OPINION
MATTHEWS, Chief Justice.I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Robert Brown was employed by the State of Alaska as First Mate on the Alaska Department of Public Safety patrol vessel VIGILANT, a 100-foot sea-going vessel. On June 18, 1985, while the VIGILANT was on patrol in Bristol Bay, Brown was injured as he boarded a fishing vessel to inspect it for a suspected violation of state fisheries laws.
After first accepting workers’ compensation benefits under the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act, AS 23.30.005-.270, Brown filed suit against the state, among others, in the superior court. Brown alleged that the state was liable to him under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688, for negligence of the master of the VIGILANT, and under the admiralty doctrines of unseaworthiness, maintenance, and cure. The state moved for summary judgment on grounds of sovereign immunity and the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, AS 23.30.055. The trial court denied the motion. We granted the state’s petition for review.
II. DISCUSSION
The trial court summarized its reasons in an order denying the state’s motion for reconsideration as follows:
After statehood, the tort claims act was passed. It expanded the waiver of sovereign immunity to cover all tort claims, specifically mentioning admiralty. No limiting language referring to the workers’ compensation statute was included in the tort claims act.
It is this court’s view, thus, that once the tort claims act was passed, there was no intention to retain sovereign immunity vis-a-vis negligence claims against the state. The workers’ compensation law is construed as simply a limitation regarding all employee-employer relations. It has nothing to do with limiting the waiver of sovereign immunity. In the case of admiralty law, workers’ compensation principles are superseded by federal law for all employees, state workers constituting no exception.
The same rationale was expressed in an opinion issued by former Attorney General Hayes more than 25 years ago. 1963 Formal Op. Att’y Gen. 28. In addressing the question of whether workers employed by the state on state ferries could sue the state under the Jones Act, the opinion stated:
[T]he only question remaining is whether the State of Alaska has waived its sovereign immunity. If it has, the Jones Act is supreme; if it has not, the State cannot be sued under the Jones Act and the only remedy available to State *110employees is the State workmen’s compensation act.
Id. at 11. The opinion next quoted the Claims Against the State Act, AS 09.50.-250, and continued:
By this waiver of immunity it must be concluded that the State may be sued for negligent torts which arise under the Jones Act. It is true that under the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act, employers, including the State (AS 23.-30.265), are excluded from admiralty liability.
Id. at 12. The opinion then quoted the exclusive remedy provision of AS 23.30.055, and stated:
However, this exclusive liability provision cannot act as a limitation on suits against the State under the Federal Maritime law once the State has unqualifiedly waived its immunity for negligent torts.... A state cannot protect private citizens from suit for a maritime tort by limiting the exclusive Federal admiralty jurisdiction as delegated by Article III, Section 2, of the United States Constitution. By waiving its immunity, the state stands in the position of a private party and cannot limit its tort liability by a general provision in the workmen’s compensation act. So much of AS 23.30.055 as limits the liability of employers in admiralty must be considered an invalid infringement on the Federal jurisdiction.
If it is the desire of the State to limit its tort liability to the workmen’s compensation act, it may do so by legislative enactment of an exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity section contained in AS 09.50.250.
Id. at 13. We agree with this reasoning. Our explanation follows.
Alaska Statute 09.50.250 provides that “[a] person ... having a ... tort claim against the state may bring an action against the state in the superior court.” This statute waives the sovereign immunity of the state as to claims brought in superi- or court for torts sounding in admiralty, as well as those based on state law. State v. Stanley, 506 P.2d 1284, 1290-1291 and n. 9 (Alaska 1973). Subject to certain explicit exceptions, the intent of this statute was to put the state on an equal footing with private persons or entities who are sued in tort. See State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712, 724 (Alaska 1972).
The Workers’ Compensation Act, to which the state is subject to the same extent as private employers, provides in part that “[t]he liability of an employer [under the Workers’ Compensation Act] is exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer ... and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages ... at law or in admiralty on account of the injury or death.” AS 23.30.055. This provision would bar any suit by Brown for damages under state law. However, the present case is brought under federal maritime law.
The exclusive remedy provision cannot deprive Brown of his federal maritime remedy. In Barber v. New England Fish Co., 510 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1973), a longshoreman was injured while aboard a barge owned by his employer. Although he had already collected benefits under the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act, we held that the exclusive remedy provision of the act did not preclude him from seeking a further recovery against his employer under federal maritime law for unseaworthiness.1 Similarly, in Thibodaux v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 580 F.2d 841, 847 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909, 99 S.Ct. 2820, 61 L.Ed.2d 274 (1979), the court held that “an exclusive remedy provision in a state workmen’s compensation law cannot be applied when it will conflict with maritime policy and undermine substantive rights afforded by federal maritime law.” Accord Purnell v. Norned Shipping B.V., 801 F.2d 152, 156 (3rd Cir.1986). In Thibodaux, the court reversed summary judgment in favor of Atlantic Richfield and remanded the case to allow plaintiffs to pursue their general maritime claims against the latter for wrongful death. 580 F.2d at 847-48. The *111court noted that it had been presented with an analogous question in Roberts v. City of Plantation, 558 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.1977). Thibodaux, 580 F.2d at 846. In Roberts, the court held that the exclusive remedy provisions of Florida’s workmen’s compensation act were not a defense to a Jones Act claim. 558 F.2d at 751.
The Thibodaux court found support in the Supreme Court’s decision in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 74 S.Ct. 202, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953). There, the court refused to apply a state contributory negligence defense which would have barred recovery for a general maritime cause of action. The court stated that “[wjhile states may sometimes supplement federal maritime policies, a state may not deprive a person of any substantial admiralty rights as defined in controlling acts of Congress or by interpretative decisions of this Court.” Id. at 409-10, 74 S.Ct. at 205 (footnote omitted). To hold otherwise would undermine the uniformity of maritime law “which the [Federal] Constitution has placed under national purview to control in ‘its substantial as well as procedural features.’ ” Id. at 409, 74 S.Ct. at 205 (quoting Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386, 44 S.Ct. 391, 393, 68 L.Ed. 748 (1924)). These precedents compel the conclusion that the exclusive remedy provisions of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act cannot deprive Brown of his federal Jones Act claim against the state.
The state relies on Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427, 72 S.Ct. 849, 96 L.Ed. 1051 (1952), in support of its argument that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act applies. Jo-hansen involved an injury to a seaman-federal employee who sued the government for damages for negligence under the Public Vessels Act of 1925, 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-799. The court held that this remedy was barred by the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act of 1916, which provided a workers’ compensation remedy to federal employees. Id. at 441, 72 S.Ct. at 857. The Johansen case presented a conflict between two federal remedies. It is thus unlike the state-federal problem which is present here.
The state also relies on three state cases: Lyons v. Texas A & M University, 545 S.W.2d 56 (Tex.Civ.App.1977); Gross v. Washington State Ferries, 59 Wash.2d 241, 367 P.2d 600 (1961); Maloney v. State, 3 N.Y.2d 356, 165 N.Y.S.2d 465, 144 N.E.2d 364 (1957). In these cases the sovereign immunity waiver was expressly conditioned on preserving the defense in question. Lyons involved an act waiving sovereign immunity which, as an integral part of the waiver, reserved to the state “all of the privileges and immunities granted by the Workmen’s Compensation Act ... to private persons and corporations.” 545 S.W.2d at 58. In Maloney, the act waiving sovereign immunity was “careful to provide that, in waiving immunity, the exclusiveness of the compensation remedy against the State is not impaired.” 144 N.E.2d at 367. The sovereign immunity waiver in Gross was expressly conditioned by a 30-day notice of claim proviso. 367 P.2d at 605. By contrast, the waiver of immunity contained in the Alaska Claims Against the State Act is not conditioned on preserving the defense in question here— the exclusive remedy provision. These cases teach that the legislature could make the exclusive remedy defense applicable to federal maritime claims by referring to the defense in the sovereign immunity waiver contained in the Claims Act. However, the legislature has not chosen to do so.
Merely because the exclusive remedy defense is not a condition of the waiver of the sovereign immunity of the state does not mean that the Claims Against the State Act has repealed the exclusive remedy defense. The defense is fully applicable to all claims against the state brought under state law. However, the defense does not apply to federal remedies, and thus the decision of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
COMPTON, J., dissents.
MOORE, J., not participating.. We noted in Barber that double recovery would not be permitted as the amounts paid under the compensation award would be subject to offset should the employee win his federal maritime case. Id. at 813, n. 39. This observation also governs the present case.