Bryan Lankford was convicted by a jury of two counts of first degree murder for the killings of Robert and Cheryl Bravence. Following the trial, the district court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced the defendant to death. Lankford appeals this conviction and sentence and the district court’s denial of his petition for post conviction relief before the same court, which was denied after a hearing. The appeals have been consolidated pursuant to I.C. § 19-2719. This matter is additionally before the Court under the statutory provisions of I.C. § 19-2827 which provides for automatic review of death sentences.
Evidence at trial disclosed that in June, 1983, Lankford was living in Texas on probation for a robbery conviction. Lankford was arrested for a DUI violation. Fearing that this violation of his probation would lead to his imprisonment, he fled the state with his older brother, Mark Lankford, in the latter’s car. The pair eventually made their way to Idaho County, where they camped in the forest near Grangeville. They concluded that, because the monthly payments on Mark Lankford’s car were delinquent, the police would be searching for it and that they needed to abandon the car to avoid capture. They left the car in the woods covered with brush and set off to steal another car.
The brothers came upon the Bravences’ campsite and decided to take the Bravences’ van. Bryan Lankford walked into the camp armed with a shotgun and engaged the Bravences in conversation. Subsequently, Mrs. Bravence left the group and went to a nearby creek. At this point, Mark Lankford ran into the campsite and ordered Robert Bravence to kneel down on the ground. While kneeling, Mark then hit Robert Bravence over the head with a nightstick. Cheryl Bravence then came up from the creek, and Mark told her to kneel down on the ground and then hit her over the head with the same nightstick. The Bravences were beaten with such force that their skulls had to be reconstructed by an anthropologist before the cause of death could be scientifically determined.
The brothers loaded the bodies into the van and headed back into the forest. The bodies were removed from the van and concealed under branches and other debris a short distance from where the Lankfords had abandoned their car. Lankford and his brother then took the van and traveled through Oregon and California before abandoning it in Los Angeles. During their flight from the murder scene they purchased accommodations and food with the Bravences’ credit card.
After abandoning the van, the brothers returned to Texas where they stayed several weeks with Ray Ralmuto, a friend of *692Lankford’s. Fearing that the authorities were closing in on them, they fled into a remote and inaccessible area of the state where they were ultimately discovered and captured. Among the items found with the Lankfords was a knife which had belonged to Mr. Bravence.
Although the Bravences’ bodies were not found until late September, they had been reported missing and, upon discovering the van, the Los Angeles Police Department conducted a forensic examination of the vehicle. The examination turned up numerous incriminating items, including the Lankfords’ fingerprints. The Los Angeles police then turned the investigation over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
After his arrest Lankford made numerous confessions regarding the killings, none of which were challenged on direct appeal.1 These statements included two statements made to Texas law enforcement officers, several statements and a written confession to an FBI agent and, after an aborted suicide attempt, Lankford made another statement to an Idaho County deputy sheriff. After Lankford was extradited to Idaho, he was charged with two counts of first degree murder. An attorney was appointed to represent Lankford.
The trial was held in March, 1984. In the process of jury selection, in accord with a stipulation by the parties, the trial court separated from the venire all persons who had heard a significant amount of information about the case in order that the jury could be selected from people who had heard little of the case. Voir dire then took place as to the remaining jurors. No significant difficulty was experienced in selecting the jury.
Lankford’s defense theory was that he was only an accessory after the fact. Lankford testified in his own behalf and stated that he was dominated by his older brother who was a violent and dangerous person. He testified that he thought his brother would merely knock out the Bravences, and he had not pointed the shotgun at them upon entering the camp. He also testified that after the murders he was hysterical and remained in the van while his brother hid the bodies in the woods. The jury nevertheless found Lankford guilty of two counts of first degree murder.
Subsequent to conviction and sentencing, Lankford filed a petition seeking post conviction relief and moved to disqualify the district judge from presiding at the post conviction relief hearing on the basis of prejudice. The motion was denied. At the post conviction hearing, Lankford argued that his trial counsel had been ineffective for a number of reasons, including his failure to demand that Lankford be subject to a psychological and physical evaluation. The defendant further argued that the trial court had erred in failing to require trial counsel to be forced to submit to an alcohol evaluation. After a hearing, the court denied post conviction relief.
On appeal to this Court, Lankford raises twenty-two issues. Eight of these issues arose from the trial proceedings; nine of the issues questioned the sentencing procedure; two issues dealt with the post conviction relief proceeding; and three issues relate to this Court’s statutorily required automatic review of a death sentence. While this Court has reviewed all twenty-two issues, we have found that some were not raised below and thus were not preserved for appeal. Several issues are closely related, and we have consolidated them. For the reasons set out below, we affirm the judgments and sentences.
I
Direct Appeal Issues
At the outset we note that the defendant appealing from a criminal conviction bears the burden of demonstrating error in the lower court. State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318, 563 P.2d 42 (1977). Furthermore, error will not be presumed on appeal but must be affirmatively shown by the appellant, and with limited exceptions error at trial must be properly objected to and pre*693served to merit review. State v. Thomas, 94 Idaho 430, 489 P.2d 1310 (1971).2 Keeping in mind the standards of review set by our prior case law, we now turn to the issues.
A.
Lankford argues that the trial court failed to question jurors regarding the adverse effect of pretrial publicity, and therefore he was denied his constitutional right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury. Lankford acknowledges that no objection was raised below as to the voir dire process, and therefore the issue is not properly preserved for appeal, absent fundamental error. State v. White, supra. However, Lankford argues nevertheless that the failure to question jurors regarding pretrial publicity amounted to fundamental error.
The trial court initially questioned jurors regarding pretrial publicity and, based upon a procedure agreed on in advance by counsel, then eliminated all those who felt that they could not fairly try the case.3 Thereafter, the trial court conducted a limited voir dire examination and the balance of the voir dire process was conducted by counsel. Lankford has not established any error, much less fundamental error, in the jury selection process. This Court has ruled that great latitude is to be allowed in examination of veniremen upon voir dire. See State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 518 P.2d 969 (1974); State v. Bitz, 93 Idaho 239, 460 P.2d 374 (1969). The voir dire procedure was established by stipulation of counsel, and there is no indication of any abuse of discretion by the trial court in the manner in which he exercised the voir dire examination. Accordingly, the claimed error is without merit.
B.
Next, Lankford asserts that it was a “fundamental error” and a violation of due process for the trial court to allow uniformed sheriff's deputies to sit in the courtroom with him. We disagree. The fact that Lankford was guarded while present at the trial fails to raise the question of fundamental constitutional error. The record demonstrates that Lankford did not appear in prison garb, State v. Crawford, 99 Idaho 87, 577 P.2d 1135 (1978); rather, at trial he appeared in a three-piece suit. A sheriff’s officer sat behind him. In Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986), the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the presence of four uniformed and armed officers was so inherently prejudicial that the defendant was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial. Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall found that unlike cases which involved a criminal defendant being brought to trial in prison garb the presence of the uniformed troop*694ers did not prejudice the defendant. Justice Marshall stated:
“We do not minimize the threat that a roomful of uniformed and armed policemen might pose to a defendant’s chances of receiving a fair trial. (Citations omitted.) But we simply cannot find an unacceptable risk of prejudice in the spectacle of four such officers quietly sitting in the first row of the courtroom’s spectator section. (Footnote omitted.) Even had the jurors been aware that the deployment of the troopers was not common practice in Rhode Island, we cannot believe that the use of the four troopers tended to brand the respondent in their eyes ‘with an unmistakable mark of guilt.’ ” Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 1347, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986) (citations omitted).
No error resulted from the fact that Lank-ford was guarded by law enforcement officers during his trial.
C.
Lankford next makes a broad based and comprehensive attack on the instructions which were presented to the jury. Lank-ford claims that the jury instructions as a whole misstated the law and were so misleading and confusing that the defendant was denied his right to a fair trial. In addition to claiming the instructions as a whole are erroneous, Lankford also attacks numerous individual instructions. Many of the errors claimed in the instructions were not addressed by objections during the trial and have not been properly preserved for this appeal. Absent a timely objection to the jury instructions, Lankford’s assignments of error with respect thereto are not entitled to consideration on appeal. State v. Watson, 99 Idaho 694, 587 P.2d 835 (1978).
Where the jury instructions, taken as a whole, correctly state the law and are not inconsistent, but may be reasonably and fairly harmonized, it will be assumed that the jury gave due consideration to the whole charge and was not misled by any isolated portion thereof. State v. Tope, 86 Idaho 462, 387 P.2d 888 (1963). After reviewing the record we find that the instructions, either individually or as a whole, were not in error. We will deal specifically with two of Lankford’s claims of error.
First, Lankford argues that the district court erred when it refused defendant’s Proposed Jury Instruction Number 44 that asked the jury to render a special verdict on the defendant’s intent. The crux of Lankford’s claim is that under the United States Constitution a defendant cannot be sentenced to death for felony murder without a finding of an intent to kill. However, in Idaho it is the judge and not the jury who makes the determination of whether the death sentence will be imposed. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it refused Lankford’s Proposed Instruction No. 4 which attempted to impermissibly shift the trial court’s duty to find an intent to kill to the jury.
Lankford also argues that Instruction No. 175 was improper because it in*695structed the jury that “malice is implied when the killing results from an act involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death____” Lankford argues that the instruction relieved the state of proving intent and since the state must prove each essential element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt the jury instruction was erroneous and in effect diminished the state’s burden of proof. We disagree. Contrary to Lankford’s assertion, the instruction does not state that killing in perpetration of a robbery is malice per se. The instruction does advise the jury that malice can be implied in some situations. The United States Supreme Court has stated that:
“In many cases, the predicate facts conclusively establish intent, so that no rational jury could find that the defendant committed the relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause injury. [Citation omitted.] ____
“No one doubts that the trial court could properly have instructed the jury that it could infer malice from respondent’s conduct. [Citation omitted.] Indeed, in the many cases where there is no direct evidence of intent, that is exactly how intent is established. For purposes of deciding this case, it is enough to recognize that in some cases that inference is overpowering. [Citation omitted.]” Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986). (Emphasis in original.)
Murder committed during the course of a robbery is, by definition, murder in the first degree. I.C. § 18-4003. Proof that the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery merely is a substitute for specific proof of premeditation on the theory that one who prepares for a robbery by making arrangements to use deadly force is guilty of acts as culpable as, and probably comprising, premeditation. See 40 Am. Jur.2d § 72, Felony-murder Generally.
D.
Next, Lankford attacks the constitutionality of I.C. § 18—4003(d)—felony murder,6 arguing that under Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), and its progeny the statute violates the 8th amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the 14th amendment guarantee of due process by punishing conduct without requiring proof of a mental state. Lank-ford’s argument has been considered by this Court at length in State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 716 P.2d 1182 (1985), and State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho 117, 676 P.2d 31 (1984), and we have found the statute to be constitutional and in compliance with Enmund.
II
Sentencing Issues
Imposition of a sentence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed by a reviewing court in the absence of an abuse of that discretion, and a sentence that is within prescribed limits of the sentencing statute will not ordinarily be considered an abuse of discretion. State v. Butler, 95 Idaho 899, 523 P.2d 31 (1974). After reviewing the record, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Lank-ford and that there were no significant errors in the sentencing procedure.
A.
After Lankford was convicted of two counts of felony murder, but before sentencing, the state entered into an immunity agreement with him under I.C. § 19-1114 in order to obtain his testimony against his brother. Lankford contends that this grant of immunity (which was after the verdict but prior to his sentencing) deprived the district court of the authority to sentence the defendant. We conclude that the district court did not err when it found that the immunity agreement (Defendant’s Exhibit # 1) between *696the state and Lankford did not immunize Lankford from sentencing for the crimes for which he had already been convicted when the agreement was entered into.
I.C. § 19-1114 states in part that, “If ... the person would have been privileged to withhold the answer given ... that person shall not be prosecuted or subject to penalty ... on account of any fact or act concerning which ... he answered.” (Emphasis added.) By its clear wording, the statute does not apply in this case. None of the testimony given by Lankford pursuant to the immunity agreement was used to prosecute or to punish Lankford.7 Instead of providing retroactive protection, the immunity agreement was prospective in effect and protected Lankford from any other charges that might have been brought pursuant to his use of the Bravences’ property.
B.
Next Lankford argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion for a continuance of the sentencing hearing. The relevant facts show that Lank-ford made a motion to have co-counsel appointed. The motion was granted and additional counsel was appointed; however, the district court warned Lankford and the newly appointed counsel that granting the motion would not automatically lead the court to grant a motion for continuance. On October 10, 1984, the new co-counsel moved to discharge the trial counsel; this motion was also granted and the district court once again warned Lankford that granting the motion would not automatically lead to a continuance.
“A decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Ward, 98 Idaho 571, 574, 569 P.2d 916, 919 (1977). Absent a showing that the appellant has shown that his substantial rights have been prejudiced, or that the district court abused its discretion, we will not reverse a denial of a motion for continuance. See State v. Laws, 94 Idaho 200, 485 P.2d 144 (1971).
The motion for a continuance was not arbitrarily denied. The record demonstrates that the district court made extensive findings into the information available to Lankford’s attorney for sentencing purposes. Lankford’s new attorney had adequate information and called numerous witnesses at the sentencing hearing. There was no showing that important witnesses were unavailable due to the denial of the motion. The state was prepared for the scheduled hearing, brought in witnesses, and incurred significant expenses, while no prejudice to Lankford was shown. In State v. Brown, 98 Idaho 209, 212, 560 P.2d 880, 883 (1977), we stated that “a defendant may not indefinitely postpone trial or sentencing by continually changing counsel....”
C.
Lankford contends that the district court erred in imposing the death penalty where the prosecution offered no evi*697dence in support of the statutory aggravating circumstances set forth in I.C. § 19-2515. At sentencing, the prosecutor did not seek the death penalty, and therefore he did not offer any additional evidence at the sentencing hearing. It is Lankford’s contention that the evidence produced at trial was not available to the judge for purpose of sentencing, and therefore the district court had no evidence with which to find the statutorily required aggravating circumstances. However, I.C. § 19-2515(c) expressly provides, “Evidence admitted at trial shall be considered and need not be repeated at the sentencing hearing.” The evidence that was used at the sentencing hearing by the trial court judge amply supported the trial court’s conclusion. The trial court is entrusted with the responsibility for sentencing in Idaho, I.C. § 19-2515(c), (d), (e); State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983), cert. den., 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1327, 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984), and therefore the district court was not bound by the recommendations of the prosecuting attorney. In State v. Kohoutek, 101 Idaho 698, 619 P.2d 1151 (1980), we held that there was no abuse of a district court’s discretion when it proposed a sentence different from that recommended by the prosecuting attorney. The district court had sufficient evidence before it and did not abuse its discretionary authority to sentence the defendant.
D.
Next, Lankford contends that the district court erred when it failed to notify the defendant of the possibility of the imposition of the death penalty. After the verdict was rendered, and in preparation for sentencing, the district court ordered the prosecution to give written notice on whether it would seek the death penalty. The prosecution responded that it would not. Lankford argues that the prosecution’s written notice negated the statutory notice that he might be sentenced to death. We disagree.
The record reflects that at his arraignment the district court expressly advised Lankford that the death penalty was a possible sentence for the crimes he was charged with. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has pointed out that the “existence [of a death penalty statute] on the statute books provides fair warning as to the degree of culpability which the state ascribed to the act of murder.” Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 298, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2300, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977). Lank-ford has not cited us to any authority which supports his position that he was entitled to greater notice than that given by the statutes and by the district court.
E.
Next, Lankford attacks the constitutionality of Idaho’s capital punishment procedure, arguing generally that I.C. § 19-2515 violates the eighth amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and the sixth amendment’s right to a trial by jury because the statute does not require jury participation in the sentencing procedure. Furthermore, Lankford contends that I.C. § 19-2515(d) is specifically unconstitutional under both Idaho and United States Constitutions because it does not require the district court to limit the testimony at the sentencing hearing to live testimony. Lankford argues that it is essential that a defendant be allowed to cross examine and rebut adverse sentencing evidence because of the possibility that the trial court is prejudiced and that the Idaho statute allows rampant use of hearsay and other inadmissible information.
The issue of jury participation has been resolved in Idaho in State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983), and State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981), and approved under the United States Constitution in McMillan et al. v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986). The issues of hearsay testimony and defendant’s right to cross examine or confront adverse testimony has likewise been resolved against appellant’s position. See State v. Osborn, supra.
F.
Next, Lankford argues that the district court’s failure to consider in writ*698ing two mitigating factors which were produced at the sentencing hearing was error that requires remanding for sentencing. The two mitigating factors which Lankford complains were not considered in writing by the district court are (1) that the prosecution recommended a sentence less than the death penalty, and (2) that the defendant had taken and substantially passed two polygraph tests that had been requested by the state. Lankford asserts that the sentencing statute, I.C. § 19-2515, has been given a broad interpretation by the courts with the intent of ensuring that a thorough and reasoned analysis of all relevant factors take place.
The record demonstrates that the district court described the mitigating factors that it considered in sentencing Lankford. Those mitigating factors included all of the factual evidence presented in mitigation by the defendant and the arguments made in connection with them. It is clear from the record that the district court judge complied with the requirements of I.C. § 19-2515.
Ill
Post Conviction Relief Issues
After sentencing and conviction, Lank-ford brought an action for post conviction relief in the district court. After an extended hearing, the district court made findings denying this petition. A denial of post conviction relief will not be disturbed on appeal where there is substantial competent evidence supporting the denial. State v. Hinkley, 93 Idaho 872, 477 P.2d 495 (1970). After reviewing the record of the post conviction relief proceeding we find that there was substantial and competent evidence to support the district court’s findings.
A.
Lankford first argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Lankford raises twelve areas where it is claimed his trial attorney failed to provide effective assistance. Lankford argues that his trial attorney failed to: (1) file a motion for change of venue; (2) adequately prepare for and conduct the voir dire which would allow the selection of a fair and impartial jury; (3) fully investigate and prepare the factual and legal basis for the defendant’s case; (4) file motions to suppress constitutionally infirm statements taken of the defendant; (5) file a motion for psychiatric or psychological evaluation; (6) file a request for discovery; (7) research and raise viable defenses; (8) object to the defendant being compelled to go to trial under heavy guard; (9) request a limiting instruction on the use of prior inconsistent statements; (10) object to irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial evidence; (11) request a limiting instruction on impeachment by prior felony conviction; (12) object to erroneous instructions. Lankford concludes that these errors and omissions of the trial counsel require a reversal of the defendant’s convictions. However, we conclude that the record does not support the allegations.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be presumed by an appellate court. State v. Elisondo, 97 Idaho 425, 546 P.2d 380 (1976). We have examined an extensive record in which the parties explored in detail the basis for Lank-ford’s allegations through witnesses and affidavits and through direct and cross examination. A review of this record clearly establishes that Lankford was not deprived of the right to effective assistance of counsel. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the test to be applied to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that the trial court cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Also see Burger v. Kemp, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987). This issue has been extensively litigated in Idaho. In Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 725 P.2d 135 (1986), we summarized the existing law as follows:
“This Court has also addressed the question of what constitutes effective assistance of counsel. In short, a defendant is *699entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney. State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 8, 539 P.2d 556, 560 (1975). Accord Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. ‘A showing that defendant was denied the reasonably competent assistance of counsel is not sufficient by itself to sustain a reversal of the conviction. The defendant, in most cases, must make a showing that the conduct of counsel contributed to the conviction or the sentence imposed.’ State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho at 4, 539 P.2d at 564 (1975); see also State v. Tisdel, 101 Idaho 52, 54, 607 P.2d 1326, 1328 (1980). We have also repeatedly stated that we will not attempt to second-guess strategic and tactical choices made by trial counsel. State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231, 233, 628 P.2d 1065, 1067-68 (1981); State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho at 10, 539 P.2d at 562.
“These standards, articulated by both the United States Supreme Court and this Court, must be used to determine whether Estes received effective assistance of counsel. As the Supreme Court has stated, ‘A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.’ Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. The presumption in evaluating attorney effectiveness is that the attorney is competent and that his actions represent sound trial strategy. A defendant shoulders a difficult burden when he seeks to assert ineffective assistance of counsel.” Estes v. State, 111 Idaho at 434, 725 P.2d at 139 (footnote omitted).
At the post conviction relief hearing, Lankford’s trial counsel testified that the extensive physical evidence, Lankford’s numerous admissible confessions, and the verbal testimony which would be produced by the prosecution at trial was sufficient to convict Bryan Lankford of first degree murder. He stated that after evaluating this evidence he determined that Lank-ford’s best opportunity to avoid a first degree murder conviction was to defend on the theory that Lankford was an “accessory after the fact.” All of the charges against Lankford’s counsel are a direct result of the trial counsel’s strategic and tactical choices to defend Lankford on the “accessory after the fact” defense. Because it is not the function of a reviewing court to substitute its judgment or that of a substitute counsel for the strategic and tactical choices of the trial counsel, State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231, 233, 628 P.2d 1065, 1067-68, Lankford’s new counsel must do more than demonstrate that alternative strategies were available which might have been better. In sum, none of the numerous charges made by the defendant against his trial counsel demonstrate that (1) Lank-ford was denied the reasonably competent assistance of counsel, and (2) that the conduct of his trial counsel contributed to his conviction.
B.
Next, Lankford claims that the district court erred in denying defendant’s motion to disqualify the court for prejudice.8 Following conviction and sentencing, the defendant moved to disqualify for cause the trial judge from the post conviction relief proceeding pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(3)9 and I.C.R. 25(b).10 Lankford’s at*700torney filed the affidavit of prejudice and no counter affidavit was filed.11 The motion was denied. The parties later stipulated to facts which they believed the trial judge could testify to if called as a witness.12 The stipulation (which was not based on actual testimony) stated that the judge had knowledge that Lankford’s trial counsel had been arrested for DUI and that the judge had received a letter from the defendant requesting a new counsel based on allegations of alcohol abuse, and this letter led to the appointment of co-counsel. The stipulation was received into evidence and then defense counsel reargued its motion asserting that because of the stipulation the trial judge was now a material witness in the case and must be disqualified. This motion was also denied.
Lankford argues that the affidavit and the stipulation were legally sufficient to show prejudice and that the case should be remanded with directions that the trial judge disqualify himself and the matter reassigned. In Idaho a judge cannot be disqualified for actual prejudice unless it is shown that the prejudice is directed against the litigant and is of such a nature and character that it would make it impossible for the litigant to get a fair trial. State v. Waterman, 36 Idaho 259, 210 P. 208 (1922).
Lankford’s affidavit claimed bias on the following grounds: (a) that the district court judge presided in the trial that found Lankford guilty of two counts of first degree murder; (b) that the judge had previously ruled on motions for continuance, new trial, alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, and sentencing; (e) that by presiding in the above matters it would be unreasonably difficult for the judge to impartially determine questions of fact raised in the affiant’s petition for post conviction relief; (d) that in assessing the death penalty the judge made findings that Lankford is not a credible person; (e) that Lankford is a material witness in the post confiction relief action and because the judge has determined that he is not a credible witness he will not receive an unbiased determination of his credibility; (f) that Lankford had reason to believe that the district court judge may be a material witness to the factual allegations supporting the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; (g) that at the affiant’s sentencing hearing the district court judge elicited testimony to sup*701port the court’s findings of fact in a leading manner, and thereby showed his bias and prejudice against Lankford; (h) that the district court judge on his own motion caused testimony favorable to the affiant (results of polygraph examination which showed Lankford to be truthful on material facts) to be stricken and removed from the jury’s consideration; (i) that there is extreme community hostility and prejudice toward Lankford in Idaho County and that this community feeling makes it unreasonably difficult for the judge, who is a resident of the community and an elected official, to impartially hear the affiant’s petition; (j) that because the judge found the offenses of which Lankford was convicted to be heinous, atrocious, and exhibiting an utter disregard for human life he could not now determine the merits of Lankford’s petition in a neutral, detached, dispassionate and impartial manner; (k) because the issues raised in the petition for post conviction relief directly affect the judgment of the district court judge, it is impossible for the trial court to be impartial; (i) that the district court judge has attached an emotional commitment to the “correctness” of his initial determination and cannot render an impartial determination on the merits of Lankford’s position; and (m) that a trial court having presided at the trial and sentencing cannot reasonably be expected to determine matters raised relating to said conviction and sentence in an impartial manner.
Lankford’s allegations of bias do not show any actual prejudice on the part of the judge directed toward Lankford of such a nature and character that it would have made it impossible for Lankford to get a fair post conviction hearing. Many of the grounds listed above, stated separately or concurrently, do nothing more than state facts that simply explain the course of events involved in a criminal trial. The remaining grounds are mere allegations that, because the judge had made prior rulings adverse to Lankford, he was biased. Thus, we reject Lankford’s claim that the district court erred in denying his motion to disqualify the judge.
Finally, Lankford’s allegation that the district court judge had become a de facto material witness in the case and was therefore barred from participation in the case is without merit. The record demonstrates that the district court judge was not subpoenaed as a witness and did not testify in the proceedings. A criminal defendant cannot turn the district court judge into a material witness by introducing a stipulation of facts which the parties believe that the judge might testify to if he was in fact called as a witness. Thus, we reject Lank-ford’s claim that thé district court judge had become a material witness in the post conviction relief proceeding.
C.
Next, Lankford claims that the district court abused its discretion in the post conviction relief proceeding by denying two of Lankford’s motions. First, Lankford moved to have the court order complete psychological and physical examinations conducted on himself. The court denied the motion. Then Lankford made a motion to compel an alcohol evaluation of the trial counsel. The court denied this request also. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions. The testimony clearly indicates that Lankford’s trial counsel made the decision not to move for psychological and physical evaluation of the defendant based on the strategy of claiming that Lankford was not involved in the crime but was only an “accessory after the fact.” Such a tactical decision should not be reviewed in hindsight during post conviction relief. We find there was no abuse of discretion when the district court denied this motion.
Regarding the motion to compel an alcohol evaluation of Lankford’s trial counsel, there is no factual basis in the record for the court to order the alcohol evaluation. Lankford’s trial counsel testified that he had not consumed alcohol while working on the case, and nothing in the record refutes this testimony. There is no factual basis in the record for such an unusual demand, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion.
*702IV
Automatic Review
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2827, all death sentences come to this Court on automatic review. The automatic review statute requires the Supreme Court to “consider the punishment as well as any errors enumerated by way of appeal.” The statute requires this Court to undertake a three-part analysis to determine:
“(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and
“(2) Whether the evidence supports the judge’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance from among those enumerated in section 19-2515, Idaho Code, and
“(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” I.C. § 19-2827.
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.
Lankford argues that the death penalty was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice and other arbitrary factors. The basis for Lankford’s claim is his assertion that the community where the defendant was tried was outraged by the crime and that it is reasonable to believe that the district court was affected by the community’s mood and that this environment led to the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.
Contrary to Lankford’s assertions, there is nothing in the record that indicates that the sentence of death was due to the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factors. To the contrary, we find the trial was conducted in an error-free manner by a district court judge who sought every opportunity to provide Lank-ford with a fair trial. The jury instructions clearly informed the jury of the applicable law and the evidence presented at trial supports the jury’s finding of two counts of first degree murder. The district court, after studying the presentence report and conducting an involved sentencing hearing in which the defendant produced witnesses and information favorable to his cause, made findings both in mitigation and in aggravation. In addition, the Court found numerous statutory aggravating circumstances as delineated under I.C. § 19-2515(g).13 After laying the findings in mitigation and aggravation, the district court set forth extensive rationale for why the death penalty was imposed. This Court can find no error in the procedure followed by the district court in making its findings. (2) Whether the evidence supports the judge’s finding of a statutory aggravat*703ing circumstance from among those enumerated in Section 19-2515, Idaho Code.
Lankford argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the district court’s finding of the statutory aggravating factors. Lankford claims that the evidence also failed to show (1) that the murder and the circumstances surrounding its commission demonstrated an utter disregard for human life; (2) that the defendant acted calmly or in a calculated manner; (3) that the defendant has a propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society; (4) that the defendant’s acts were accompanied by a specific intent to kill.
After reviewing the complete record in this case, it is evident that the trial court’s finding of the aggravating circumstances listed above were clearly supported by the evidence produced. Lankford’s testimony clearly supports aggravating circumstances (1), (2) and (4).
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
Finally, we have conducted our proportionality review as required by I.C. § 19-2827. To complete this process, we have reviewed the sentence imposed and the sentences imposed in similar cases in an effort to assure that the sentence in this case was not excessively disproportionate.14 In making such a comparison, we have generally considered (1) the nature of and the motive for the crime committed; (2) the heinous nature of the crime; and (3) the nature and character of the defendant to determine whether the sentence was proportionate and just. After thoroughly examining the record and evaluating these factors, we find nothing that would indicate that the sentence of death imposed against Lankford was disproportionate or unjust.
*704In this case, Lankford was found guilty of a savage murder against two innocent campers who were selected because they owned a van which the defendant intended to steal. Lankford came into their camp wielding a shotgun which must have ultimately led to Mr. Bravence’s (who was a captain in the United States Marine Corps) subservient compliance with Lankford’s brother’s order to kneel on the ground where he was bludgeoned to death. Jurors could reasonably have inferred that Mr. Bravence complied with the demand to kneel on the ground because of the defendant’s menacing display of the shotgun. After Mr. Bravence was mortally wounded, Mrs. Bravence returned from the creek. She was ordered onto the ground and unmercifully killed by a blow to the head without a word of protest from Lankford. Although Lankford testified that he did not intend that the Bravences die, Lankford not only participated in the murders, but he did nothing to prevent his brother from bludgeoning Mrs. Bravence after he had witnessed the savage consequences of the nightstick attack on Mr. Bravence. The attack was brutal and one that could only have been intended to kill the victims because of the severity of the blows. The district court judge was entirely justified in finding from these facts that Lankford was a major participant in the killings and that he intended that the Bravences die.
The character and nature of Lankford leads to the conclusion that he was an extremely dangerous person. The fact that the murders were committed while Lankford was in violation of parole on a robbery charge in Texas, and was fleeing from the authorities, indicated to the sentencing court that he has little respect for the law or for fellow human beings, and the record substantiates this finding.
Our review of similar recent cases demonstrates that Lankford’s acts can be easily aligned with other Idaho cases in which the death penalty was imposed. In State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 54, 675 P.2d 33 (1983), and State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho 117, 676 P.2d 31 (1983), the nature of the crime and the character of the defendants were similar to this case. The murders in those cases were not only brutal, but the defendants had, like Lankford, prior criminal records. In State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396 (1983), defendant viciously murdered his female victim who was a former co-worker. Sivak, like Lankford, had a prior criminal record. In these and other recent cases the aggravating circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime far outweighed any mitigating circumstances.
In State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 690 P.2d 293 (1984), we stated:
“We acknowledge the trial court’s superior ability to observe witnesses and their demeanor during the sentencing phase of a trial, and especially the unique ability of the trial judge to observe the character and demeanor of the defendant, a tool essential to the ultimate goal of tailoring a sentence to a particular defendant. With that unique ability of the trial court in mind, we have determined that the sentence imposed in the present case is not out of proportion to the sentence heretofore imposed.” 107 Idaho at 369, 690 P.2d at 304.
We find that the trial court exercised this unique ability, understood the record in detail, and acted in accordance with Idaho statutory procedure to sentence the defendant to death.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed are affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DONALDSON and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.. At the post conviction relief hearing, Lankford claimed he had been denied effective assistance of counsel based on his trial attorney’s failure to challenge the admission of these confessions.
. The exception to the general rule is that this Court will review "fundamental error” on appeal even when no adequate objection has been interposed at trial. State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 551 P.2d 1344 (1976), cert. den. 429 U.S. 842, 97 S.Ct. 118, 50 L.Ed.2d 111 (1976).
"‘Error that is fundamental must be such error as goes to the foundation or basis of the defendant's rights or must go to the foundation of the case or take from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to prevent him to waive. Each case will of necessity, under such a rule, stand on its own merits. Out of facts in each case will arise the law.’ See also State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971).” Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469, 475, n. 13, 491 P.2d 733, 739, n. 13 (1971).
. At the beginning of the voir dire process, upon the request of both the state and Lankford’s attorneys, the district court judge requested all prospective jurors who "will not be in a position to serve as a result of bias, prejudice or undue influence or any other reason that they may be aware of” to raise their hands. Those veniremen who raised their hands were then sent to the back of the room, and the voir dire examination continued without calling those persons.
Although the procedures used by the district judge may not have been common practice, both counsel agreed in advance that the procedure was designed and reasonably calculated to assure a selection of an unbiased jury. Lank-ford’s attorney, the prosecutor and the district court judge were all residents of Idaho County and familiar with the pretrial publicity and the mood in the community. There is simply no error in using a voir dire procedure which both counsel agreed was designed to assure the selection of a fair and impartial jury.
. "DEFENDANT’S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 4
"Answer this question only if you find the defendant, Bryan Lankford, guilty of Murder in the first degree.
Do you find, beyond a reasonable doubt that Bryan Lankford himself killed, attempted to kill, or had any intent to kill either of the victims in this case?”
. "INSTRUCTION NO. 17
" ‘Malice’, as aforesaid, may be either express or implied. Malice is express when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being. Malice is implied when the killing results from an act involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death, which act is done for a base, antisocial purpose, and with a wanton disregard for human life by which is meant, an awareness of a duty imposed by law not to commit such acts followed by the commission of the forbidden act despite that awareness, or when the killing is a direct and casual result of the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a felony inherently dangerous to human life, specifically in this case robbery.
“The mental state constituting malice aforethought does not necessarily require any ill will or hatred of the person killed.
"‘Aforethought’ does not imply deliberation or the lapse of considerable time. It only means that the required mental state must precede rather than follow the act.”
. 18-4003. Degrees of murder.—...
"(d) Any murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping or mayhem is murder of the first degree.
. Lankford asserts that the district court judge used the immunized testimony in its findings of fact to support the imposition of the death penalty. However, the record does not support that assertion. While the district court described Lankford’s testimony at his brother’s motion for new trial in its sentencing memorandum, it was not considered as an aspect of any of the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the court. During the district court’s oral discussion of the sentence, the judge stated:
"The defendant has shown no remorse for his offenses. He has not cooperated with authorities after his arrest. He has told authorities that he and his brother had nothing whatsoever to do with the death of the Bravences. He has testified that his brother was alone involved in the murders. He has testified on October 10, 1984 in the companion case, State v. Mark Lankford, Idaho County Case No. 20158, that he called the Lewiston Tribune and claimed that it was he alone who murdered the Bravences. This he later denied and offered the explanation which is set forth in the addendum to the presentence investigation report under date of October 3, 1984, to the effect that it was simply part of a plan that would secure freedom for his brother, who could in turn free him.”
Although it is true that the district court judge pointed out the conflicting testimony given by Lankford at various times, including the testimony given pursuant to the immunity agreement, there has been no showing that the sentence was based upon the comments quoted above.
. The record demonstrates that Lankford's counsel made it clear that the motion to disqualify was for cause and was not brought under I.C.R. 25(a) permitting peremptory disqualification. (Tr., post conviction relief proceedings, p. 20.) We note that I.C.R. 25(a) is not available to a criminal defendant in a post conviction relief proceeding.
. "Rule 40(d)(3). Motion for disqualification.
—Any such disqualification for cause shall be made by a motion to disqualify accompanied by an affidavit of the party or his attorney stating distinctly the grounds upon which disqualification is based and the facts relied upon in support of the motion. Such motion for disqualification for cause must be made not later than 5 days after service of a notice setting the action for trial or pre-trial, and must be made before any contested proceeding in the action has been submitted for decision to the judge sought to be disqualified; provided where a new trial is granted either by the trial court or an appellate *700court such motion may be made by a party not later than 5 days after service of the notice setting the action for re-trial. The presiding judge or magistrate sought to be disqualified shall grant or deny the motion for disqualification upon notice and hearing in the manner prescribed by these rules for motions.”
.See note 10 on page 722.
. The affidavit set forth specific facts demonstrating that the judge was prejudiced because of his prior rulings made in connection with the trial and stated that the judge might be a material witness to the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.
.The stipulation reads: "Comes now, attorney for Petitioner, Joan Fisher and attorney for Respondent, Henry R. Boomer, do hereby stipulate and agree that if the Honorable George R. Reinhardt was to testify in this matter, he would say the following: One, that prior to attorney W.W. Longeteig’s appointment as counsel for Bryan Stuart Lankford in Case No. 20157, Judge George R. Reinhardt believed that W.W. Longeteig had either pled guilty, been arrested, or was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol on more than one occasion, and based upon that, Reinhardt felt that W.W. Longeteig had a problem with alcohol.
"Two, that on July 28, 1984, George Reinhardt received certain correspondence from Bryan Lankford which is attached hereto — which is not, because we were not putting it in writing, but it was a motion that was before the court, which the court ruled upon and appointed co-counsel. And with reference to the allegations concerning alcohol, and based upon paragraph one that said such allegations could be true and as a consequence thereof, appoint Joan Fisher to be Bryan Lankford’s co-counsel in Idaho, County in Case No. 20157."
. "19-2515. Inquiry Into mitigating or aggravating circumstances — Sentence in capital cases — Statutory aggravating circumstances— Judicial findings.— ...
"(g) The following are statutory aggravating circumstances, at least one (1) of which must be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt before a sentence of death can be imposed:
(1) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder.
(2) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another murder.
(3) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(4) The murder was committed for remuneration or the promise of remuneration or the defendant employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration.
(5) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity.
(6) By the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life.
(7) The murder was one defined as murder of the first degree by section 18-4003, Idaho Code, subsections (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f), and it was accompanied with the specific intent to cause the death of a human being.
(8) The defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society.
(9) The murder was committed against a former or present peace officer, executive officer, officer of the court, judicial officer or prosecuting attorney because of the exercise of official duty.
(10) The murder was committed against a witness or potential witness in a criminal or civil legal proceeding because of such proceeding."
. Those cases we have considered include: State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 736 P.2d 1327 (1987); State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163, 715 P.2d 833 (1985); State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 716 P.2d 1182 (1985); State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 716 P.2d 1152 (1985); State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 710 P.2d 1202 (1985); State v. Bean, 109 Idaho 616, 710 P.2d 526 (1985); State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 690 P.2d 293 (1984); State v. Bainbridge, 108 Idaho 273, 698 P.2d 335 (1985); State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho 117, 676 P.2d 31 (1983); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 54, 675 P.2d 33 (1983); State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396 (1983); State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983); State v. Major, 105 Idaho 4, 665 P.2d 703 (1983); State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 660 P.2d 1336 (1983), cert. den., 461 U.S. 934, 103 S.Ct. 2101, 77 L.Ed.2d 308 (1983); State v. Carter, 103 Idaho 917, 655 P.2d 434 (1982); State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 648 P.2d 203 (1982); State v. Stormoen, 103 Idaho 83, 645 P.2d 317 (1982); State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981); State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 610 P.2d 522 (1980); State v. Padilla, 101 Idaho 713, 620 P.2d 286 (1980); State v. Fuchs, 100 Idaho 341, 597 P.2d 227 (1979); State v. Needs, 99 Idaho 883, 591 P.2d 130 (1979); State v. Lindquist, 99 Idaho 766, 589 P.2d 101 (1979); State v. Bradley, 98 Idaho 918, 575 P.2d 1306 (1978); State v. Birrueta, 98 Idaho 631, 570 P.2d 868 (1977); State v. Allen, 98 Idaho 782, 572 P.2d 885 (1977); State v. Ward, 98 Idaho 571, 569 P.2d 916 (1977); State v. Gerdau, 96 Idaho 516, 531 P.2d 1161 (1975); State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833, 537 P.2d 1369 (1975) cert. den., 423 U.S. 1089, 96 S.Ct. 881, 47 L.Ed.2d 99; State v. Hokenson, 96 Idaho 283, 527 P.2d 487 (1974); State v. Hatton, 95 Idaho 856, 522 P.2d 64 (1974); State v. Standlee, 96 Idaho 165, 525 P.2d 360 (1974); State v. Foley, 95 Idaho 222, 506 P.2d 119 (1973); State v. Beason, 95 Idaho 267, 506 P.2d 1340 (1973); State v. Atwood, 95 Idaho 124, 504 P.2d 397 (1972); State v. Sanchez, 94 Idaho 125, 483 P.2d 173 (1971); State v. Gomez, 94 Idaho 323, 487 P.2d 686 (1971); State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 P.2d 553 (1970), cert. den., 401 U.S. 942, 91 S.Ct. 947, 28 L.Ed.2d 223 (1971); State v. Radabaugh, 93 Idaho 727, 471 P.2d 582 (1970); State v. Rodriguez, 93 Idaho 286, 460 P.2d 711 (1969); State v. Jiminez, 93 Idaho 140, 456 P.2d 784 (1969); King v. State, 93 Idaho 87, 456 P.2d 254 (1969); State v. Gonzalez, 92 Idaho 152, 438 P.2d 897 (1968); State v. Chaffin, 92 Idaho 629, 448 P.2d 243 (1968); Carey v. State, 91 Idaho 706, 429 P.2d 836 (1967); State v. Koho, 91 Idaho 450, 423 P.2d 1004 (1967); State v. Anstine, 91 Idaho 169, 418 P.2d 210 (1966); State v. Gish, 87 Idaho 341, 393 P.2d 342 (1964); State v. Clokey, 83 Idaho 322, 364 P.2d 159 (1961); State v. Burris, 80 Idaho 395, 331 P.2d 265 (1958); State v. Snowden, 79 Idaho 266, 313 P.2d 706 (1957); State v. Buchanan, 73 Idaho 365, 252 P.2d 524 (1953); State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203 (1953) (considered only in terms of crime committed and penalty imposed; overruled on substantive law point in State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 486 P.2d 82 (1971)); State v. Pettit, 104 Idaho 601, 661 P.2d 767 (Ct.App.1983); State v. Fenley, 103 Idaho 199, 646 P.2d 441 (Ct.App.1982).
. "Rule 25. Disqualification of judge.— ...
"(b) Disqualification for cause. Any party to an action may disqualify a judge or magistrate from presiding in any action upon any of the following grounds:
"(1) That he is a party, or is interested, in the action or proceeding.
"(2) That he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree, computed according to the rules of law.
"(3) That he has been attorney or counsel for any party in the action or proceeding.
"(4) That he is biased or prejudiced for or against any party or his case in the action.