concurring specially.
While I concur in the result, I write to clarify the state of the law with regard to Division 3 of the majority opinion. This court previously has applied OCGA § 17-8-25 and its companion sections governing continuances to judicial proceedings other than trials. See, e.g., Hayes v. State, 214 Ga. App. 893, 894 (449 SE2d 360) (1994) (OCGA § 17-8-22, sentencing hearing); Riggins v. State, 206 Ga. App. 239, 241 (2) (424 SE2d 879) (1992) (OCGA § 17-8-25, probation revocation hearing).
Nevertheless, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a continuance. “ ‘It was pointed out in Hobbs v. State, 8 Ga. App. 53, 54 (68 SE 515) that continuances in criminal cases are not governed by the strict rules of civil cases and that the motion should be granted “whenever the principles of justice appear to demand a postponement.” . . . [Cits.]’ ” Gallimore v. State, 166 Ga. App. 601 (305 SE2d 164) (1983). We have previously held that the absence of a material witness for the state is a reasonable showing in support of a continuance within the meaning of OCGA § 17-8-21, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the state’s motion. Minicucci v. State, 214 Ga. App. 468, 469 (2) (448 SE2d 34) (1994). I therefore concur in the result in Division 3 of the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pope joins in this special concurrence.