Safeco Insurance Co. v. Barcom

Callow, C.J.

(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I agree with the majority's analysis with respect to the applicable statute of limitation period. Accordingly, I concur in Safeco Insurance Company v. Barcom.

However, in Bowers v. Safeco Insurance Company, the majority remands the case to the Court of Appeals "for consideration of . . . additional issues", to wit: "(2) whether [the] policy provides coverage in this instance; and (3) if the policy provides coverage, what are the policy limits." Majority, at 584, 578-79.1 disagree.

This court should dispose of these issues rather than remand them to the Court of Appeals. Remand means delay and expense to the parties, and imposes an additional step in the proceedings. We can adjudicate the issues more *585expeditiously and eliminate duplication of effort if we resolve these issues now.

The decedent's children seek to recover for the wrongful death of their mother under their father's insurance policy. The policy language provides:

We will pay damages which a covered person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by a covered person and caused by an accident.

(Italics mine). See also RCW 48.22.030. The children, but not the mother, were named insureds under the father's policy. The children have already recovered to the UIM limits on the mother's policy.

The children assert that they can recover under the father's policy for their mother's wrongful death because they are "covered persons” "legally entitled to recover" damages from the uninsured motorist under the wrongful death statute, relying on Grange Ins. Ass'n v. Hubbard, 35 Wn. App. 407, 667 P.2d 121, review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1023 (1983). In Hubbard, a mother sued to recover damages under the UIM portion of her liability insurance policy for loss of consortium under RCW 4.24.010 (the child-death statute) resulting from the death of her son. 35 Wn. App. at 411. The policy did not cover her son because he had been joyriding in a stolen car at the time he was killed. 35 Wn. App. at 409 & n.3. The parties stipulated that she could not recover for his injuries in a representative capacity under the wrongful death statute. 35 Wn. App. at 409. However, the court held that the mother's loss of consortium claim constituted an "independent action of her own" and therefore permitted her to recover under the policy. 35 Wn. App. at 413.

We recently decided Eurick v. Pemco Ins. Co., 108 Wn.2d 338, 738 P.2d 251 (1987). In Eurick, parents sued to recover damages under the UIM portion of their liability insurance policy for loss of consortium under RCW 4.24-.010. 108 Wn.2d at 341. The policy did not cover the son because he had been riding a motorcycle at the time he was *586killed. 108 Wn.2d at 340. The parties stipulated that the parents could not recover for his injuries in a representative capacity under the wrongful death statute. 108 Wn.2d at 340. We held that a reasonable person reading the motorcycle exclusion would conclude that it also applied to bar the parents' claim for loss of consortium. 108 Wn.2d at 338-39.

If Eurick has overruled Hubbard, then the policy clearly does not provide coverage for the children's wrongful death claim. The clear intent of the contract is to exclude from the set of risks that Safeco would insure against, and that respondents would pay premiums for, all claims arising from bodily injuries sustained by persons not covered by the insurance policy. Compare Eurick, 108 Wn.2d at 342. Because the mother was not covered by the insurance policy, the children's claim would be barred.

Even if Hubbard remains good law, it does not show that the decedent's children should recover in this case. At the time of the mother's death, Washington law did not permit recovery for loss of parental consortium. Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 600 P.2d 602 (1979). In 1984, 4 years after the accident, this court decided to permit such recovery, but explicitly made its holding prospective only. Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., 103 Wn.2d 131, 140-41, 691 P.2d 190 (1984). Unlike in Hubbard, then, the decedent's children cannot recover for loss of consortium.

Instead, the decedent's children must rely solely on their claim brought in a representative capacity under the wrongful death statute. The children's guardian brings a wrongful death claim as a representative of the deceased mother's estate. RCW 4.20.010. Because the mother was not a covered person under the father's policy, she could not maintain a claim against the insurance company. Neither can her representative in a wrongful death action. Compare Eurick, 108 Wn.2d at 341; Hubbard, 35 Wn. App. at 409.

*587I would hold that the insurance policy does not cover the decedent's children's claim, and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I dissent.