving a getaway car, see People v. Scott, 170 Cal.App.3d 267, 271, 215 Cal.Rptr. 618 (1985), "with the intent that the principal may escape from arrest and trial,” People v. Prado, 67 Cal.App.3d 267, 136 Cal.Rptr. 521, 523 (1977), is anything other than an overt act, the effect of which is to mislead or otherwise confound the efforts of law enforcement.
. I agree with the majority that the charging documents in this case do not provide sufficient detail from which to glean the factual basis for Navarro-Lopez's conviction under the California accessory after the fact statute. See Maj. op. at 1074. However, because I believe a conviction under section 32 is categorically a crime of moral turpitude, the lack of specific information is irrelevant since we need not employ the modified categorical approach. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143; United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir.2002).
. The majority cites to a nonbinding Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual to support its argument that an accessory after the fact conviction cannot involve moral turpitude where the underlying offense was not morally turpitudinous. Maj. op. at 1071. However, the majority overlooks another provision of the same manual, which states that “[c]rimes committed against governmental authority which fall within the definition of moral turpitude include ... [h]arboring a fugitive from justice (with guilty knowledge).” 9 U.S. Dep’t of State Foreign Affairs Manual 40.21(a) n. 2.32(a)(6).
. The majority's citation to California convictions under section 32 involving firearms, assault, and burglary offenses is therefore unpersuasive. See Maj. op. at 1072-73. These crimes are still quite serious, and they certainly do not reflect the majority’s concern that in California there is a "realistic probability,” see Duenas-Alvarez, 127 S.Ct. at 822, that an individual will be convicted under section 32 for particularly benign or charitable acts.