DISSENT
PAGE, Justice(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I do so because, notwithstanding Spence’s despicable act of violence against A.S., we should be slow to divest an owner of real property of the right to possess that property. A person who “enters a building without consent” may be convicted of burglary. Minn.Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1 (2008). A person “[e]n-ters a building without consent” when they “enter a building without the consent of the person in lawful possession.” Minn. Stat. § 609.581, subd. 4(a) (2008). As the State has the burden to prove elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the State must demonstrate that Spence did not have “lawful possession.” See State v. Cannady, 727 N.W.2d 403, 408 (Minn.2007).
“Lawful possession” includes not only actual possession but also the right to possess. At common law, tenants in common enjoy unity of possession; possession by one tenant in cominon “is regarded as possession by all the cotenants, not as a disseisin.” Adams v. Johnson, 271 Minn. 439, 442, 136 N.W.2d 78, 81 (1965). According to A Dictionary of Modem Legal Usage, “ownership is a legal status: the aggregate of rights that give a person the fullest power to enjoy, destroy, or dispose of a thing; one of these rights is to possess the thing.” 673 (2d ed. 1995). “[E]ach cotenant has at all times the right to enter upon and enjoy every part of the common estate.” Petraborg v. Zontelli, 217 Minn. 536, 540, 15 N.W.2d 174, 177 (1944). Thus, each co-tenant has a right to possess the common property unless one cotenant has been divested of that right voluntarily, by way of contract or other agreement, or involuntarily, by way of a court order. See Schmidt v. Constans, 82 Minn. 347, 352, 85 N.W. 173, 174-75 (1901) (stating that co-tenants can contract with one another in all matters, including tenancy); State v. Evenson, 554 N.W.2d 409, 412 (Minn.App.1996) (an order for protection divests a cotenant of his or her “right to possess”), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29,1996).
The court holds that an agreement to divest oneself of the right to possess a jointly-owned building can be implied from the mere fact that one cotenant allows another cotenant to be the sole occupant of the jointly-owned building. That holding, however, is contrary to established law, which provides that possession by one co-tenant is regarded as possession by all cotenants and that all cotenants have the right to enter the property at all times. See Adams, 271 Minn. at 442, 136 N.W.2d at 81; Petraborg 217 Minn. at 540, 15 *112N.W.2d at 177. Thus, while I agree with the court that cotenants may voluntarily divest themselves of their right to possess a building by an express or an implied agreement, on the record here, occupancy by itself is insufficient to support a finding that Spence voluntarily divested himself of the right to enter upon and enjoy every part of the house he owned with A.S.
The record in this case indicates that, while Spence did not occupy the building, he was nonetheless an owner of and therefore a cotenant in the property and had the legal right to possess, including the legal right to control and consent to entry into the building. Spence’s name was on the mortgage and he made mortgage payments. There is nothing in the record indicating that Spence had been divested, either voluntarily or involuntarily, of his right to possess the property. There was no contract or other agreement between Spence and A.S. divesting him of that right, nor was there a court order in place doing so. Spence, as an owner of and cotenant in the property, had the right to possess and enjoy the property to the full extent of his ownership interest. Because there was no express contract, facts that would support an implied agreement, or court order divesting Spence of that right, I conclude that Spence was a “person in lawful possession” at the time of his entry into the property. Therefore, his burglary conviction must be reversed.