dissenting.
The majority correctly holds “that the language in OCGA § 16-11-34 (a) is not vague: it is clear and unambiguous.” Maj. op. p. 445. *449However, I cannot agree that the language is so overbroad that interpreting it narrowly so as to exclude constitutionally protected expression “would be less a matter of reasonable judicial construction than a matter of substantial legislative revision.” Maj. op. p. 448.
As Justice Thompson recognized in Howard v. State, 272 Ga. 242, 244 (1) (527 SE2d 194) (2000), “before considering whether [a] statute that affects protected speech is [unconstitutionally] overbroad, it must be determined if it can be narrowly construed by this Court.”
To withstand constitutional attack, a statute or ordinance which prohibits speech “must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected expression.” [Cit.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Howard v. State, supra at 243 (1).
Our judicial responsibility requires us to consider the legislature’s intent in enacting the law and to construe the statute to give effect to that intent when possible. This role means that we must give a narrowing construction to a statute when possible to save it from constitutional challenge. [Cits.]
Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587, 598 (IV) (544 SE2d 99) (2001). The legislative intent here is clear and legitimate. The purpose of OCGA § 16-11-34 (a) is to discourage deprivation of the constitutional right of the people to assemble peaceably together in meetings. See State v. Schwing, 328 NE2d 379, 384 (II) (Ohio 1975). As the majority recognizes, “ ‘the state retains a legitimate concern in ensuring that some individuals’ unruly assertion of their rights of free expression does not imperil other citizens’ rights of free association and discussion.’ [Cits.]” Dempsey v. People, 117 P3d 800, 805 (II) (A) (1) (Colo. 2005).
In the seminal case of In re Kay, 464 P2d 142, 150 (III) (Cal. 1970) (In Bank), the Supreme Court of California construed a statute which on its face applied to “every person who... willfully disturbs or breaks up any assembly or meeting,” in light of its purpose and the competing First Amendment interests, as authorizing “the imposition of criminal sanctions only when the defendant’s activity itself ■— and [n]ot the content of the activity’s expression — substantially impairs the effective conduct of a meeting.”
The court then identified a three-part test by which this standard should be measured: (1) the nature of the meeting *450involved; (2) whether the activity substantially impaired the conduct of the meeting; and (3) whether the defendants knew, or should have known, that their conduct violated an applicable custom, usage, or rule of the meeting. [Cit.]
State v. Hardin, 498 NW2d 677, 680 (Iowa 1993). See also Dempsey v. People, supra at 806 (II) (A) (2); 1 Smolla & Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 10:38, p. 10-72 (2004).
When OCGA § 16-11-34 (a) is tested by these requirements, it clearly does not contain any deficiency with respect to the first or third prongs. The statute does not require a specific intent to prevent or disrupt a lawful meeting. See Easley v. State, 266 Ga. App. 902, 905 (4) (598 SE2d 554) (2004) (aggravated assault statute). Under the third prong, however, such a specific intent, although contained in some similar statutes in other states, obviously is not constitutionally necessary. Thus, the majority’s reliance on State v. Ervin, 40 SW3d 508, 519 (I) (B) (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) is erroneous because the statute analyzed there required a specific intent and the court did not hold that such intent was necessary, but rather that it was constitutionally sufficient. The requirement in OCGA § 16-11-34 (a) that the defendant “recklessly or knowingly commit[ ] any act which may reasonably be expected to prevent or disrupt a lawful meeting, gathering, or procession” means at least that the defendant “should have known[ ] that [his] conduct violated an applicable custom, usage, or rule of the meeting.” State v. Hardin, supra. See also State v. Encalade, 505 S2d 87, 91-92 (La. App. 1987) (upholding constitutionality of a statute narrowly proscribing the disruption of a lawful assembly in “a manner that would foreseeably disturb or alarm the public”). Compare State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 674 (2) (398 SE2d 547) (1990) (narrowing construction as to intent was necessary and was accomplished even though statute did not contain any language of intent). Therefore, OCGA § 16-11-34 (a) explicitly meets the third prong of the Kay test. Furthermore, its language requiring a reasonable expectation of disruption necessarily contemplates a determination of the nature of the meeting and, thus, explicitly meets the first prong.
Moreover, the language which expressly requires the commission of an act shows that the statute is directed at conduct and not speech. OCGA § 16-11-34 (a), like another statute which prohibited disruptive activities on State property and was previously upheld by this Court,
clearly seeks to proscribe conduct, not free speech, and “.. . that conduct — even if expressive — falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state *451interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. . . [Cits.]Decided April 25, 2006. Richard W Shelton, Solicitor-General, for appellant.
State v. Boone, 243 Ga. 416, 419 (1) (254 SE2d 367) (1979).
As for the second prong of the Kay test, “with minimal variations, other courts have likewise adopted an actual disruption standard. [Cits.]”Dempsey v. People, supra. Thus, OCGA§ 16-11-34 (a) is overly broad in only one respect. It fails expressly to require that the act committed result in an actual, substantial prevention or disruption of a lawful meeting. What the statute prohibits is the reckless or knowing commission of an act which may reasonably be expected to disrupt a lawful meeting.
Some such [acts] can be constitutionally proscribed. Therefore, by simply narrowing the broad statutory provision in such a manner that it extends only to constitutionally unprotected activities, this court does not transform it into a prohibition of conduct not formerly prohibited by the statute. Instead, we merely remove from the statute any prohibition against constitutionally protected interruptions or disturbances.
State v. Schwing, supra at 386 (II). See also Morehead v. State, 807 SW2d 577, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Disturbances of lawful assemblages, with the requisite statutory intent, that are not constitutionally protected are those which either cause the termination of the assemblage in an untimely manner or substantially impair the conduct of the lawful meeting. State v. Schwing, supra. Construing OCGA § 16-11-34 (a) as prohibiting only those two types of disruptions, “the statutory provision was not unconstitutionally over-broad.” State v. Schwing, supra. “This construction achieves the apparent legislative purpose while preserving the statutory language and the delicate balance between competing freedoms.” Morehead v. State, supra.
Because the majority has needlessly cast OCGA § 16-11-34 (a) aside based on a faulty analysis, and failed to fulfill this Court’s responsibility to effectuate the legislative intent and, if possible, to save the statute from constitutional challenge by means of a narrowing construction, I dissent to the judgment of affirmance.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hines joins in this dissent. *452Langdale & Vallotton, Robert A. Plumb, Jr., for appellees. Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Vonnetta L. Benjamin, Assistant Attorney General, amici curiae.