dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion that the erroneous admission of evidence of the race and ages of waitresses defendant directed offensive touching and language toward was nonprejudicial. The test for prejudicial error is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction. State v. Milby, 302 N.C. 137, 273 S.E.2d 716 (1981).
The complained of evidence was introduced during the following colloquy. For the sake of brevity, defendant’s objections and the court’s rulings have been omitted.
Q. Mr. Byrum, Mr. Moseley asked you previously about whether or not Mr. Cotton was a good employee of yours; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, during the time Mr. Cotton was in your employ, did you have occasion to personally witness any problems with Mr. Cotton, while' he was working for you?
*623A. Well, the one problem was with the waitress [sic]; it wasn’t with doing his job.
Q. What kind of problem was it with the waitresses Mr. Byrum?
A. He was always messing with them.
Q. How do you mean, “messing with them,” Mr. Byrum?
A. Touching them.
Q. Touching them where?
A. On their shoulders, and their bodies, and their rears, and telling dirty jokes.
Q. The shoulders, the bodies, and rear?
A. Yes, sir; different places.
Q. And how often did this go on, Mr. Byrum?
A. He touched about every Friday and Saturday night.
Q. And he only worked on Friday and Saturday nights; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir; unless I called him in on Thursday nights.
Q. All right; and how old were the waitresses, Mr. Byrum?
A. They usually run like high school; up to 50, 55.
Q. So, well, in particular, at the time that he was working for you, you had waitresses there between the ages of what, would you say?
A. 18 and 55.
Q. And, in particular, the waitresses that you — that he was touching on the rear end and touching on the shoulder; how old were they?
A. Between the same ages; it was not just —
A. It was not just one waitress; it was just about all of ’em [sic].
Q. And, other than the touching them on the rear, and on the body, did he do anything else with respect to those waitresses? [sic]
A. I said, “No,” sir.
*624Q. Did he say anything to these waitresses?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what kind of things were they? [sic]
A. Usually about sex; I don’t remember, you now [sic], word for word what it was; but it was always pertaining to that subject.
Q. And did that also pertain to all of the waitresses, and not just one or two?
A. Well, it was two, more than anybody else.
Q. All right, and do you recall the ages of those two waitresses?
A. One was like 18; and one was 47, I believe.
Q. What was the race of these waitresses?
A. White.
The threshold question in the case was one of identity. The evidence presented by the State was far from overwhelming. The only evidence presented by the State that had strong probative weight was the identification testimony of the two victims. The force of that evidence was significantly impugned, particularly by other evidence of record not set out in the facts of the majority opinion.
First, as to victim one, the evidence also tended to show that she was nearsighted and was not wearing her glasses during the attack upon her, and the only illumination in the room was from a street lamp filtering through her blinds; that during the time her assailant was in her presence he made efforts to keep her from seeing his face; that upon viewing a photographic lineup on 31 July containing six photos, one of which was of defendant, she initially chose two pictures from the array, one of which depicted defendant. After examining those two pictures for a number of minutes, she told the investigating officer that defendant’s photo “looks most like him.” On 8 August, she viewed a physical lineup consisting of seven men. Defendant was the only participant whose picture had been among those in the photographic array. Again, the victim was instructed to choose the one that looked the most like her assailant. After viewing the participants for a while, she *625told the officer that it was between participants numbers four and five. She then stated that number five, defendant, “looks the most like him.”
As to the second victim, the evidence also tended to show that on the two occasions that the assailant entered her house he directed the beam of a flashlight in her face; that other than the flashlight beam the only source of light in the house was from a television set which was not on when her attacker entered the second time. On 31 July, the second victim viewed the same photographic lineup of six photos, including defendant’s photo, that the first victim had viewed. Likewise, she was told to pick out the photo of the individual who most resembled her assailant. She failed to pick out anyone from this array. When she viewed the physical lineup on 8 August 1984, and picked out a Kenneth Watkins as her attacker, she thereafter asked the officer conducting the lineup if she had picked out the right person. On cross-examination she stated that she tried to pick out the right man, but had made a mistake.
The majority opinion points out that defendant’s alibi witnesses gave conflicting and inconsistent testimony and that defendant’s initial statement to investigators was inconsistent with his alibi testimony at trial concerning his activities on the days in question. While defendant’s alibi evidence was not unassailable, this evidence was not without probative force.
This was not a racially motivated trial. On the contrary, it was a trial in which two women who were brutally attacked, terrorized and raped sought relief through the criminal justice system. However, the injection of the complained of evidence which the majority agrees was erroneously admitted, invited the jury, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to reach a verdict based upon this contamination.
It seems clear that from all of the probative evidence of record that there was a serious and legitimate question as to identity, and I believe that the totality of the circumstances establishes a reasonable possibility that the complained of evidence induced the jury to substitute emotional and racial prejudices in reaching a verdict and contributed to defendant’s conviction. I would therefore vote for a new trial.