concurring specially.
Although I concur with the majority opinion, I am compelled nevertheless to write separately in order to make clear to the bench and bar that the cases cited by the dissent, Pittman v. State, 178 Ga. App. 693 (4) (344 SE2d 511) (1986) and Anglin v. State, 173 Ga. App. 648 (6) (327 SE2d 776) (1985) do not concern the giving of notice pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rules 31.1 and 31.3. Consequently, those cases in no way support the proposition that the notice requirement can be obviated simply by showing the purpose for which the similar transaction or incident is being introduced. Therefore, I agree with the majority that the judgment must be reversed due to the State’s failure to give the required notice in this case.
I am authorized to state that Judge Beasley joins in this special concurrence.