ON REHEARING
BAKES, Justice.Appellant Fowler has filed a petition for rehearing claiming that our earlier opinion erred when we stated:
*5There is no claim here, as there was in Woodvine, that the two compensation agreements executed by Fowler and approved by the Industrial Commission adjudicated merely impairment rather that permanent disability. Accordingly, as we held in Woodvine, those compensation agreements, when approved by the commission, became awards which are “final and conclusive as to claimant’s permanent disability.”
Ante at 4, 773 P.2d at 272 (emphasis in original). The brief in support of petition for rehearing urges that the issue of whether Fowler’s prior compensation agreements were “final and conclusive as to the question of disability was not before the Commission. The record will reflect that the parties stipulated that the only issue to be decided by the Commission in the hearing held on March 26, 1987, was whether Plaintiff’s claim for further compensation had been barred under Idaho Code [§] 72-706 and Idaho Code [§] 72-719.” The brief on rehearing then states, quoting the parties’ earlier stipulation, that “all other claims, issues, and defenses, [were] reserved for future determination following resolution of the issue herein stated and the parties waive no rights or defenses which are presently available to them.”
The two issues raised in the original appeal,1 and the foregoing claim in the brief in support of petition for rehearing reflect a misperception of how I.C. § 72-706(2) and I.C. § 72-719 apply. Whether the applicable statute of limitations is I.C. § 72-706, or I.C. § 72-719, and whether the payment of additional medical expenses constitutes the payment of additional “compensation” which, under 72-706(2) extends the statute of limitations, depends entirely upon whether the prior compensation agreements were final and conclusive regarding Fowler’s disability. If the agreements did indeed determine disability then, upon their approval by the Commission, they became awards under I.C. § 72-711 which were “final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated” therein. I.C. § 72-718; Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716, 682 P.2d 1263 (1984). Such final agreements and awards would only be modifiable under the provisions of I.C. § 72-719, which admittedly were not met in this case because the applications for additional compensation were not filed within five years of the date of the accident causing the injury. I.C. § 72-719.
If, on the other hand, the prior compensation agreements did not determine disability, but rather determined only impairment, then they were not final and conclusive awards as to disability under I.C. § 72-718, Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716, 682 P.2d 1263 (1984), and I.C. § 72-706 would be the applicable statute of limitations.
Only in the event that it is determined that the agreements did not determine disability, and therefore were not final awards as to disability under I.C. § 72-718, does the payment of additional medical expenses become relevant under I.C. § 72-706(2). In our original opinion we concluded from the record that “[t]here is no claim here, as there was in Woodvine, that the two compensation agreements executed by Fowler and approved by the Industrial Commission adjudicated merely impairment rather than permanent disability.” Ante at 4, 773 P.2d at 272 (emphasis in original). After rehearing this case we deem it at least arguable that one or perhaps both of the parties may have considered that the ambiguity issue had been reserved for later *6decision by the Commission pursuant to the stipulation entered into before the Commission. However, if the potential ambiguity of the two compensation agreements had been reserved and not presented to or resolved by the Industrial Commission, then the factual basis for determining the appropriate statute of limitations and the effect of the payment of medical bills would be absent.
To attempt to resolve this problem, a review of the two compensation agreements, executed by Fowler and approved by the Commission, is appropriate.
1. The 1973 compensation agreement, involving Fowler’s 1972 accident, is not a Woodvine type compensation agreement containing the ambiguous “and/or” language. Rather, the agreement clearly provides for an award of disability which was approved by the Industrial Commission. After approval by the Commission it became an “award” which, under I.C. §§ 72-711 and 72-718, is final and conclusive as to claimant’s disability caused by the 1972 industrial accident. I.C. § 72-719 is the applicable statute of limitations regarding modifications to the 1973 agreement. Since claimant’s application for modification was not filed within five years of the date of the accident causing the injury, as required by I.C. § 72-719, the 1973 compensation agreement cannot be reopened or modified regardless of whether the employer has paid additional “compensation,” be it income benefits or medical benefits. Under I.C. § 72-718 the 1973 agreement was “final and conclusive” as to that disability determination, and I.C. § 72-706 has no application to it. Accordingly, we reaffirm the Commission’s conclusion that Fowler’s application regarding the 1973 agreement is time-barred.
2. The 1976 compensation agreement, however, is a Woodvine type “and/or” agreement which, in the Wood-vine case, we held could be construed to be ambiguous. Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716, 682 P.2d 1263 (1984). While “[determination of whether a document is ambiguous is itself a question of law,” DeLancey v. DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63, 65, 714 P.2d 32, 34 (1986), “[interpretation of an ambiguous document presents a question of fact.” Id. Accord Woodvine. Thus, the interpretation of the 1976 compensation agreement was a question of fact which, if raised, should have been decided by the Commission. Since it is arguable that the ambiguity issue was reserved as a result of the stipulation of the parties, we remand the matter to the Commission to resolve the ambiguity question involved in the 1976 agreement.
Should the Commission find that the 1976 agreement did indeed determine disability, then when approved by the Commission it became an “award” which is “final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated therein,” I.C. §§ 72-711 and 72-718; Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716, 682 P.2d 1263 (1984), and, like the 1973 agreement, Fowler’s application regarding the 1976 agreement would be time-barred. I.C. § 72-719.
On the other hand, should the Commission find that the Commission-approved 1976 compensation agreement only determined impairment, then the award therein is not final as to disability because under I.C. § 72-718 such an award is only “conclusive as to all matters adjudicated by the Commission____” In that event, I.C. § 72-706 is the applicable statute of limitations. Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716, 682 P.2d 1263 (1984). In determining whether that statute of limitations has run, the Commission should review our decisions in the recent cases of Bainbridge v. Boise Cascade Plywood Mill, 111 Idaho 79, 721 P.2d 179 (1986) (compensation as used in I.C. § 72-706(2) includes both income and medical benefits); and Ryen v. City of Coeur d’ Alene, 115 Idaho 791, 770 P.2d 800 (1989).
The Commission’s decision that Fowler’s application regarding the 1973 compensation agreement is time-barred is affirmed. The Commission’s decision that Fowler’s application regarding the 1976 compensation agreement is time-barred is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
*7Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. No costs or attorney fees awarded on appeal.
SHEPARD, C.J., and BISTLINE, HUNTLEY and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.. Appellant’s original brief on appeal raised the following two issues:
I. Does payment of compensation more that five years following an industrial accident extend the period during which a Claimant can ask for a modification of award under § 72-719, Idaho Code, and for further compensation and award under § 72-706, Idaho Code?
II. Are payments of medical benefits payments of compensation within the meaning of 72-706, payment of which extends the period within which a Claimant can make and file with the Commission an application requesting a hearing for further compensation and award and for modification of award?