(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the majority decision on the third issue with respect to the IRS deductions for the children, but I must dissent from the disposition of the first two issues reversing the finding of contempt.
The majority opinion correctly notes the distinction between criminal and civil contempt proceedings. There is no question but what the proceeding below was for civil contempt, nor do I believe that the trial court acted under anything but civil contempt procedures. The trial court did not incarcerate, nor threaten to incarcerate, Thomas in retribution for his past failures to make child support payments and that appears to be the beam in the eye of the majority.
In adhering to all of the bright-line decisions on the contempt process, we must be mindful that “[t]he purpose of contempt proceedings is to uphold the power of the court, and also to secure to suitors therein the rights by it awarded.” Simmons v. Simmons, 66 S.D. 76, 78, 278 N.W. 537, 538 (1938). A reading of the Iowa cases cited by the majority discloses a slight mistake in the summary of their essence. Rather than noting that compliance with a court’s order prior to contempt proceedings is regarded as sufficient purging, as the majority opinion states, Nystrom v. District Court,1 as reiterated in McDonald v. McDonald,2 states:
It seems to be the general rule that prompt compliance after institution of contempt proceedings with the court order or decree alleged to have been disobeyed will usually be regarded as a sufficient purging, ‘especially when no material injury or loss has been suffered by the party for whose benefit the action was taken.’ (Emphasis added.)
Thus, we should note that the rule is not black or white as the majority would hold. Rather, it implies that there may be cases that do not fall into the “usual” category.
The majority cites to Karras v. Gannon, 345 N.W.2d 854 (S.D.1984), a case that I find particularly inappropriate. In Karras, the issue appeared to be whether a tenant could be held in contempt for failure to comply with an oral order to give adequate notice to his landlord of the commencement of harvesting a crop on the landlord’s land. The decision found the distinction between the civil and the criminal aspects to be “blurred” but ultimately reversed the finding of contempt because the order relied on was oral, never reduced to writing, signed, attested, filed and served on the tenant. Aside from the distinction in the basis for the decisions, I would point out that the so-called “order” in Karras was a one-time direction, an example of the “usual” case.
In a similar vein, the Minnesota case cited in the majority decision is a one-shot order, exemplary of the “usual” situation. In Cozik v. Cozik,3 the decision examined a contempt citation for failure to make payments of alimony and child support pen-dente lite. However, the hearing was not *654held until after the decree of divorce was entered. There, when the delinquent husband and father paid up the defalcation before the hearing, there was, indeed, nothing to coerce.
The order in the case before the trial court below, incorporated in the decree of divorce and as amended, was a continuing order. It required continuing monthly payments of child support until the children attained majority. It also apparently resulted in a continuing failure on the part of Thomas to make timely payments. At least the record reflects that he had failed to make timely payments on several prior occasions. On one occasion, Constance had to apply to the State for ADC. The appeal before us results from the third proceedings by which Thomas has been called into court under threat of contempt for his failure to make payments in compliance with the divorce decree. Thus, I find this case distinguishable from Karras and Cozik.
In this case, the trial court in issuing the order to show cause was trying to coerce Thomas to make the payments that were overdue, and into henceforth insuring timely payments by requiring that he execute a wage assignment. Thomas, by paying at the last minute so that he could waltz into court and wave the receipt under the judge’s nose claiming to have purged himself, may be correct as to the money-due aspect of the order, but that has nothing to do with the failure to be timely in the payments. That is what the trial court was getting at and I think very properly held Thomas in contempt for his failure to pay in a timely fashion, which gave him an opportunity to relieve himself by acting according to a condition in the contempt order, to-wit: execute a wage assignment. All Thomas had to do was sign the wage assignment and he could walk. Contrary to the statement in the majority decision, there was something to coerce besides the overdue child support payments.
I think that it is absolutely essential that we give our trial courts the tools with which to support their orders. This case appears to be the typical case where the parent decides that he is going to meet his other obligations before he meets his support obligations. Thomas complains that the trial court failed to properly consider his other obligations. But, as we have previously held, where the defense is inability to pay, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish his inability to comply. Self-serving testimony alone is insufficient and corroboration is necessary to establish the defense. Rousseau v. Gesinger, 330 N.W.2d 522 (S.D.1983). From my review of the record, I find such showing to be utterly lacking.
Lastly, on the issue of attorney’s fees, I agree with the majority disposition although, because I would affirm the trial court on all issues, I have less difficulty in awarding the fees. Examination of the record discloses a letter from Constance pleading with the trial court to stop this appeal because she cannot afford the attorney fees. This is pertinent proof of the injury done to Constance by Thomas’ game playing with support payments and the crying need to protect the children by insuring that the delinquent party pays the fees and costs incurred.
In Brunick v. Brunick, 405 N.W.2d 633 (S.D.1987), citing Blare v. Blare, 302 N.W.2d 787 (S.D.1981), we determined that a trial court’s jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding continues to encompass actions to modify the judgment concerning support and maintenance of the children. Divorce actions are exempt from the prohibition against attorney fees absent an express statutory authorization. SDCL 15-17-7. Therefore, I would maintain that any time a trial court finds that a parent who is delinquent in support payments and otherwise satisfies the four elements warranting a finding of contempt,4 but who escapes the adjudication of contempt because he or she has come in and paid up, that trial court can, in its judicial discretion, award attorney fees and costs to the ex-spouse who *655had to start the contempt proceedings in order to wring out the payments required by the decree or order.
. 244 Iowa 735, 739, 58 N.W.2d 40, 42 (1953).
. 170 N.W.2d 246, 247-48 (Iowa 1969).
.279 Minn. 91, 155 N.W.2d 471 (1968).
. "(1) the existence of an order; (2) knowledge of the order; (3) ability to comply with the order; and (4) willful or contumacious disobedience of the order.” Thomerson v. Thomerson, 387 N.W.2d 509, 512-13 (S.D.1986).